Confederate Cavalry At Chickamauga What Went Wrong

This study investigates General Braxton Bragg’s use of cavalry during the pivotal Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. As army commander, Bragg was responsible for organizing units, selecting commanders, and assigning missions. His decisions had significant impact upon the tactical and operational fortunes of the Army of Tennessee and on Confederate strategy. First, this investigation defines the unique heritage of American cavalry. Second, it addresses the actual employment of cavalry in the United States of America. Did these roles coincide with those of European cavalry? Did available army and cavalry leadership play a crucial part in the successes and failures of Confederate plans? Do the careers of Generals Bragg, Wheeler, and Forrest offer clues to their efforts at Chickamauga? Also, how did the elements of national power (political, military, economic, geographic, and national will), contribute to Confederate cavalry performance? This study concludes that blame is to be shared between the commanders involved and the system within which they fought. This study presents an in depth view of the performance of Confederate cavalry in this “victory” at the “River of Death”.

An award–winning, “deeply researched and thoroughly analyzed” account of the Confederate cavalry’s mistakes that turned Chickamauga into a Pyrrhic victory (Eric J. Wittenberg, award-winning author of The Battle of Brandy Station). Tales of the Confederate cavalry’s raids and daring exploits create a whiff of lingering romance about the horse soldiers of the Lost Cause. Sometimes, however, romance obscures history. In August 1863 William Rosecrans’ Union Army of the Cumberland embarked on a campaign of maneuver to turn Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee out of Chattanooga, one of the most important industrial and logistical centers of the Confederacy. Despite the presence of two Southern cavalry corps—nearly 14,000 horsemen—under legendary commanders Nathan Bedford Forrest and Joe Wheeler, Union troops crossed the Tennessee River unopposed and unseen, slipped through the passes cutting across the knife-ridged mountains, moved into the narrow valleys, and turned Bragg’s left flank. Threatened with the loss of the railroad that fed his army, Bragg had no choice but to retreat. He lost Chattanooga without a fight. After two more weeks of maneuvering, skirmishing, and botched attacks, Bragg struck back at Chickamauga, where he was once again surprised by the position of the Union army and the manner in which the fighting unfolded. Although the combat ended with a stunning Southern victory, Federal counterblows that November reversed all that had been so dearly purchased. David A. Powell’s Failure in the Saddle is the first in-depth attempt to determine what role the Confederate cavalry played in both the loss of Chattanooga and the staggering number of miscues that followed up to, through, and beyond Chickamauga. Powell draws upon an array of primary accounts and his intimate knowledge of the battlefield to reach several startling conclusions: Bragg’s experienced cavalry generals routinely fed him misleading information, failed to screen important passes and river crossings, allowed petty command politics to routinely influence their decision-making, and on more than one occasion disobeyed specific and repeated orders that may have changed the course of the campaign. Richly detailed, Failure in the Saddle offers new perspectives on the role of the Rebel horsemen in every combat large and small waged during this long and bloody campaign and, by default, a fresh assessment of the generalship of Braxton Bragg. This judiciously reasoned account includes a guided tour of the cavalry operations, several appendices of important information, and original cartography. Winner of the Civil War Round Table of Atlanta’s Richard Harwell Award

The award-winning Civil War historian examines the actions of Union Cavalry on the first day of the Battle of Chickamauga in this history and tour guide. This volume provides an in-depth study of the two important delaying actions conducted by mounted Union soldiers at Reed’s and Alexander’s bridges on the first day of Chickamauga. Much like Eric J, Wittenberg’s “The Devil’s to Pay”: John Buford at Gettysburg—which won the Gettysburg Civil War Roundtable’s 2015 Book Award—this volume combines engaging military history with a detailed walking and driving tour complete with the GPS coordinates. On September, 18, 1863, a cavalry brigade under Col. Robert H. G. Minty and Col. John T. Wilder’s legendary “Lightning Brigade” of mounted infantry made stout stands at a pair of chokepoints crossing Chickamauga Creek. Minty’s small cavalry brigade held off nearly ten times its number by designing and implementing a textbook example of a delaying action. Their efforts thwarted Confederate Gen. Braxton Bragg’s entire battle plan by delaying his army’s advance for an entire day. The appendices of this book include two orders of battle, a discussion of the tactics employed by the Union mounted force, and an epilogue on how the War Department and National Park Service have remembered these events. Complete with more than 60 photos and 15 maps by master cartographer Mark Anderson Moore, Holding the Line on the River of Death is a valuable addition to the burgeoning Chickamauga historiography.

