Counter Unmanned Aircraft System Cuas Capability For Battalion And Below Operations

The development of inexpensive small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) technologies and the growing desire of hobbyists to have more and more capability have created a sustained sUAS industry, however these capabilities are directly enabling the ability of adversaries to threaten U.S. interests. In response to these threats, the U.S. Army and other Department of Defense (DoD) organizations have invested significantly in counter-sUAS technologies, often focusing on detecting radio frequency transmissions by sUASs and/or their operators, and jamming the radio frequency command and control links and Global Positioning System signals of individual sUASs. However, today's consumer and customized sUASs can increasingly operate without radio frequency command and control links by using automated target recognition and tracking, obstacle avoidance, and other software-enabled capabilities. The U.S. Army tasked the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to conduct a study to address the above concerns. In particular, the committee was asked to assess the sUAS threat, particularly when massed and collaborating; assess current capabilities of battalion-and- below infantry units to counter sUASs; identify counter-sUAS technologies appropriate for near- term, mid-term, and far-term science and technology investment; consider human factors and logistics; and determine if the Department of Homeland Security could benefit from DoD efforts. This abbreviated report provides background information on the full report and the committee that prepared it.

In The Drone Age, Michael J. Boyle addresses some of the biggest questions surrounding the impact of drones on our world today and the risks that we might face tomorrow. Will drones produce a safer world because they reduce risk to pilots, or will the prospect of clean, remote warfare lead governments to engage in more conflicts? Will drones begin to replace humans on the battlefield? Will they empower soldiers and peacekeepers to act more precisely and humanely in crisis zones? How will terrorist organizations turn this technology back on the governments that fight them? And how are drones enhancing surveillance capabilities, both at war and at home? As advanced drones come into the hands of new actors-foreign governments, local law enforcement, terrorist organizations, humanitarian organizations, and even UN peacekeepers-it is even more important to understand what kind of world they might produce. The Drone Age explores how the unique features of drone technology are altering the decision-making processes of governments and non-state actors alike by transforming their risk calculations and expanding their capacities both on and off the battlefield. By changing what these actors are willing and ready to do, drones are quietly transforming the dynamics of wars, humanitarian crises, and peacekeeping missions while generating new risks to security and privacy. An essential guide to a potentially disruptive force in modern world politics, The Drone Age shows how the innovative use of drone technology will become central to the ways that governments and non-state actors compete for power and influence in the future.

This book applies concepts from evolutionary science and military innovation to explore how state and nonstate adversaries of the Western powers have learned to defeat (or render irrelevant) the model of high-tech, expensive, precision warfare pioneered by the United States in 1991 and globally dominant since. The book begins with a historical overview of the period since the Cold War, framed by CIA Director James Woolsey's 1993 comment that "we have slain a large dragon" (the Soviet Union) "but now we find ourselves in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes, and in many ways the dragon was easier to keep track of." The book describes the selective pressures acting on adversaries as a result of the evolutionary fitness landscape created by western military dominance. It then explores ideas from social and evolutionary science - including social learning, natural selection, artificial selection, predator effects, and the distinction between concept-led peacetime innovation and wartime coevolution - to explain how adversaries adapt. It presents a series of case studies on nonstate actors (including Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Islamic State), Russia, and China, as well as sections on North Korea and Iran. The book concludes by considering how western powers can respond to the increasing ineffectiveness of their military model and examines likely strategic futures.

