Countering The Threat Of Improvised Explosive Devices

Attacks in London, Madrid, Bali, Oklahoma City and other places indicate that improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are among the weapons of choice of terrorists throughout the world. Scientists and engineers have developed various technologies that have been used to counter individual IED attacks, but events in Iraq and elsewhere indicate that the effectiveness of IEDs as weapons of asymmetric warfare remains. The Office of Naval Research has asked The National Research Council to examine the current state of knowledge and practice in the prevention, detection, and mitigation of the effects of IEDs and make recommendations for avenues of research toward the goal of making these devices an ineffective tool of asymmetric warfare. The book includes recommendations such as identifying the most important and most vulnerable elements in the chain of events leading up to an IED attack, determining how resources can be controlled in order to prevent the construction of IEDs, new analytical methods and data modeling to predict the ever-changing behavior of insurgents/terrorists, a deeper understanding of social divisions in societies, enhanced capabilities for persistent surveillance, and improved IED detection capabilities.

Countering the threat of improvised explosive devices (IED)s is a challenging, multilayered problem. The IED itself is just the most publicly visible part of an underlying campaign of violence, the IED threat chain. Improving the technical ability to detect the device is a primary objective, but understanding of the goals of the adversary; its sources of materiel, personnel, and money; the sociopolitical environment in which it operates; and other factors, such as the cultural mores that it must observe or override for support, may also be critical for impeding or halting the effective use of IEDs. Disrupting Improvised Explosive Device Terror Campaigns focuses on the human dimension of terror campaigns and also on improving the ability to predict these activities using collected and interpreted data from a variety of sources. A follow-up to the 2007 book, Countering the Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices: Basic Research Opportunities, this book summarizes two workshops held in 2008.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a type of unconventional explosive weapon that can be deployed in a variety of ways, and can cause loss of life, injury, and property damage in both military and civilian environments. Terrorists, violent extremists, and criminals often choose IEDs because the ingredients, components, and instructions required to make IEDs are highly accessible. In many cases, precursor chemicals enable this criminal use of IEDs because they are used in the manufacture of homemade explosives (HMEs), which are often used as a component of IEDs. Many precursor chemicals are frequently used in industrial manufacturing and may be available as commercial products for personal use. Guides for making HMEs and instructions for constructing IEDs are widely available and can be easily found on the internet. Other countries restrict access to precursor chemicals in an effort to reduce the opportunity for HMEs to be used in IEDs. Although IED attacks have been less frequent in the United States than in other countries, IEDs remain a persistent domestic threat. Restricting access to precursor chemicals might contribute to reducing the threat of IED attacks and in turn prevent potentially devastating bombings, save lives, and reduce financial impacts. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals prioritizes precursor chemicals that can be used to make HMEs and analyzes the movement of those chemicals through United States commercial supply chains and identifies potential vulnerabilities. This report examines current United States and international regulation of the chemicals, and compares the economic, security, and other tradeoffs among potential control strategies.

As the United States seeks to maintain its influence abroad, hostile nations and non-state actors will attempt to leverage the low-cost effectiveness of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to disrupt US military operations. These cheap devices, made from relatively easily acquired components, will enable the continued use of the IED on the modern battlefield. While the US spent billions of dollars to counter this seemingly new IED threat, the devices used in Iraq and Afghanistan were similar in nature and effect to the booby traps used in Vietnam. The Army's failure to retain the institutional knowledge gained from its experiences with booby traps in Vietnam resulted in an initial inability to provide support for the detection and clearance of these devices and targeting of assembly/emplacement networks. Instead, the Army rushed the force management process, specifically within the Engineer Regiment, to refocus its efforts, regrow the skillset, and organize to meet the threat. While the major Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) conflicts close, other powers seek to counter United States dominance with methods that do not involve major combat operations. The use of cheap and easily acquired parts for IEDs will support their continued use. Therefore, a key to success in future conflicts is retaining and institutionalizing the knowledge gained through recent experiences while understanding the evolution of threats. Studies of historically noteworthy conflicts often evoke comparison. While history does not repeat itself, common themes emerge regarding actions of each participant and their success or failure. These themes provide a basis for future militaries to incorporate, adapt, or otherwise prepare for encountering these situational eventualities on the battlefield. The US military left Vietnam with robust counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) experiences and knowledge, part of the greater counter-insurgency skillset developed by soldiers assigned to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) between February 1962 and March 1973. However, the military retained little of this experience in doctrine, training, or force structure as the Army's focus shifted to a new operating concept focused on maneuver-centric warfare against a near-peer threat from the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s and 80s. The close of the Cold War in 1990s ended the perceived threat of large scale, force-on-force, warfare for the moment. New threats emerged in Africa and the Balkans; old threats gained renewed interest in the Middle East. From the mid-1990s to the summer of 2001, the Army's focus was on limited warfare and peacekeeping operations. Non-state actors, under the banner of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, forcing the Army to again reassess its focus. The war that followed led to significant investments of time, money, and blood in relearning the C-IED lessons forgotten during thirty years spent avoiding guerrilla warfare using conventional ground forces. While lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan guide today's engineer force structure and training in the C-IED fight, the Engineer Regiment must not lose interest as the focus for the training of tactical and operational units pivots back to major combat operations. Letting today's lessons suffer a fate similar to that of lessons learned during the Vietnam War will place the US Army at a disadvantage if the common threat of effective, low-cost weapons, fades and then reemerges to challenge US maneuver formations.

