Conventional Military Strategy In The Third Nuclear Age

This volume delves into the way conventional deterrence operates between nuclear-armed states in the third nuclear age. Unlike the first and second ages the advent of this new age has witnessed greater strain on the principles of mutual vulnerability and survivability that may result in increased risks of advertent or inadvertent escalation and horizontal nuclear proliferation. The book looks at the sum of three key simultaneous developments in the third nuclear age that merit attention. These include the emergence of asymmetric strategies, the introduction of unmanned platforms and the expansion of nuclear arsenals. The volume discusses how these concurrent developments might shape the practice of conventional deterrence and provides useful insights into conventional military dynamics, not just among the current nuclear dyads but also ones that may emerge in future. It seeks answers to several key issues in state security not limited to: What purpose and scope does the conventional military instrument have in a state’s overall military strategy versus other nuclear-armed states? If mutual vulnerability and deterrence are the frameworks, why did the prospect of escalation appear in the first place? What are the trends — political, doctrinal, or technological — that augment or diminish conventional and nuclear interface? With insights on military crises that have witnessed participation from nuclear-armed states like the United States, Russia, China, Pakistan, and India this book will especially be of interest to scholars and researchers working in the areas of security and deterrence studies, defence and strategic studies, peace and conflict studies, and foreign policy. It will also appeal to policymakers, career bureaucrats, security and defense practitioners, and professionals working with think tanks and embassies.

This book, first published in 1965, examines the doctrine for fighting a conventional war against a nuclear power. Troops must be deployed as if they were fighting a nuclear war: dispersed over a greatly extended battlefield, conducting mobile operations, with no fixed front line, or static defence system, or defence zone. A new strategy of forward defence is needed, whereby significant numbers of troops are dispatched into the enemy’s rear, and this book lays out such a strategy, and thereby sets a proposal for the future safety of Western Europe.

The author takes issue with the complacent belief that a happy mixture of deterrence, arms control and luck will enable humanity to cope adequately with weapons of mass destruction, arguing that the risks are ever more serious.

A “second nuclear age” has begun in the post-Cold War world. Created by the expansion of nuclear arsenals and new proliferation in Asia, it has changed the familiar nuclear geometry of the Cold War. Increasing potency of nuclear arsenals in China, India, and Pakistan, the nuclear breakout in North Korea, and the potential for more states to cross the nuclear-weapons threshold from Iran to Japan suggest that the second nuclear age of many competing nuclear powers has the potential to be even less stable than the first. Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age assembles a group of distinguished scholars to grapple with the matter of how the United States, its allies, and its friends must size up the strategies, doctrines, and force structures currently taking shape if they are to design responses that reinforce deterrence amid vastly more complex strategic circumstances. By focusing sharply on strategy—that is, on how states use doomsday weaponry for political gain—the book distinguishes itself from familiar net assessments emphasizing quantifiable factors like hardware, technical characteristics, and manpower. While the emphasis varies from chapter to chapter, contributors pay special heed to the logistical, technological, and social dimensions of strategy alongside the specifics of force structure and operations. They never lose sight of the human factor—the pivotal factor in diplomacy, strategy, and war.

Since the U.S. presidential elections of 1980, debate has intensified between those who believe that nuclear weapons can only deter a war not intended to be fought and those who see nuclear weapons as an advancement in weaponry that allows for the waging and winning of a nuclear war. At the focal point of this debate is the rise of the “counterforc

In Arms Control for the Third Nuclear Age, David A. Cooper offers a reappraisal of classic arms control theory that advocates for reprioritizing deterrence over disarmament. In this very different era of great power rivalry, this hard-nosed approach will be a must-read for scholars, students, and practitioners of nuclear arms control.