Critical German Submarine Operations Versus Allied Convoys During March 1943 An Operational Analysis

German submarine operations against allied convoys, during March 1943 is critically analyzed from an operational perspective. The theater commander's operational scheme is dissected for the purpose of identifying lessons which can be applied to the planning and execution of today's theater operations. A brief historical account of the early phases of the war and the events and decisions which preceded the critical convoy battles will be followed by an analysis of the operational scheme employed by Admiral Doenitz. German victory during the spring offensive clearly demonstrated numerous operational successes, a reasonably well conceived operational plan, and proof positive of the potential for a larger scale victory, yet history recorded Germany's ultimate defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic. This analysis identified three significant flaws which led to the German demise; first, strategic guidance and operational means were inadequately reconciled ... Operational anlaysis, German U-Boats in Atlantic during March 1943.

German submarine operations against allied convoys, during March 1943 is critically analyzed from an operational perspective. The theater commander’s operational scheme is dissected for the purpose of identifying lessons which can be applied to the planning and execution of today’s theater operations. A brief historical account of the early phases of the war and the events and decisions which preceded the critical convoy battles will be followed by an analysis of the operational scheme employed by Admiral Dönitz. German victory during the spring offensive clearly demonstrated numerous operational successes, a reasonably well conceived operational plan, and proof positive of the potential for a larger scale victory. Yet history recorded Germany’s ultimate defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic. This analysis identified three significant flaws which led to the German demise; first, strategic guidance and operational means were inadequately reconciled which prevented the proper execution of the operational plan; second, operational intelligence and reconnaissance were inadequately exploited; third, Germany failed to coordinate and execute joint operations between service arms, specifically the lack of air assets in support of vital U-boat operations. Clearly one must conclude a reasonable operational plan has marginal chance for success when strategic guidance and joint coordination are incompatible with theater objective accomplishment.

The Battle of the Atlantic, the longest continuous campaign of World War II, climaxed in 1943, when Germany came closest to interrupting Allied supply lines and perhaps winning the war. In March of that year, German U-boats scored their last great triumph, destroying nearly 150,000 tons of supplies and fuel.

The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest campaign of the Second World War. This volume highlights the scale and complexity of this bitterly contested campaign, one that encompassed far more than just attacks by German U-boats on Allied shipping. The team of leading scholars assembled in this study situates the German assault on seaborne trade within the wider Allied war effort and provides a new understanding of its place within the Second World War. Individual chapters offer original perspectives on a range of neglected or previously overlooked subjects: how Allied grand strategy shaped the war at sea; the choices facing Churchill and other Allied leaders and the tensions over the allocation of scarce resources between theaters; how the battle spread beyond the Atlantic Ocean in both military and economic terms; the management of Britain's merchant shipping repair yards; the defense of British coastal waters against German surface raiders; the contribution of air power to trade defense; antisubmarine escort training; the role of special intelligence; and the war against the U-boats in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans.

This is the sixth volume in the comprehensive and authoritative series, Germany and the Second World War. It deals with the extension of a European into a global war in the period from 1941 to 1943. It focuses on the politics, strategy, and operations of the belligerent powers as Germany lost the initiative to the Allies, and it represents, both in content and in composition, the climax and turning points of the war. Series description This is the sixth in the magisterial ten-volume Germany and the Second World War series. The six volumes so far published in German take the story to 1943, and have achieved international acclaim as a major contribution to historical study. Under the auspices of the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt [Research Institute for Military History], a team of renowned historians has combined a full synthesis of existing material with the latest research to produce what will be the definitive history of the Second World War from the German point of view. The comprehensive analysis, based on detailed scholarly research, is underpinned by a full apparatus of maps, diagrams, and tables. Intensively researched and documented, Germany and the Second World War is an undertaking of unparalleled scope and authority. It will prove indispensable to all historians of the twentieth century.

The Republic of Korea's industrial policy has directed that nation's economy through nearly three decades of spectacular growth. But the authors of this paper maintain that this policy is showing signs of being outmoded. The time has come, the authors argue, for the Korean government to stop managing the economy's structural development and to redefine the responsibilities of business and government. Under this proposed compact, the allocation of resources would shift from the government to the private industrial and financial sectors. The transformation of the government bureaucracy from an ad hoc policy role to one of a transparent and predictable regulator is a key to the success of this undertaking. These new directions would present the government with enormous challenges. Greater competitive discipline and regulatory oversight would be required. While dealing with the complexities of the transition, the government would have to maintain macroeconomic stability and the momentum of savings and investment. For comparison, the study examines the industrial economies of France, Germany, Japan, and the United States, which underwent similar shifts.