Credit And Fiscal Multipliers In China

We jointly estimate credit and fiscal multipliers in China. We use the tenure of the provincial party secretary, interacted with the type of stimulus used in other provinces, to obtain separate instruments for provincial credit and government expenditure. We estimate a fiscal multiplier of 0.8 and a credit multiplier of 0.2 in 2001-2015. The multipliers have changed over time. The fiscal multiplier has increased from 0.75 in 2001-2008 to 1.4 in 2010-2015. The credit multiplier has declined from 0.17 to zero over the same periods. Our results suggest that reducing credit growth in China is unlikely to disrupt output growth, whereas fiscal policy may be effective in supporting macroeconomic adjustment.

We jointly estimate credit and fiscal multipliers in China. We use the tenure of the provincial party secretary, interacted with the type of stimulus used in other provinces, to obtain separate instruments for provincial credit and government expenditure. We estimate a fiscal multiplier of 0.8 and a credit multiplier of 0.2 in 2001-2015. The multipliers have changed over time. The fiscal multiplier has increased from 0.75 in 2001-2008 to 1.4 in 2010-2015. The credit multiplier has declined from 0.17 to zero over the same periods. Our results suggest that reducing credit growth in China is unlikely to disrupt output growth, whereas fiscal policy may be effective in supporting macroeconomic adjustment.

Strong Chinese output growth after the Global Financial Crisis was supported by booming credit. This credit boom carries risks. International experience suggests that China’s credit growth is on a dangerous trajectory, with increasing risks of a disruptive adjustment and/or a marked growth slowdown. Several China-specific factors—high savings, current account surplus, small external debt, and various policy buffers—can help mitigate near-term risks of a disruptive adjustment and buy time to address risks. But, if the risks are left unaddressed, these mitigating factors will likely not eliminate the eventual adjustment, but make the boom larger and last longer. Hence, decisive policy action is needed to deflate the credit boom safely.

" The world economy was still reeling from the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 when the COVID-19 pandemic struck like a bolt of lightning in late 2019. Whatever remained of the neoliberal credo - based on the salience of free markets - was upended, and economic nationalism fast became the new stock ideology. In Negotiating the New Normal, Saurav Jha carefully examines why, in the wake of the coronavirus shock, strong economic recovery in the developed world is more doubtful than ever. Instead of throwing its weight behind a multipolar world order, China, by far the largest economy among the BRICS nations, has chosen to create a Pax Sinica. However, it is unlikely to make much headway owing to both internal economic contradictions and pushback from the West and beyond. And what of India? Can it become a 'new China' to serve as a key engine of global growth, overcoming the pandemic-induced setback, as well as earlier policy missteps like demonetization? Answering all these questions and raising many more, Jha's deeply researched and cogently argued account examines the 'new normal' of a transactional, even predatory geoeconomic climate where central banks are fast running out of answers and heavily indebted governments are desperately searching for silver bullets. This work of extraordinary depth and ambition, tracing the destinies of the major economic centres of the world, provides a nuanced if sobering context to the reader as it suggests what India must do to rise in this grave new pandemic-ridden world. "

This Selected Issues paper examines the drivers and prospects for high levels of savings in China. China has one of the highest levels of national savings in the world, which is at the heart of its external and internal imbalances. High and rising household savings have mainly resulted from demographic changes as a result of the one-child policy and the breakdown of the social safety net during the transition from a planned to a market economy. Demographic changes will put downward pressure on national savings. Policy efforts to strengthen the social safety net and reduce income inequality are also needed to reduce savings further and faster and to boost consumption.

A brilliant analysis of the transition in world economics, finance, and power as the era of globalization ends and gives way to new power centers and institutions. The world is at a turning point similar to the fall of communism. Then, many focused on the collapse itself, and failed to see that a bigger trend, globalization, was about to take hold. The benefits of globalization--through the freer flow of money, people, ideas, and trade--have been many. But rather than a world that is flat, what has emerged is one of jagged peaks and rough, deep valleys characterized by wealth inequality, indebtedness, political recession, and imbalances across the world's economies. These peaks and valleys are undergoing what Michael O'Sullivan calls "the levelling"--a major transition in world economics, finance, and power. What's next is a levelling-out of wealth between poor and rich countries, of power between nations and regions, of political accountability from elites to the people, and of institutional power away from central banks and defunct twentieth-century institutions such as the WTO and the IMF. O'Sullivan then moves to ways we can develop new, pragmatic solutions to such critical problems as political discontent, stunted economic growth, the productive functioning of finance, and political-economic structures that serve broader needs. The Levelling comes at a crucial time in the rise and fall of nations. It has special importance for the US as its place in the world undergoes radical change--the ebbing of influence, profound questions over its economic model, societal decay, and the turmoil of public life.

Fiscal multipliers are important tools for macroeconomic projections and policy design. In many countries, little is known about the size of multipliers, as data availability limits the scope for empirical research. This note provides general guidance on the definition, measurement, and use of fiscal multipliers. It reviews the literature related to their size, persistence and determinants. For countries where no reliable estimate is available, the note proposes a simple method to come up with reasonable values. Finally, the note presents options to incorporate multipliers in macroeconomic forecasts.