Counterterrorism In African Failed States

Failed states offer attractive venues for terrorist groups seeking to evade counterterrorism efforts of the United States and its partners in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). State failure entails, among its other features, the disintegration and criminalization of public security forces, the collapse of the state administrative structure responsible for overseeing those forces, and the erosion of infrastructure that supports their effective operation. These circumstances make identification of terrorist groups operating within failed states very difficult, and action against such groups, once identified, problematic. Terrorist groups that are the focus of the current GWOT display the characteristics of a network organization with two very different types of cells: terrorist nodes and terrorist hubs. Terrorist nodes are small, closely knit local cells that actually commit terrorist acts in the areas in which they are active. Terrorist hubs provide ideological guidance, financial support, and access to resources enabling node attacks. An examination of three failed states in Sub-Saharan Africa - Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia - reveals the presence of both types of cells and furnishes a context for assessing the threat they pose to the national interests of the United States and its partners.

Terrorist groups operating in Sub-Saharan Africa failed states have demonstrated the ability to avoid the scrutiny of Western counterterrorism officials, while supporting and facilitating terrorist attacks on the United States and its partners. The potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists makes terrorist groups operating from failed states especially dangerous. U.S. counterterrorism strategies largely have been unsuccessful in addressing this threat. A new strategy is called for, one that combines both military and law enforcement efforts in a fully integrated counterterrorism effort, supported by a synthesis of foreign intelligence capabilities with intelligence-led policing to identify, locate, and take into custody terrorists operating from failed states before they are able to launch potentially catastrophic attacks.

Failed states-states in which government authority has collapsed, violence has become endemic, and functional governance has ceased-have emerged in the period since the end of the Cold War as one of the most difficult challenges confronting the international community, especially in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. Transnational terrorist groups use the chaos of failed states to shield themselves from effective counterterrorism efforts by the international community. The potential nexus of failed state-based terrorism and terrorists' access to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), especially nuclear WMD, escalates the risk that such groups pose to the United States and to its allies in the Global War on Terror. In this monograph, the author finds that current counterterrorism strategies have yielded limited results in addressing the threat posed by terrorist groups operating in and from failed states. He argues that the uniquely challenging conditions in such states require a new approach to counterterrorism.

Failed states offer attractive venues for terrorist groups seeking to evade counterterrorism efforts of the United States and its partners in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). State failure entails, among its other features, the disintegration and criminalization of public security forces, the collapse of the state administrative structure responsible for overseeing those forces, and the erosion of infrastructure that supports their effective operation. These circumstances make identification of terrorist groups operating within failed states very difficult, and action against such groups, once identified, problematic. Terrorist groups that are the focus of the current GWOT display the characteristics of a network organization with two very different types of cells: terrorist nodes and terrorist hubs.1 Terrorist nodes are small, closely knit local cells that actually commit terrorist acts in the areas in which they are active. Terrorist hubs provide ideological guidance, financial support, and access to resources enabling node attacks. An examination of three failed states in Sub-Saharan Africa- Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia-reveals the presence of both types of cells and furnishes a context for assessing the threat they pose to the national interests of the United States and its partners. Al Qaeda established terrorist hubs in Liberia and Sierra Leone to exploit the illegal diamond trade, laundering money, and building connections with organized crime and the illegal arms trade. In Somalia, Al Qaeda and Al Ittihad Al Islami established terrorist hubs that supported terrorist operations throughout East Africa. A new organization led by Aden Hashi 'Ayro recruited terrorist nodes that executed a series of attacks on Western nongovernment organization (NGO) employees and journalists within Somalia. Analysis of these groups suggests that while the terrorist nodes in failed states pose little threat to the interests of the United States or its GWOT partners, terrorist hubs operating in the same states may be highly dangerous. The hubs observed in these three failed states were able to operate without attracting the attention or effective sanction of the United States or its allies. They funneled substantial financial resources, as well as sophisticated weaponry, to terrorist vi nodes operating outside the failed states in which the hubs were located. The threat posed by these hubs to U.S. national interests and to the interests of its partners is significant, and is made much more immediate by the growing risk that nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) will fall into terrorist hands. The burgeoning proliferation of nuclear weapons and the poor security of some existing nuclear stockpiles make it more likely that terrorist groups like Al Qaeda will gain access to nuclear weapons. The accelerating Iranian covert nuclear weapons program, estimated to produce a nuclear capability within as little as one year, is especially disturbing in this context.2 A failed state terrorist hub that secures access to a nuclear weapon could very conceivably place that weapon in the hands of a terrorist node in a position to threaten vital American national interests.

This book provides an examination of insurgent movements and terrorist organizations, as well as state policies that instigate intrastate conflicts in African states. It examines the tactics used by anti-government forces, states’ counterterrorism responses, and the human security impacts of insecurity on citizens in Africa.

Seven Africanist scholars from the African Strategic and Peace Research Group in Nigeria here address the threat of terrorism in the context of the global strategic climate. The study is against the background of the altered shape of the global security equation, and the devalued utility of the notion of security through state-centric military preparedness. They posit that failure to grasp its exact nature is leading to the spread to parts of Africa hitherto regarded as relatively safe. Further the adverse socio-political conditions on the continent have increased Africa's vulnerability. They examine areas where the experiences of other regions are relevant, providing both a regional and global context. Professor Thomas Imobighe is Director of the Centre for Strategic and Development Studies at Ambrose Alli University, Edo State. Dr. Agatha Eguavoen is Reader and Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at Ambrose Alli University, Edo State.

Africa is a continent of growing strategic importance in the global war on terrorism. Over the past decade, it has seen a significant number of terrorist attacks and operations, both north and south of the Sahara. Many of these attacks have been led by, coordinated with, or purported to be in support of al Qaeda, but others have been launched by African organizations without significant external support. African Counterterrorism Cooperation provides an overview of terrorist threats in each African economic region and examines terrorism and counterterrorism efforts on the continent as a whole. Drawn largely from papers presented by distinguished experts at a recent conference sponsored by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, this volume comprises chapters on terrorism threats and vulnerabilities in Africa, the roles of the African Union and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, counterterrorism measures in East Africa, terrorism threats and responses in the Southern African Development Community Region, and counterterrorism initiatives in the Economic Community of West African States. The final chapter offers an overview of U.S. support for African counterterrorism efforts. Edited by Dr. Andre Le Sage and with a foreword by Gen. Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., USMC (Ret.).