Corporate Governance Issues As Contributors To The Financial Crisis

Studienarbeit aus dem Jahr 2017 im Fachbereich BWL - Bank, Börse, Versicherung, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London (CeFIMS), Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: In this paper, issues of corporate governance as contributors to the recent financial crisis will be examined. In that context, the subsequent changes in governance will be evaluated regarding their real risk-reducing impact or rather their potentially adverse consequences for the current financial environment. In order to prepare a sound discussion, there will be at first a definition of corporate governance and an overview of relating theories, to then come to discuss corporate governance issues as contributors to the financial crisis. Afterwards, the corporate governance structures after the financial crisis is evaluated and a conclusion is drawn.

Over the last two decades there has been a notable increase in the number of corporate governance codes and principles, as well as a range of improvements in structures and mechanisms. Despite this, corporate governance failed to prevent a widespread default of fiduciary duties of corporate boards and managerial responsibilities in the finance industry, which contributed to the 2007–10 global financial crisis. This book brings together leading scholars from North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East to provide fresh and critical analytical insights on the systemic failures of corporate governance linked to the global financial crisis. Contributors draw from a range of disciplines to demonstrate the severe limitations of the dominant corporate governance framework and its associated market-oriented approach. They provide suggestions on how the governance problems could be tackled to prevent or mitigate any future financial crisis and explore new directions for post-crisis corporate governance research and reforms.

The years from 2000 to 2010 were bookended by two major economic crises. The bursting of the dotcom bubble and the extended bear market of 2000 to 2002 prompted Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was directed at core aspects of corporate governance. At the end of the decade came the bursting of the housing bubble, followed by a severe credit crunch, and the worst economic downturn in decades. In response, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, which changed vast swathes of financial regulation. Among these changes were a number of significant corporate governance reforms. Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis asks two questions about these changes. First, are they a good idea that will improve corporate governance? Second, what do they tell us about the relative merits of the federal government and the states as sources of corporate governance regulation? Traditionally, corporate law was the province of the states. Today, however, the federal government is increasingly engaged in corporate governance regulation. The changes examined in this work provide a series of case studies in which to explore the question of whether federalization will lead to better outcomes. The author analyzes these changes in the context of corporate governance, executive compensation, corporate fraud and disclosure, shareholder activism, corporate democracy, and declining US capital market competitiveness.

Several financial crises passed, in 1997-1999 and 2007-2009, left lessons for worldwide management control, accounting practice and internal system problems for corporations both in Viet Nam and in the world. It is one of the reasons for this book’s presence. The book cover the subject of corporate governance in theories and practices in regions: Asia Pacific, Europe, Africa and America, after recent time of crisis and corporate scandals over the world, including Viet Nam, which affect our economy, society, work and life balance. The recent trend is shown in its title for part one: Theories and Practices on Corporate Governance Issues and Standards after Financial Crisis. Our own comparative analysis and research is shown in part two and part three of this book. In this edition, the book has some updated information in: adding a new implementation form for corporate governance, as well as proposed new case questions for academic purpose. Welcome any ideas from readers.

Corporate governance, the internal policies and leadership that guide the actions of corporations, played a major part in the recent global financial crisis. While much blame has been targeted at compensation arrangements that rewarded extreme risk-taking but did not punish failure, the performance of large, supposedly sophisticated institutional investors in this crisis has gone for the most part unexamined. Shareholding organizations, such as pension funds and mutual funds, hold considerable sway over the financial industry from Wall Street to the City of London. Corporate Governance Failures: The Role of Institutional Investors in the Global Financial Crisis exposes the misdeeds and lapses of these institutional investors leading up to the recent economic meltdown. In this collection of original essays, edited by pioneers in the field of fiduciary capitalism, top legal and financial practitioners and researchers discuss detrimental actions and inaction of institutional investors. Corporate Governance Failures reveals how these organizations exposed themselves and their clientele to extremely complex financial instruments, such as credit default swaps, through investments in hedge and private equity funds as well as more traditional equity investments in large financial institutions. The book's contributors critique fund executives for tolerating the "pursuit of alpha" culture that led managers to pursue risky financial strategies in hopes of outperforming the market. The volume also points out how and why institutional investors failed to effectively monitor such volatile investments, ignoring relatively well-established corporate governance principles and best practices. Along with detailed investigations of institutional investor missteps, Corporate Governance Failures offers nuanced and realistic proposals to mitigate future financial pitfalls. This volume provides fresh perspectives on ways institutional investors can best act as gatekeepers and promote responsible investment.

