Compound Warfare That Fatal Knot

In the long history of warfare, a recurring theme is the combined use of regular and irregular forces to pursue victory. The practice of employing regular and irregular forces together was not only applied, but also instrumental in bringing victory to the side that at the beginning of the conflict seemed clearly inferior to its opponent. The term “compound warfare” is used to describe this phenomenon of regular and irregular forces fighting in concert. This book is a compilation of examples of this pattern of warfare in many other times and places. Knowing how the dynamics of compound warfare have affected the outcome of past conflicts will better prepare us to meet both present crises and future challenges of a similar nature.

Compound warfare (CW) is the simultaneous use of a regular or main force and an irregular or guerrilla force against an enemy. In other words, the CW operator increases his military leverage by applying both conventional and unconventional force at the same time. This collection contains studies of conflicts that occurred in three different centuries and in many different social, political, economic, and military environments. While the cases examined are dissimilar in numerous ways, they are linked by the presence within them of some variant of compound warfare. Dr. Michael D. Pearlman's essay on 18th century Indian wars describes an environment in which a wide variety of military operators were interacting. Pearlman concludes that French and British adversaries both employed elements of compound warfare. Dr. Jerry D. Morelock's study evaluates George Washington's achievement as a main force commander in a compound warfare environment. Dr. Thomas M. Huber's analysis of Napoleon's long campaign in Spain illuminates the ingenious methods of the phenomenon practiced by the Duke of Wellington. Dr. Jerold E. Brown's treatment of Indian warfare on the Great Plains explores lost opportunities of the U.S. Army to employ compound warfare methods. Dr. John T. Broom's article on the Anglo-Irish conflict (1919) analyzes the multiple pressures the Irish independence movement sought to apply to the British. Dr. Gary J. Bjorge's analysis of the Huai Hai campaign shows how Mao Zedong, one of the modern masters of compound warfare, brought its tenets to bear against Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese civil war. Randall N. Briggs' view of the American experience in Vietnam sheds light on the complex problems the United States faced in the compound warfare environment there and how America tried to resolve those problems. Dr. Robert F. Baumann's essay on the Soviet war in Afghanistan surveys Afghan tribesmen using compound warfare methods effectively against the Soviet Union.

This thesis will analyze Major General George Crook’s performance during the Sioux War of 1876-77 and attempt to answer whether or not Crook successfully fought the Native Americans by effectively implementing the concept of counterinsurgency compound warfare. Counterinsurgency Compound Warfare is the simultaneous use of a regular or conventional force and an irregular, indigenous force in unison against a common enemy. A highly skilled conventional force fighting an insurgency will often face significant cultural, ethnic, linguistic and physical challenges. An irregular, indigenous force can meet many of these challenges by working in concert with the conventional force. Major General George Crook sought to utilize Indian allies outside their traditional roles as scouts and utilized his forces in mutually supporting roles within each force’s means and capabilities. The efficacy of an indigenous, irregular force is not only military in nature but, when used appropriately and honestly, this force serves as a vehicle of influence with native populations. The mutually supporting nature of this relationship enhances the strengths of both forces while limiting their inherent weaknesses. This thesis will attempt to explain how Crook was successful when he faced ethnic divisions, interagency rivalry and political hindrances while displaying adaptability as a leader and the ability to continue to learn while fighting a difficult counterinsurgency war.

Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents is a series that provides primary source documents and expert commentary on various topics relating to the worldwide effort to combat terrorism, as well as efforts by the United States and other nations to protect their national security interests. Volume 141, Hybrid Warfare and the Gray Zone Threat, considers the mutation of the international security environment brought on by decades of unrivaled U.S. conventional military power. The term "hybrid warfare" encompasses conventional warfare, irregular warfare, cyberwarfare, insurgency, criminality, economic blackmail, ethnic warfare, "lawfare", and the application of low-cost but effective technologies to thwart high-cost technologically advanced forces. This volume is divided into five sections covering different aspects of this topic, each of which is introduced by expert commentary written by series editor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. This volume contains thirteen useful documents exploring various facets of the shifting international security environment, including a detailed report on hybrid warfare issued by the Joint Special Operations University and a White Paper on special operations forces support to political warfare prepared by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, as well as a GAO report and a CRS report covering similar topics. Specific coverage is also given to topics such as cybersecurity and cyberwarfare, the efficacy of sanctions in avoiding and deterring hybrid warfare threats, and the intersection of the military and domestic U.S. law enforcement.

