Competition And Conditions In The Financial System

This paper develops a model where large financial intermediaries subject to systemic runs internalize the effect of their leverage on aggregate risk, returns and asset prices. Near the steady-state, they restrict leverage to avoid the risk of a run which gives rise to an accelerator effect. For large adverse shocks, the system enters a zone with high leverage and possibly runs. The length of time the system remains in this zone depends on the degree of concentration through a franchise value, price-drop and recapitalization channels. The speed of entry of new banks after a collapse has a stabilizing effect.

The 2008 credit crisis started with the failure of one large bank: Lehman Brothers. Since then the focus of both politicians and regulators has been on stabilising the economy and preventing future financial instability. At this juncture, we are at the last stage of future-proofing the financial sector by raising capital requirements and tightening financial regulation. Now the policy agenda needs to concentrate on transforming the banking sector into an engine for growth. Reviving competition in the banking sector after the state interventions of the past years is a key step in this process. This book introduces and explains a relatively new concept in competition measurement: the performance-conduct-structure (PCS) indicator. The key idea behind this measure is that a firm’s efficiency is more highly rewarded in terms of market share and profit, the stronger competitive pressure is. The book begins by explaining the financial market’s fundamental obstacles to competition presenting a brief survey of the complex relationship between financial stability and competition. The theoretical contributions of Hay and Liu and Boone provide the theoretical underpinning for the PCS indicator, while its application to banking and insurance illustrates its empirical qualities. Finally, this book presents a systematic comparison between the results of this approach and (all) existing methods as applied to 46 countries, over the same sample period. This book presents a comprehensive overview of the knowns and unknowns of financial sector competition for commercial and central bankers, policy-makers, supervisors and academics alike.

Why do different countries have such different financial systems? Is one system better than the other? This text argues that the view that market-based systems are best is simplistic, and suggests that a more nuanced approach is necessary.

"The relationships among competition in the financial sector, access of firms to external financing, and associated economic growth are ambiguous in theory. Moreover, measuring competition in the financial sector can be complex. In this paper Claessens and Laeven first estimate for 16 countries a measure of banking system competition based on industrial organization theory. They then relate this competition measure to growth of industries and find that greater competition in countries' banking systems allows financially dependent industries to grow faster. These results are robust under a variety of tests. The results suggest that the degree of competition is an important aspect of financial sector funding. This paper--a product of the Financial Sector Operations and Policy Department--is part of a larger effort in the department to study competition in banking"--World Bank web site.

For academics, regulators and policymaker alike, it is crucial to measure financial sector competition by means of reliable, well-established methods. However, this is easier said than done. The goal of this Handbook is to provide a collection of state-of-the-art chapters to address this issue. The book consists of four parts, the first of which discusses the characteristics of various measures of financial sector competition. The second part includes several empirical studies on the level of, and trends in, competition across countries. The third part deals with the spillovers of market power to other sectors and the economy as a whole. Finally, the fourth part considers competition in banking submarkets and subsectors.

As countries large and small, rich and poor are drawn inexorably into the global economy, protectionist policies are proving increasingly inefficient and ineffective for driving growth. The countries of Latin America, which have long pursued agendas of state ownership and heavy regulation of key industries, began to institute a series of reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, designed to promote competition and business creation. However, without the legal and institutional framework to support these policies (and thus guarantee resource-efficient behavior on the part of business owners), the record has been spotty at best. Competition Policies in Emerging Economies features in-depth analysis of two key industries—telecommunications and banking—in several Central American nations to shed light on the dynamics of the transition to deregulation and trade liberalization, and learn from the experiences of these economies. This book has a three-fold purpose: (1) to examine the competition conditions and policies of small developing countries of Central America (and hence cover an area where very little information exists); (2) develop an in-depth analysis of regulation and competition policies in two key industrial sectors with poor competition records (telecommunications and banking); (3) link the former results analysis with other international experiences, in order to derive research and policy recommendations that can be applied to other small, developing, and emerging economies. Featuring discussion of political, legal, economic, financial, cultural, and organization-level issues, the book provides unique perspectives on the forces resisting competitive practices and offers suggestions for overcoming them.