Credit Rating Agencies On The Watch List

Rating agencies judge how solvent banks and big companies are. Prior to the financial crisis they were too optimistic when rating the risk of the banks and this prompted politicians worldwide to issue new regulations. This book explains what rating agencies do, why they are so important for the economy, and the new European Regulation.

Rating agencies judge how solvent banks and big companies are. Prior to the financial crisis they were too optimistic when rating the risk of the banks and this prompted politicians worldwide to issue new regulations. This book explains what rating agencies do, why they are so important for the economy and the new European Regulation.

This book examines the transgressions of the credit rating agencies before, during and after the recent financial crisis. It proposes that by restricting the agencies’ ability to offer ancillary services there stands the opportunity to limit, in an achievable and practical manner, the potentially negative effect that the Big Three rating agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch – may have upon the financial sector and society moreover. The book contains an extensive and in-depth discussion about how the agencies ascended to their current position, why they were able to do so and ultimately their behaviour once their position was cemented. This work offers a new framework for the reader to follow, suggesting that investors, issuers and the state have a ‘desired’ version of the agencies in their thinking and operate upon that basis when, in fact, those imagined agencies do not exist, as demonstrated by the ‘actual’ conduct of the agencies. The book primarily aims to uncover this divergence and reveal the ‘real’ credit rating agencies, and then on that basis propose a real and potentially achievable reform to limit the negative effects that result from poor performance in this Industry. It addresses the topics with regard to financial regulation and the financial crisis, and will be of interest to legal scholars interested in the intersection between business and he law as well as researchers, academics, policymakers, industry and professional associations and students in the fields of corporate law, banking and finance law, financial regulation, corporate governance and corporate finance.

The global crisis revealed that credit rating agencies (CRAs) are capable of bringing about potential distortions in the financial sector, thereby resulting in a reduction in market confidence which, in turn, influences negotiations and expectations. CRAs need to be held accountable for lack of transparency and inaccurate ratings, however the existing regulatory framework does not secure adequate investor protection. This book provides a new and important contribution to research in the area, at a crucial time in the debate around financial regulation and investment regimes.

The book examines the role of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in the subprime mortgage crisis. The CRAs are blamed for awarding risky securities ‘3-A’ investment grade status and then failing to downgrade them quickly enough when circumstances changed, which led to investors suffering substantial losses. The causes identified by the regulators for the gatekeeper failure were conflicts of interest (as the issuers of these securities pay for the ratings); lack of competition (as the Big Three CRAs have dominated the market share); and lack of regulation for CRAs. The book examines how the regulators, both in the US and EU, have sought to address these problems by introducing soft law self-regulation in accordance with the International Organisation of Securities Commissions Code and hard law statutory regulation, such as that found in the “Reform Act” and “Dodd-Frank Act” in the US and similar provisions in the EU. The highly topical book examines these provisions in detail by using a doctrinal black-letter law method to assess the success of the regulators in redressing the problems identified. It also examines the US case law regulation relating to the legal liability of CRAs. The book examines whether the regulations introduced have had a deterrent effect on the actions of CRAs, whether investors are compensated for their losses, and how the regulators have dealt with the issues of conflicts of interest and an anti-competitive environment. Should liability be introduced for CRAs through changes in the law so as to compel them to issue reliable ratings and solve the current problems? The book seeks to simplify the complex issues involved and is backed by concrete evidence; as such, it will appeal to both the well-informed and the lay general public who are interested in learning more about the role of CRAs in the sub-prime mortgage crisis and regulators’ attempts to remedy the situation. Novice readers can familiarise themselves with the legal and financial terminology used by referring to the glossary at the end of the book.

This Palgrave Pivot aims to examine the bourgeoning relationship between the Principles for Responsible Investment and the Credit Rating Industry. Since May of 2016, when the partnership was initially publicised, the PRI have endeavoured to incorporate Credit Rating Agencies into its initiative via its ‘ESG in Credit Ratings Initiative’, and have been working diligently to find, and create common ground between Credit Rating Agencies and Institutional Investors seeking to be more forward-looking in their investment approaches. However, in recent years the ‘Big Two’ Credit Rating Agencies – Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s – have finally received record fines for their conduct in the run-up to the Financial Crisis. There is a need, then, to examine the incorporation of the Credit Rating Agencies into such a progressive initiative. To achieve this objective, this book examines the field of ‘responsible investing’, the credit rating industry, and the power dynamic that exists between the rating industry, investors, and the PRI (via its ‘Initiative’).

The Independence of Credit Rating Agencies focuses on the institutional and regulatory dynamics of these agencies, asking whether their business models give them enough independence to make viable judgments without risking their own profitability. Few have closely examined the analytical methods of credit rating agencies, even though their decisions can move markets, open or close the doors to capital, and bring down governments. The 2008 financial crisis highlighted their importance and their shortcomings, especially when they misjudged the structured financial products that precipitated the collapse of Bear Stearns and other companies. This book examines the roles played by rating agencies during the financial crisis, illuminating the differences between U.S. and European rating markets, and also considers subjects such as the history of rating agencies and the roles played by smaller agencies to present a well-rounded portrait. Reports on one of the key causes of the 2008 financial crisis: agencies that failed to understand how to analyze financial products Describes inherent business model and pricing conflicts that compromise the independence of credit rating agencies Reveals how rating agencies large and small, regulatory bodies, and vested interests interact in setting fees and policies

Financial regulation has entered into a new era, as many foundational economic theories and policies supporting the existing infrastructure have been and are being questioned following the financial crisis. Goodhart et al’s seminal monograph "Financial Regulation: Why, How and Where Now?" (Routledge:1998) took stock of the extent of financial innovation and the maturity of the financial services industry at that time, and mapped out a new regulatory roadmap. This book offers a timely exploration of the "Why, How and Where Now" of financial regulation in the aftermath of the crisis in order to map out the future trajectory of financial regulation in an age where financial stability is being emphasised as a key regulatory objective. The book is split into four sections: the objectives and regulatory landscape of financial regulation; the regulatory regime for investor protection; the regulatory regime for financial institutional safety and soundness; and macro-prudential regulation. The discussion ranges from theoretical and policy perspectives to comprehensive and critical consideration of financial regulation in the specifics. The focus of the book is on the substantive regulation of the UK and the EU, as critical examination is made of the unravelling and the future of financial regulation with comparative insights offered where relevant especially from the US. Running throughout the book is consideration of the relationship between financial regulation, financial stability and the responsibility of various actors in governance. This book offers an important contribution to continuing reflections on the role of financial regulation, market discipline and corporate responsibility in the financial sector, and upon the roles of regulatory authorities, markets and firms in ensuring the financial health and security of all in the future.