'Judging by the academic post-mortems, the 2008 economic collapse was triggered by a financial sector gone wild. But the collapse was also made possible by defects in corporate governance. At last, this volume offers a serious investigation into the role corporate governance played in getting the world into that mess and can play in getting it out. Offering diverse perspectives from some of the world's preeminent corporate scholars, the volume deserves a place on the desk of anyone seeking to understand the collapse and how to avoid the next one.' Kent Greenfield, Boston College Law School, US 'This excellent collection from a highly distinguished group of scholars focuses on three intertwined and overlapping "aftermaths", the pressing concerns of corporate governance reform arising out of the financial crisis since 2008, the state of corporate governance reform since the spectacular failures of Enron, Worldcom and others, and, finally, the prospects of what since the early 1980s has been a global debate over the convergence and divergence of corporate law debates. Drawing on numerous country studies, this book greatly advances our understanding of where corporate governance reform is headed.' Peer Zumbansen, York University, Canada 'This volume addresses a range of important issues that were relevant before the global financial crisis and have, in many ways, become more so since the crisis. The book contains the work of a number of renowned commentators who have given the issues considered in the book much thought over an appreciable period of time. This volume is one that all scholars interested in corporate governance, no matter what their academic discipline is, would be interested in reading. I am eagerly awaiting its publication.' Andrew Keay, University of Leeds, UK 'The governance needle now swings to and fro like a windscreen wiper, no longer fast upon the goal of shareholder primacy and wealth maximization. "The aim of this volume is to introduce the new ideas animating. . . governance in the post-financial crisis world". This book does a superb job of accomplishing that objective. Probing discussions of sustainability, stakeholder models, globalization, ethical behavior, soft law, independent directors, and family capitalism coalesce around the antipode toward which the windscreen wiper increasingly swings, and not which "may be" but will be "the shape of things to come".' Douglas M. Branson, University of Pittsburgh, US The financial crisis of 200809 raises questions about the assumptions that underpin corporate governance. Shareholder value and private ordering may not in fact be the best means of promoting efficiency and corporate responsibility and the mechanisms used to ensure management accountability may not be effective. In this fascinating study, experts from around the world draw on the experience of the financial crisis to explore topical issues ranging from shareholder primacy and the corporate objective to the stakeholder principle, business ethics, and globalization of corporate governance principles. The chapters are provocative, acknowledging that our understanding of fundamental questions of corporate governance is still developing and demonstrating that the corporate governance debate is far from over. This informative book will appeal to researchers in corporate governance and corporate law including graduate students, policymakers, lawyers, accountants, and management consultants. Chambers of commerce and trade associations will also find much to interest them in this book.

Many financial institutions have in recent years failed – failed either completely, and gone into bankruptcy, or failed in the sense that they have not achieved what their owners or their customers expected them to deliver. This has had significant and adverse effects on customers, taxpayers, shareholders, and sometimes management. There has been much discussion of what should be done about this, and some action has been taken. But has it been the right kind of action? Crises of the sort being experienced are low probability but high impact events. This volume, from an international group of scholars, deals with two main issues: firstly, how can the governance of the financial sector by the authorities be improved and secondly, how can the governance of firms and institutions within the sector be improved to render the probability and cost of future crises lower? Poor governance has been one of the major contributors to the global financial crisis. With better governance of and in the financial sector the financial crisis might well have been avoided altogether and certainly could have been much milder in its impact. This is not simply a case of being wise after the event. These problems were widely discussed before the event, but little action was taken. This book explores not only what the contribution of poor governance was to the crisis and to its depth, but also why it is often difficult to improve governance. The volume offers a positive critique of the measures that are being put in place in the light of the experience of the crisis and suggests how they might plausibly be improved. This book will be of particular interest to students and researchers of economics and international finance, but will also prove profitable reading for practitioners and the interested public.