The effort to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and roadside bombs in Afghanistan and Iraq is fully explained in this comprehensive two-part encyclopedia compilation, featuring the Convoy Survivability Training Support Package presenting information on enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures for attacking convoys, as well as U.S. measures in effect to counter them.IED REPORT: Updated with the latest information from the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), it also includes the results of Congressional inquiries into jamming the IED assembly line by impeding the flow of ammonium nitrate in south and central Asia. A recent GAO report on the JIEDDO effort is also reproduced. The JIEDDO solicitation of proposals for the development of innovative capabilities to defeat IEDs employed against dismounted U.S. or coalition forces anywhere in the world, but especially in Afghanistan is included. The military is looking for advances in the dismounted detection of buried IEDs and unmanned ground vehicles for dismount support. Buried IEDs are emplaced on or under the ground to be detonated in the proximity of Coalition Forces or other passers-by. IEDs are used on roadways, paths and choke points where intended victims are likely to walk. Devices are frequently emplaced in or near features (e.g. washouts, culverts, gates and bridges) that conceal their signatures and channel traffic over them. Components common to an IED are a switch, an initiator, a power source, and the main charge with container. The main charge is typically a homemade, fertilizer-based, bulk explosive in a plastic or fabric container. The most common switches for buried IEDs are victim operated pressure switches and command wires. IEDs are the enemy's fires system - their artillery. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the enemy delivers these fires through networks that for centuries have formed the sinews of commerce for tribes and factions. IED attacks provide the enemy with a cheap, stand-off, precision targeting system that often provides attackers with complete anonymity. Coverage of IEDs and the JIEDDO includes: JIEDDO Annual Reports (including the newest for the Fiscal Year 2010), Acronyms and Terms, Glossary, DoD Directives, Urgent Needs and Readiness Levels, Technology Readiness Levels, Training for Forensics and Crime Scene Investigation to Battle IEDs, biographies of key officials in the JIEDDO, History of JIEDDO, The Threat, Organizational Structure, Organization Chart, Attacking the Network, Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC), Keyhole, Information Operations, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon (ISR), Warrior Alpha, WTI, Constant Hawk, Technology Insertion Process, Identity InstaCheck, Palantir, more.CONVOY SURVIVABILITY TRAINING: Specific areas of instruction include but are not limited to hardening vehicles, defending against attack, consolidation and reorganization, gun truck employment, various reports, battle drills, and basic instructions for setting up a convoy live fire exercise. The document states in part: "During this course of instruction you will learn to: Identify the threat; harden vehicles; conduct convoy briefing; execute motor movement; defend against attack; defend against Improvised Explosive Devices (IED); conduct convoy consolidation and reorganization; conduct actions at the Release Point (RP); describe the purpose and functions of the gun truck; identify gun truck crew duties; harden gun trucks; employ gun trucks; identify emerging enemy trends on the battlefield.

" Improvised explosive devices have been a significant cause of fatalities among U.S. troops in Afghanistan. About 80 percent of the IEDs contain homemade explosives, primarily calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) fertilizer smuggled from Pakistan. U.S. officials recognize the threat posed by the smuggling of CAN and other IED precursors from Pakistan into Afghanistan, and State and other agencies are assisting Pakistan's government to counter this threat. This report (1) describes the status of U.S. efforts to assist Pakistan in countering IEDs and (2) reviews State's tracking of U.S. assisted efforts in Pakistan to counter IEDs. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed agency strategy and programmatic documents, including State's fiscal year 2013 MSRP for Pakistan. GAO also met with U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., Arlington, Virginia, and Tampa, Florida; and met with U.S. and Pakistani officials in Islamabad, Pakistan. "