Compromise Peace And Public Justification

This book explores the morality of compromising. The author argues that peace and public justification are values that provide moral reasons to make compromises in politics, including compromises that establish unjust laws or institutions. He explains how it is possible to have moral reasons to agree to moral compromises and he debates our moral duties and obligations in making such compromises. The book also contains discussions of the sources of the value of public justification, the relation between peace and justice, the nature of modus vivendi arrangements and the connections between compromise, liberal institutions and legitimacy. In exploring the morality of compromising, the book thus provides some outlines for a map of political morality beyond justice.

When we compromise on justice, we accept or acquiesce to an arrangement that we judge to be unjust, or at least not fully just. Such arrangements are often described as constituting a ‘modus vivendi’. What reasons could we have to accept a modus vivendi, thereby compromising on justice? Given the fact of disagreement on justice, this is an important, but rather neglected question in political philosophy. One possible answer, inspired by John Rawls, is that compromising on justice is only justified if this nonetheless brings us as close to ideal justice as possible under given circumstances. The most straightforward way to take issue with this answer is to present other reasons to compromise on justice. The articles in this book explore epistemic reasons and those that stem from values besides justice, like democracy, peace, toleration and non-subjugation. This book thereby sheds some light on the relevance of compromising for the legitimacy of institutional arrangements. This book was previously published as a special issue of the Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy.

Distributive justice is one of the most discussed topics in political philosophy. Focusing on the plurality of irreconcilable conceptions of social and political justice, this book presents an array of new perspectives on the topic. Bringing together 30 original essays of well-established and young international scholars, the volume is essential reading for anyone interested in social and political justice.

Until recently, discussions of compromise have been largely absent in political theory. However, political theorists have become increasingly interested in understanding the practice and justification of compromise in politics. This interest is connected to the increased concern with pluralism and disagreement. Compromise and Disagreement in Contemporary Political Theory provides a critical discussion of when and to what extent compromise is the best response to pluralism and disagreement in democratic decision-making and beyond. Christian F. Rostbøll and Theresa Scavenius draw together the work of ten established and emerging scholars to provide different perspectives on compromise. Organized into four parts, the book begins by discussing the justification and limits of compromise. Part 2 discusses the practice of compromise and considers the ethics required for compromise as well as the institutions that facilitate compromise. Part 3 focuses on pluralism and connects the topic of compromise to current discussions in political theory on public reason, political liberalism, and respect for diversity. Part 4 discusses different challenges to compromise in the context of the current political environment. The book will be of interest to a wide range of scholars in the social sciences, philosophy, and law. It will be useful in introducing scholars to a variety of approaches to compromise and as readings for graduate courses in political theory and political philosophy, ethics, the history of ideas, and the philosophy of law.

This book provides an interdisciplinary examination of the relationship between compromise and democracy. Compromises have played a significant role in our representative democracies and yet the nature of the relationship between compromise and democracy has generally raised tricky theoretical questions and generated ambiguous evaluations. This book focuses on the relationship between compromise and liberal democracies from both a cultural and institutional perspective and addresses new and lesser-explored aspects of the relationship. It explores a variety of topics including: compromise and in-commensurable values, antagonist paradigms, compromise and majority decisions, compromise and publicity, compromise and post-conflict societies, compromise and anti-system political parties, and compromise and the understanding of political representation. Compromises in Democracy offers an original perspective on the topic by assembling contributions from the fields of philosophy, sociology, political theory, political science and history of ideas.

Is pluralism inherent to the human condition? Does it have its origins in the diversity of cultures? Are disagreements among individuals the same as disagreements among societies? Focusing on these critical questions essential to the understanding of modern societies, this book traces the origins of pluralism in contemporary political thought and presents new, original interpretations of the idea by contemporary philosophers. The chapters in the volume bring clarity into an ongoing fractious debate and reveal the underlying roots and fissures in our understanding of a dynamic and contested idea. Drawing on the works of John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and other major political philosophers, they delve into the different strands of the concept, their possible real-world political outcomes, and popular misconceptions. A key text, this volume will be essential reading for scholars and researchers of politics, political theory and philosophy, and social theory.

Commentators often interpret the resentment of supporters of populism as blindly emotional and unconnected to facts and principles. Democratic Respect argues instead that we should approach the populist politics of resentment as a struggle for recognition based on moral experiences that are intimately connected to people's factual and moral beliefs. By associating populist resentment with alleged violations of democratic principles, we can discuss what citizens and governments owe one another in terms of recognition and respect. Populism advances a unique interpretation of democracy and recognition, which Rostbøll confronts with the notion of democratic respect. How democracy should recognize the people is shown to be connected to debates over the meaning and value of democratic procedures, rights, majority rule, compromise, and public deliberation. The book builds a bridge between empirical research and philosophical analysis, while providing insights relevant to a public grappling with the challenges many democracies face today.

This is the fifth volume of Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Since its revival in the 1970s political philosophy has been a vibrant field in philosophy, one that intersects with jurisprudence, normative economics, political theory in political science departments, and just war theory. OSPP aims to publish some of the best contemporary work in political philosophy and these closely related subfields. This volume features seven papers that address a range of central topics and represent cutting edge work in the field. They are divided into two parts that explore issues relating to power and legitimacy, and to political, legal, and moral relations.