One of the most significant areas of guerrilla warfare during the American Civil War occurred along the Missouri-Kansas border. Many of these guerrilla forces had been active during the Bleeding Kansas period and continued their activities into the Civil War supporting the Confederacy. The guerrillas attacked Federal forces and disrupted their lines of communications, raided settlements in Kansas, and attempted to support Confederate conventional forces operating in the area. In 1864, Major General Sterling Price led a raid into Missouri in a final attempt to bring the state into the Confederacy. This thesis explores the nature of guerrilla warfare in the Missouri-Kansas border area and explains how Price and the guerrillas failed to employ the elements of Compound Warfare to bring Missouri into the Confederacy.

Terrorism: Commentary on Security Documents is a series that provides primary source documents and expert commentary on various topics relating to the worldwide effort to combat terrorism, as well as efforts by the United States and other nations to protect their national security interests. Volume 141, Hybrid Warfare and the Gray Zone Threat, considers the mutation of the international security environment brought on by decades of unrivaled U.S. conventional military power. The term "hybrid warfare" encompasses conventional warfare, irregular warfare, cyberwarfare, insurgency, criminality, economic blackmail, ethnic warfare, "lawfare", and the application of low-cost but effective technologies to thwart high-cost technologically advanced forces. This volume is divided into five sections covering different aspects of this topic, each of which is introduced by expert commentary written by series editor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. This volume contains thirteen useful documents exploring various facets of the shifting international security environment, including a detailed report on hybrid warfare issued by the Joint Special Operations University and a White Paper on special operations forces support to political warfare prepared by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, as well as a GAO report and a CRS report covering similar topics. Specific coverage is also given to topics such as cybersecurity and cyberwarfare, the efficacy of sanctions in avoiding and deterring hybrid warfare threats, and the intersection of the military and domestic U.S. law enforcement.

This carefully researched book provides an operational level analysis of European warfare from 1792 to 1815 that includes the tactics, operations, and strategy of major conflicts of the time. 2015 marks the 200th anniversary of the famous Waterloo campaign, sparking a renewed interest in Napoleon's prowess as a military leader and acumen as a strategist. This in-depth analysis scrutinizes the complex campaigns and strategies of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, looking at how military genius—referred to in the book as "operational art"—shaded the panorama of 18th-century warfare. Drawing upon familiar battles as well as lesser-known campaigns, this sweeping reference uses 20th-century military theory to explain 19th-century events. Author John T. Kuehn discusses joint warfare and strategy found in the military movements of Marshal Suvorov in Italy and Switzerland in 1799; the early and later campaigns of Napoleon and Nelson; and the Duke of Wellington's campaigns in Spain, Portugal, and Belgium. The work also includes an entire chapter on theory and history of operational art spanning a variety of perspectives—from theorist Carl von Clausewitz to American air force pilot John Boyd. This book is a must-have for any military history collection.

This book provides a novel analysis of the military campaign of Rafael Carrera during the popular insurrection of 1837-1840 in Guatemala. Over the course of three years Carrera, a semi-literate farmer, and his army of peasants established Conservative control over Guatemala and accelerated the disintegration of the Central American Federation. Although Carrera’s rise has been analyzed from a political and socio-economic perspective, the present work shows that Carrera’s vertiginous success is the product of a peculiar and misunderstood approach to warfare that combines guerrilla recruiting practices and rural insurgency logistics with conventional combat tactics and operations. Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo argues that Carrera’s hybrid warfare was made possible because of the conditions created by the militarization of Latin American society following the administrative reforms of the Bourbon monarchy in the late eighteenth century. The concept of hybrid warfare is offered as an alternative model to understand the success of other insurgencies.