Competition In Energy Markets

Recent years have seen a major growth in the European law concerning the operation of the energy industry, especially with respect to electricity and gas. Several directives have been adopted that are aimed at the promotion of competition in this key sector of the European economy. At thesame time, the jurisprudence of the European Court had developed further on matters such as access to networks, import and export monopolies and security of supply.In this book the authors examine the principal legislation, Treaty provisions and decisions of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance of the EU as they related to the promotion of competition in European energy markets. In particular, two chapters are devoted to a detailed analysis of theprovisions of the two directives that set out common rules for the creation of an internal market in the electricity and gas sectors. In each case, the analysis is set in the context of the various programmes of energy market liberalization and privatization in the Member States, which aresummarized in this book. However, the authors also take the wider pan-European context into account, explaining the requirements and the implications of the European Economic Area Agreement, the Energy Charter Treaty and the Europe Agreements with countries of Central and Eastern Europe.The approach adopted by the authors is both analytical and historical. They locate the legislation in the context of the EU Internal Market programme that began in the late 1980s and explain the roles played by the various parties (energy industries, consumers and EU institutions) in shaping thefinal legislation. Importantly, they explain how the framework character of the energy directives has led to further important rule-making in the implementation of the directives across the EU. They conclude that a co-ordinated response between the European Commission and the national regulatorswill be essential to resolve problems arising in the transition to a competitive energy market in the EU.

This book analyses the development of choice and competition in the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI). Drawing on a review of the international experience, it describes the main approaches that are being developed, discusses the key issues in the effective reform of electricity markets and provides an assessment of the emerging approach to reform. The book is written from the perspective of regulators and policy makers. It seeks to answer the question: what is an effective regulatory framework for competition in electricity markets?

After 2 decades, policymakers and regulators agree that electricity market reform, liberalization and privatization remains partly art. Moreover, the international experience suggests that in nearly all cases, initial market reform leads to unintended consequences or introduces new risks, which must be addressed in subsequent “reform of the reforms. Competitive Electricity Markets describes the evolution of the market reform process including a number of challenging issues such as infrastructure investment, resource adequacy, capacity and demand participation, market power, distributed generation, renewable energy and global climate change. Sequel to Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective in the same series published in 2006 Contributions from renowned scholars and practitioners on significant electricity market design and implementation issues Covers timely topics on the evolution of electricity market liberalization worldwide

Explains the economics of electricity at each step of the supply chain: production, transportation and distribution, and retail.

Featuring an original introduction by the editors, these carefully-selected essays explore the main issues surrounding competition and regulation in electricity markets. The industry is experiencing irresistible forces of change, driven by energy policy objectives; a reassessment of market regulation in the face of high-energy prices; and the response to consumer pressure to agree on what constitutes a fair price for energy. This volume identifies the key articles that underpin the debate across the industries supply chain (generation, supply and networks) from a regulatory perspective (including market power and incentive regulation). The collection then considers the overall impact of liberalisation and future developments.

Making Energy Markets charts the emergence and early evolution of electricity markets in western Europe, covering the decade from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. Liberalising electricity marked a radical deviation from the established paradigm of state-controlled electricity systems which had become established across Europe after the Second World War. By studying early liberalisation processes in Britain and the Nordic region, and analysing the role of the EEC, the book shows that the creation of electricity markets involved political decisions about the feasibility and desirability of introducing competition into electricity supply industries. Competition introduced risks, so in designing the process politicians needed to evaluate who the likely winners and losers might be and the degree to which competition would impact key national industries reliant on cross-subsidies from the electricity sector, in particular coal mining, nuclear power and energy intensive production. The book discusses how an understanding of the origins of electricity markets and their political character can inform contemporary debates about renewables and low carbon energy transitions.

This book fills a gap in the existing literature by dealing with several issues linked to long-term contracts and the efficiency of electricity markets. These include the impact of long-term contracts and vertical integration on effective competition, generation investment in risky markets, and the challenges for competition policy principles. On the one hand, long-term contracts may contribute to lasting generation capability by allowing for a more efficient allocation of risk. On the other hand, they can create conditions for imperfect competition and thus impair short-term efficiency. The contributors – prominent academics and policy experts with inter-disciplinary perspectives – develop fresh theoretical and practical insights on this important concern for current electricity markets. This highly accessible book will strongly appeal to both academic and professional audiences including scholars of industrial, organizational and public sector economics, and competition and antitrust law. It will also be of value to regulatory and antitrust authorities, governmental policymakers, and consultants in electricity law and economics.

This addition to the ISOR series introduces complementarity models in a straightforward and approachable manner and uses them to carry out an in-depth analysis of energy markets, including formulation issues and solution techniques. In a nutshell, complementarity models generalize: a. optimization problems via their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions b. on-cooperative games in which each player may be solving a separate but related optimization problem with potentially overall system constraints (e.g., market-clearing conditions) c. conomic and engineering problems that aren’t specifically derived from optimization problems (e.g., spatial price equilibria) d. roblems in which both primal and dual variables (prices) appear in the original formulation (e.g., The National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) or its precursor, PIES). As such, complementarity models are a very general and flexible modeling format. A natural question is why concentrate on energy markets for this complementarity approach? s it turns out, energy or other markets that have game theoretic aspects are best modeled by complementarity problems. The reason is that the traditional perfect competition approach no longer applies due to deregulation and restructuring of these markets and thus the corresponding optimization problems may no longer hold. Also, in some instances it is important in the original model formulation to involve both primal variables (e.g., production) as well as dual variables (e.g., market prices) for public and private sector energy planning. Traditional optimization problems can not directly handle this mixing of primal and dual variables but complementarity models can and this makes them all that more effective for decision-makers.