Currencies Capital And Central Bank Balances

Drawing from their 2018 conference, the Hoover Institution brings together leading academics and monetary policy makers to share ideas about the practical issues facing central banks today. The expert contributors discuss U.S. monetary policy at individual central banks and reform of the international monetary and financial system. The discussion is broken down into seven key areas: 1) International Rules of the Monetary Game; 2) Banking, Trade and the Making of the Dominant Currency; 3) Capital Flows, the IMF's Institutional View and Alternatives; 4) Payments, Credit and Asset Prices; 5) Financial Stability, Regulations and the Balance Sheet; 6) The Future of the Central Bank Balance Sheet; and 7) Monetary Policy and Reform in Practice. With in-depth discussions of the volatility of capital flows and exchange rates, and the use of balance sheet policy by central banks, they examine relevant research developments and debate policy options.

Most central banks oblige depository institutions to hold minimum reserves against their liabilities, predominantly in the form of balances at the central bank. The role of these reserve requirements has evolved significantly over time. The overlay of changing purposes and practices has the result that it is not always fully clear what the current purpose of reserve requirements is, and this necessarily complicates thinking about how a reserve regime should be structured. This paper describes three main purposes for reserve requirements - prudential, monetary control and liquidity management - and suggests best practice for the structure of a reserves regime. Finally, the paper illustrates current practices using a 2010 IMF survey of 121 central banks.

This paper presents an overview of exposures in the balance sheets of central banks, banks, and other depository institutions during the past decade, with emphasis on asset growth and currency composition. It exploits the IMF’s SRF-based monetary data to show: (i) there was a widely observed buildup of assets prior to the global financial crisis, but there has been no significant reduction in its wake; (ii) the foreign currency composition of the balance sheets of banks and other depository institutions remained remarkably constant in spite of the crisis, significant changes in the composition of balance sheets, and globalization, and does not seem to have been significantly influenced by the behavior of exchange rates; and (iii) exposure to households increased prior to the crisis, but this increased risk was offset by increased capitalization.

This paper provides a simple, quantitative, net worth-based, approach to assessing the need for central bank capital. It derives a concept of "core capital" (a function of the central bank's operating expenditures and the carrying cost of its international reserves) as the minimum capital needed by a central bank to ensure the credibility of its inflation target. The approach is illustrated with the published accounts of three loss-making central banks and selected accounting entries for a broader sample of central banks. Policy implications are explored. In particular, the paper argues that central bank capitalizations cannot be automatic and require instead a broad policy debate.

Central banks may operate perfectly well without capital as conventionally defined. A large negative net worth, however, is likely to compromise central bank independence and interfere with its ability to attain policy objectives. If society values an independent central bank capable of effectively implementing monetary policy, recapitalization may become essential. Proper accounting practice in determining central bank profit or loss and rules governing the transfer of the central bank’s operating result to the treasury are also important. A variety of country-specific central bank practices are reviewed to support the argument.

This paper argues that in reserve currency issuing economies at the effective lower bound, outright transfers from the central bank to households are both more equitable and more effective in achieving monetary policy objectives than asset purchases or negative interest rates. It shows that concerns pertaining to central banks’ policy solvency and equity position can be addressed through a careful assessment of a central bank's loss absorbing capacity and, if need be, tiered reserve remuneration policies. It also spells out key differences to a debt or money financed fiscal stimulus, which are particularly pronounced in a currency union without a central fiscal capacity. The paper concludes by discussing broader institutional, political, and legal considerations.

Part of The Elgar Series on Central Banking and Monetary Policy, this book explores the relationship between central banking, monetary policy and the economy at large, focusing on the specific relationship between central banking, monetary policy and the future of money.

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