Constitutional Preferences And Parliamentary Reform

This book provides a comprehensive account of national parliaments' adaptation to European integration. Advancing an explanation based on political parties' constitutional preferences, the volume investigates the nature and variation of parliamentary rights in European Union affairs across countries and levels of governance. In some member states, parliaments have traditionally been strong and parties hold intergovernmental visions of European integration. In these countries, strong parliamentary rights emerge in the context of parties' efforts to realise their preferred constitutional design for the European polity. Parliamentary rights remain weakly developed where federally-oriented parties prevail, and where parliaments have long been marginal arenas in domestic politics. Moreover, divergent constitutional preferences underlie inter-parliamentary disagreement on national parliaments' collective rights at the European level. Constitutional preferences are key to understanding why a 'Senate' of national parliaments never enjoyed support and why the alternatives subsequently put into place have stayed clear of committing national parliaments to any common policies. This volume calls into question existing explanations that focus on strategic partisan incentives arising from minority and coalition government. It, furthermore rejects the exclusive attribution of parliamentary 'deficits' to the structural constraints created by European integration and, instead, restores a sense of accountability for parliamentary rights to political parties and their ideas for the European Union's constitutional design.

Assesses what we know - and do not know - about comparative constitutional design and particular institutional choices concerning executive power and other issues.

Although the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is twenty years old, little is known about how it affects those who wield power, what influence it has on legislative decisions, or to what extent the government believes it should be constrained by Charter concerns. For most laws Parliament has the final word on how social policy is balanced against protected rights. Thus the extent to which legislation is sensitive towards rights depends on how those who develop, propose, and assess policy view the Charter. How influential are governmental legal advisors? How risk averse or risk tolerant are government ministers when pursuing legislative goals that may result in Charter challenges? How capable is Parliament in requiring government to justify and explain legislative choices that may impair rights? In Charter Conflicts Janet Hiebert examines these questions while analyzing the Charter's influence on controversial legislative decisions such as social benefits for lesbians and gay men, the regulation of tobacco advertising, the rules of evidence for sexual assault trials, the use of DNA for law enforcement purposes, and the rules for police searches of private residences. She questions the broadly held assumption that only courts are capable of respecting rights, arguing that Parliament shares responsibility with the judiciary for resolving Charter conflicts. She views the Charter's significance less in terms of the judiciary overruling Parliament than in the incentives and pressures it provides for public and political officials to satisfy themselves that legislation is consistent with protected rights.

Despite the importance of second chambers to the success of constitutional democracies around the world, today many fundamental questions about bicameralism remain understudied and undertheorized. What makes bicameral reform so difficult? Why choose bicameralism over unicameralism? What are the constitutional values of bicameralism? This innovative book addresses these questions and many more from comparative, doctrinal, empirical, historical and theoretical perspectives.

This book explains why contemporary liberal democracies are based on historical templates rather than revolutionary reforms; why the transition in Europe occurred during a relatively short period in the nineteenth century; why politically and economically powerful men and women voluntarily supported such reforms; how interests, ideas, and pre-existing institutions affected the reforms adopted; and why the countries that liberalized their political systems also produced the Industrial Revolution. The analysis is organized in three parts. The first part develops new rational choice models of (1) governance, (2) the balance of authority between parliaments and kings, (3) constitutional exchange, and (4) suffrage reform. The second part provides historical overviews and detailed constitutional histories of six important countries. The third part provides additional evidence in support of the theory, summarizes the results, contrasts the approach taken in this book with that of other scholars, and discusses methodological issues.

Contrary to popular myth, Britain does have a constitution, one that is uncodified and commanded little political interest for most of the twentieth century. In the late 1990s, Tony Blair's New Labour Government launched a program of reform that was striking in its ambition. Reinventing Britain tells the story of Britain's constitutional reform and weighs its long-term significance, with essays both by officials who worked on the reforms and by other leading commentators and academics from Britain and North America. Contributors: Mark Bevir, Jack Citrin, Joseph Fletcher, Robert Hazell, Ailsa Henderson, Kate Malleson, Craig Parsons, Kenneth MacKenzie, Peter Riddell

This book examines the current debate about constitutional reform. Included in this new edition is a chapter on the Labour Government's plans to reform the system of government.