Conscious Mind In The Physical World

We have seen remarkable progress in our detailed understanding of the physical world, from the smallest constituents of atoms to the remotest distances seen by telescopes. However, we have yet to explore the phenomenon of consciousness. Can physical things be conscious or is consciousness something else, forever outside the range of physics? And ho

WHAT HAS MODERN SCIENCE SWEPT UNDER THE RUG? This pioneering work, which sparked intense controversy when it was first published two decades ago, suggests that modern science, in the name of rigor and objectivity, has arbitrarily excluded the role of consciousness in the establishment of physical reality. Drawing on the results of their first decade of empirical experimentation and theoretical modeling in their Princeton Engineering Anomalies Research (PEAR) program, the authors reach provocative conclusions about the interaction of human consciousness with physical devices, information-gathering processes, and technological systems. The scientific, personal, and social implications of this revolutionary work are staggering. MARGINS OF REALITY is nothing less than a fundamental reevaluation of how the world really works.

According to Russellian monism, an alternative to the familiar theories in the philosophy of mind that combines attractive components of physicalism and dualism, matter has intrinsic properties that both constitute consciousness and serve as categorical bases for the dispositional properties described in physics. Consciousness in the Physical World collects various works on Russellian monism, including historical selections, recent classics, and new pieces. Most chapters are sympathetic with the view, but some are skeptical. Together, they constitute the first book-length treatment of the view itself, its relationship to other theories, its motivations, and its problems.

Since classical times we have seen considerable progress in our understanding of the physical world through the disciplines of science. However, when it comes to the mind and its most palpable property, consciousness, we have difficulty attempting any kind of meaningful discussion. Can material things be conscious, or is the mind entirely separate from physics? If we insist on the latter, how does the mind relate to the physical world? Relying more on evidence rooted in the empirical sciences than on standard philosophical arguments, this book disseminates a persuasive and self-consistent model implying an objective mind completely unconnected with anything physical. Moreover it means that the mind has no effect on the physical domain, but, by free volition, is able to navigate its way through a myriad of configurations that constitute the world we experience.

Do we live in a deterministic universe that passively awaits our observation and utilization? Or do we create our own reality in the process of observing it? These questions, writes the editor, traditionally have been the domain of philosophers, theologians, and romantic writers; in recent years, though, they have become a concern of scientists. Ad

What is mind? What is its relationship to the physical world? Is consciousness a causative agent in the physical world? With much progress being made in the neurosciences, many have thought that these questions could be answered by reducing them to questions about physical systems such as the brain. But this approach has foundered on the core problem of consciousness: Why is it that some brain processes are accompanied by conscious awareness? This anthology points out new sources and unexamined paths of consciousness research. By presenting a wide spectrum of non-reductive theories, the volume endeavours to overcome the dichotomy between dualism and monism that keeps plaguing the debate in favour of new and more differentiated positions.

What is it for you to be conscious? There is no consensus in philosophy or science: it has remained a mystery. Ted Honderich develops a brand new theory of consciousness, according to which perceptual consciousness is external to the perceiver.