Combined Arms Warfare In The Twentieth Century

The original version of this text was published in 1984 as a textbook on military history for officers in the U.S. Army. The revised version includes an appendix of terms and acronyms, and concepts are explained in nontechnical terms, making it more comprehensible to the general reader. Also incorporated is a description of combined arms warfare from the late-1970s to the end of the 20th century, which takes into account developments that were not obvious in 1984. The main topics are how the major armies of the world fight on the battlefield; what concepts, weapons, and organizations have developed for this purpose; and how the different armies have influenced each other in these developments. House is a former military officer and analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. c. Book News Inc.

This book investigates the modem changes in organization, concepts and doctrine in view of the recent discussion concerning revolution in military affairs. The concept presented is one that proposes that the changes are evolutionary in nature when compared against certain criteria requisite for true revolutions in military affairs. The characteristics required for a true revolution in military affairs are explained and a historical comparison of the evolution of the United States World War II armored division is used to expound on these characteristics. This book emphasizes the importance of the impact of revolutions in military affairs and their impact on the military as an organization. This work compares the changes now occurring with the established criteria to demonstrate the evolutionary nature of these changes.

Combined arms warfare (CAW) -- the integration of different arms on the battlefield (e.g., armor, infantry, artillery, aircraft, and engineers) in order to achieve maximal efficiency there -- is as old as war itself. Every army across both time and space that has engaged in combat has practiced one version or another of CAW, whether consciously or otherwise. The Israel Defenxse Forces (IDF) has been no exception to the rule. This book traces the Israeli experience with CAW from the countrys War of Independence in 194749 (against a coalition of Arab states) through Operation Protective Edge in 2014 (against a coalition of Hamas-led terrorist/insurgent groups). It describes and analyzes the IDFs practice of CAW in each interstate war (IW), asymmetrical war (AW), and low-intensity conflict (LIC) that Israel has fought since the countrys establishment in the mid-twentieth century. The book also highlights the Israeli approach to CAW in respect of special operations (SPEC OPS). With no end in sight to the ArabIsraeli conflict, and with further hostilities between Israel and its neighbors virtually assured in the future, Combined Arms Warfare in Israeli Military History constitutes an essential addition to the literature about Middle Eastern warfare. This book is aimed primarily at the academic and research community, but it is fully accessible to anyone with an interest in Israeli military history.

This study investigates the modem changes in organization, concepts and doctrine in view of the recent discussion concerning revolution in military affairs. The concept presented is one that proposes that the changes are evolutionary in nature when compared against certain criteria requisite for true revolutions in military affairs. The characteristics required for a true revolution in military affairs are explained and a historical comparison of the evolution of the United States World War II armored division is used to expound on these characteristics. This study emphasizes the importance of the impact of revolutions in military affairs and their impact on the military as an organization. The study compares the changes now occurring with the established criteria to demonstrate the evolutionary nature of these changes.

Fairly or unfairly, the stalemate on the First World War’s Western Front is often attributed to the intellectual stagnation of the era’s military officers. This paper traces the development (or absence of development) of combined arms and fire & maneuver tactics and doctrine in the period prior to WW I, focusing on the Russo-Japanese War. The Western armies that entered the Great War seemingly ignored many of the hard-learned lessons and observations of pre-war conflicts. Though World War I armies were later credited with developing revolutionary wartime tactical-level advances, many scholars claim that this phase of tactical evolution followed an earlier period of intellectual stagnation that resulted in the stalemate on the war’s Western Front. This stalemate, they claim, could have been avoided by heeding the admonitions of pre-war conflicts and incorporating the burgeoning effects of technology into military tactics and doctrine. Some go even further and fault the military leadership with incompetence and foolishness for not adapting to the requirements of modern war. The Russo-Japanese War showed the necessity for combined arms techniques and fire and maneuver tactics on the modern battlefield. Specifically, the war showed the need for: (1) the adoption of dispersed, irregular formations; (2) the employment of fire and maneuver techniques and small unit-tactics, including base of fire techniques; (3) the transition to indirect-fire artillery support to ensure the survivability of the batteries, and; (4) the necessity for combined arms tactics to increase the survivability of assaulting infantry and compensate for the dispersion of infantry firepower.