This is the Army's keystone doctrine for how to fight and sustain Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Chapter 1 focuses on UAS organizations, missions, and fundamentals. Chapter 2 provides an overview of Army UAS and system descriptions and capabilities. Chapter 3 provides an overview of joint UAS and the capabilities they give the maneuver commander. Chapter 4 discusses UAS planning considerations all users must be familiar with for the successful execution of UAS operations. Chapter 5 discusses employment of the UAS. Chapter 6 discusses sustainment requirements and considerations for UAS operations at all echelons. UAS operations support battlefield commanders and their staffs as they plan, coordinate, and execute operations. UAS increase the situational awareness (SA) of commanders through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Chapter 1 * ORGANIZATION, MISSIONS, and FUNDAMENTALS * Section I - General * Unmanned aircraft system Types * Organization * Mission * Capabilities * Limitations * Fundamentals * Echelons of Support * Section II - Unmanned Aircraft System Organizations * RQ-1L I-Gnat Organization * RQ-5/MQ-5 Hunter Aerial Reconnaissance Company * RQ-7 Shadow Aerial Reconnaissance Platoon * RQ-11 Raven Team * Section III - Duty Descriptions and Responsibilities * Company Commander * Platoon Leader * Unmanned aircraft system Operations Officer (150U) * First Sergeant * Platoon Sergeant * Air Mission Commander * Unmanned aircraft system Operator (15W) * External Pilot (RQ-5/MQ-5 Hunter Only) * Unmanned Aerial System Operator (RQ-11 Raven) * Chapter 2 * ARMY UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS * RQ-1L I-Gnat * RQ-5/MQ-5 Hunter * RQ-7 Shadow * RQ-11 Raven * Chapter 3 * JOINT UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS * Section I - Joint UAS Request Procedures * Joint Command Architecture * Unmanned aircraft system Support * Section II - Air Force * RQ-4 Global Hawk * RQ/MQ-1 Predator * MQ-9 Predator B * Force Protection Aerial Surveillance System-Desert Hawk * Section III - Navy * RQ-2 Pioneer * RQ-8B Fire Scout * Section IV - Marine Corps * FQM-151 Pointer * Dragon Eye * Silver Fox * Scan Eagle * Section V - Coast Guard * Eagle Eye * Section VI-Special Operations Command * CQ-10 SnowGoose * FQM-151 Pointer * RQ-11 Raven * Dragon Eye * Chapter 4 * UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS MISSION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS * Section I - Overview * Section II - Employment Considerations * Location of Unmanned aircraft systems * Sustained Operations * Terrain and Weather * Sensor Considerations * Threat Considerations * Time/Resources Available * Dynamic Retasking * Civil Considerations (Combat Operations) * Section III - Mission Planning Process * Mission Supported Unit * Echelons Above Brigade Combat Team Tasking and Planning * Brigade and Below Planning Responsibilities * Brigade and Below Tasking/Planning * Unmanned aircraft system Unit Planning Process * Post Mission Actions * Section IV - Army Airspace Command and Control * Section V - Command and Control * Levels of Interoperability * Communications * Using a Remote Video Terminal * Section VI - Risk Mitigation * Safety * Risk Management * Unmanned aircraft system Safety Considerations * Chapter 5 * UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS EMPLOYMENT * Section I - Reconnaissance and Surveillance * Reconnaissance * Unmanned aircraft system Reconnaissance Fundamentals * Actions on the Objective * Data Exfiltration * Surveillance * Section II - Security Operations * Screen * Guard and Cover Operations * Section III-Unmanned Aircraft System Targeting * Facilitate Targeting * Precision of Target Locations * Facilitate Command and Control * Facilitate Movement * Section IV - Manned-Unmanned Team Operations * Manned-Unmanned Team Missions * Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition Missions * Screen Missions * Movement to Contact * Aerial Target Designation * Artillery Fire Support * Close Air Support * Kill Box * Section V - Personnel Recovery * Mission Execution

In 1996, Congress enacted directing the Department of Defense to assess and demonstrate technology alternatives to incineration for destruction of the chemical weapons stored at Pueblo Chemical and Blue Grass Army Depots. Since then, the National Research Council (NRC) has been carrying out evaluations of candidate technologies including reviews of engineering design studies and demonstration testing. Most recently, the NRC was asked by the Army to evaluate designs for pilot plants at Pueblo and Blue Grass. These pilot plants would use chemical neutralization for destroying the chemical agent and the energetics in the munitions stockpiles of these two depots. This report provides the interim assessment of the Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP) to permit adjustment of any significant problems as soon as possible. The report presents an analysis of the issues about the current PCAPP design and a series of findings and recommendations about ways to reduce concerns with involve the public more heavily in the process.

The U.S. military does not believe its soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines should be engaged in combat with adversaries on a "level playing field." Our combat individuals enter engagements to win. To that end, the United States has used its technical prowess and industrial capability to develop decisive weapons that overmatch those of potential enemies. In its current engagement-what has been identified as an "era of persistent conflict"- the nation's most important weapon is the dismounted soldier operating in small units. Today's soldier must be prepared to contend with both regular and irregular adversaries. Results in Iraq and Afghanistan show that, while the U.S. soldier is a formidable fighter, the contemporary suite of equipment and support does not afford the same high degree of overmatch capability exhibited by large weapons platforms-yet it is the soldier who ultimately will play the decisive role in restoring stability. Making the Soldier Decisive on Future Battlefields establishes the technical requirements for overmatch capability for dismounted soldiers operating individually or in small units. It prescribes technological and organizational capabilities needed to make the dismounted soldier a decisive weapon in a changing, uncertain, and complex future environment and provides the Army with 15 recommendations on how to focus its efforts to enable the soldier and tactical small unit (TSU) to achieve overmatch.

This report surveys opportunities for future Army applications in biotechnology, including sensors, electronics and computers, materials, logistics, and medical therapeutics, by matching commercial trends and developments with enduring Army requirements. Several biotechnology areas are identified as important for the Army to exploit, either by direct funding of research or by indirect influence of commercial sources, to achieve significant gains in combat effectiveness before 2025.

This latest CSIS report examines the use of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) in combined arms warfare based on the war in Ukraine and other cases. In the future, UASs will likely play an increasingly important role in great power competition against such countries as China and Russia.