During the Chickamauga Campaign, General Stanley's two Union cavalry divisions battled Forrest's and Wheeler's cavalry corps in some of the most difficult terrain for mounted operations. The Federal troopers, commanded by Crook and McCook, guarded the flanks of the advance on Chattanooga, secured the crossing of the Tennessee River, then pushed into enemy territory. The battle exploded on September 18 as Col. Minty and Col. Wilder held off a determined attack by Confederate infantry. The fighting along Chickamauga Creek included notable actions at Glass Mill and Cooper's Gap. Union cavalry dogged Wheeler's forces throughout Tennessee. The Union troopers fought under conditions so dusty they could hardly see, leading the infantry through the second costliest battle of the war.

Includes 23 plans and diagrams. This thesis examines the use of artillery by the Union Army of the Cumberland during the Battle of Chickamauga on 19 and 20 September, 1863. The thesis methodology is an analysis of the terrain, technology, tactics, organization for combat, and leadership during the battle. This thesis shows that the Union did not employ artillery effectively due to poor organization for combat and failure of leaders to use the weapons systems in accordance with their strengths. The failure to plan for artillery use on 20 September directly led to weakness on the left flank, which the Confederates exploited. The ensuing havoc led Union leaders to attempt to reorganize their artillery structure while in contact with the enemy, leading to predictable failure. This thesis shows the failure of artillery, a branch that was nearing the end of its relevance during the American Civil War due to technological change. As military thinkers today go through the process of redesigning the force, they can use the lessons of the artillery at as an example of the wrong way to employ a force at the end of its life cycle.

The bestselling author of Stonewall Jackson offers a vividly detailed account of the pivotal battles (Chickamauga in September 1863, and Chattanooga, two months later) that became the most critical three-month period of the Civil War. 16 pages of photos.

This thesis is a historical analysis of Major General Joseph J. Reynolds and his division during the Battle of Chickamauga. Chickamauga was the division’s first major engagement. Arriving on the battlefield the first day, amidst a fierce Confederate offensive, the division was separated into brigades and regiments. The various units were piecemealed into battle, operating independently of their division commander’s control. Division experiences included a desperate charge and the crushing route of an entire brigade. On the second day, the division withstood an initial Confederate onslaught in which the Union line was cut in half. After an attack south of the division position, the division was forced back, and eventually withdrew. The day ended with another charge, attacking a threat to the retreating Union army. The division’s performance varied during the two-day battle, its reputation neither enhanced or scorned. General Reynolds did not distinguish himself at Chickamauga. Although not a subject of official inquiry, he was never again to command troops in the field during the Civil War. This study analyzes Reynolds and his division at the Battle of Chickamauga and draws conclusions as to the proximate causes of the performance. These causes include division disposition, division control, and a focus on Reynolds’ leadership and decisions.

Includes 39 maps and plans The Campaign and Battle of Chickamauga, Aug.-Sep. 1863, is an excellent vehicle for a Staff Ride. Because of the size of the forces involved and the difficulty of the terrain encountered, it represents an opportunity to raise many challenging teaching points relevant to today’s officer. Second, the nation has wisely preserved most of the primary battle area in the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park and has marked most unit positions for detailed study by visitors. These markers are linked by an extensive trail network that permits access to all significant areas of the field. Thus, the park is an excellent physical laboratory for the study of conflict at the tactical and human level. The Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga, 18-20 Sep. 1863, provides a systematic approach to the analysis of this great Civil War battle. Part I describes the organization of the Federal and Confederate Armies, detailing their weapons, tactics, and logistical, engineer, communications, and medical support. In part II, the Chickamauga campaign is discussed, placing the battle in historical perspective and illustrating how the battle fits into the overall context of the Chickamauga campaign. Part III furnishes a suggested route to follow in order to get a firsthand, concrete view of how the battle developed. By following this route, various phases of the battle can be discussed and significant points made concerning the evolving battle. Also in part III are various vignettes by participants in the battle that describe the fight and offer insights into the emotional disposition of the combatants. Part IV furnishes current information on the Chickamauga site, sources of assistance, and logistical data for conducting a Staff Ride. In addition, appendixes give order of battle information for the two armies, meteorological data, and a list of Medal of Honor recipients in the battle. A bibliography is also provided.