David Hume S Critique Of Infinity

This new study of David Hume s philosophy of mathematics critically examines his objections to the concept of infinity, and his alternative phenomenalist theory of space and time as constituted by minima sensibilia or sensible extensionless indivisibles.

In this book the author offers a critical analysis of David Hume's argument against miracles from his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, "Of Miracles" is one of the most influential works written in defense of the position that belief in supernatural occurrences is not reasonable. Using Hume's work as a point of departure, the author addresses the two most important epistemological questions asked about miracles: Is it ever reasonable to ascribe a divine source to an anomalous event in order to identify it as miraculous? and What theoretically entails sufficient evidence that a miracle has actually taken place? Contemporary rehabilitations of Hume's argument, as put forth by Antony Flew, Alastair McKinnon, and Patrick Nowell-Smith, are evaluated. Contents: Defining the Miraculous; Hume's Argument, Part 1;Hume's Argument, Part 2;The Rationality of Belief and the Existence of God; Contemporary Rehabilitations of Hume's Argument; and Miracles and Evidence.

Moral philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.

David Hume (1711-1776) is one of the foremost critics of attempts to provide rational arguments in support of traditional Christian theism in Western philosophy. In this Element, the authors examine Hume's chief objections to the cosmological argument, the design argument, and the argument from miracles, along with some main responses to these objections. The authors also examine Hume's seminal version of the argument from evil, which is deployed in an effort to show that traditional Christian theism is lacking in coherent meaning. Drawing on recent developments in Hume scholarship according to which Hume's ultimate philosophical aim was to further an anti-Christian agenda, an attempt is made to situate Hume's writings on God and religion in an unfolding narrative that is impacted throughout by the trenchant religious criticisms of Hume's chief philosophical predecessor, Thomas Hobbes.

Henry Allison examines the central tenets of Hume's epistemology and cognitive psychology, as contained in the Treatise of Human Nature. Allison takes a distinctive two-level approach. On the one hand, he considers Hume's thought in its own terms and historical context. So considered, Hume is viewed as a naturalist, whose project in the first three parts of the first book of the Treatise is to provide an account of the operation of the understanding in which reason is subordinated to custom and other non-rational propensities. Scepticism arises in the fourth part as a form of metascepticism, directed not against first-order beliefs, but against philosophical attempts to ground these beliefs in the "space of reasons." On the other hand, Allison provides a critique of these tenets from a Kantian perspective. This involves a comparison of the two thinkers on a range of issues, including space and time, causation, existence, induction, and the self. In each case, the issue is seen to turn on a contrast between their underlying models of cognition. Hume is committed to a version of the perceptual model, according to which the paradigm of knowledge is a seeing with the "mind's eye" of the relation between mental contents. By contrast, Kant appeals to a discursive model in which the fundamental cognitive act is judgment, understood as the application of concepts to sensory data, Whereas regarded from the first point of view, Hume's account is deemed a major philosophical achievement, seen from the second it suffers from a failure to develop an adequate account of concepts and judgment.

While Hume remains one of the most central figures in modern philosophy his place within Enlightenment thinking is much less clearly defined. Taking recent work on Hume as a starting point, this volume of original essays aims to re-examine and clarify Hume's influence on the thought and values of the Enlightenment.

This work, first published in 1985, offers a general interpretation of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature. Most Hume scholarship has either neglected or downplayed an important aspect of Hume’s position – his scepticism. This book puts that right, examining in close detail the sceptical arguments in Hume’s philosophy.

In his seminal Philosophy of David Hume (1941), Norman Kemp Smith called for a study of Hume &"in all his manifold activities: as philosopher, as political theorist, as economist, as historian, and as man of letters,&" indicating that &"Hume's philosophy, as the attitude of mind that found for itself these various forms of expression, will then have been presented, adequately and in due perspective, for the first time.&" Claudia Schmidt seeks to address this long-standing need in Hume scholarship. Against the charges that Hume holds no consistent philosophical position, offers no constructive account of rationality, and sees no positive relation between philosophy and other areas of inquiry, Schmidt argues for the overall coherence of Hume's thought as a study of &"reason in history.&" She develops this interpretation by tracing Hume's constructive account of human cognition and its historical dimension as a unifying theme across the full range of his writings. Hume, she shows, provides a positive account of the ways in which our concepts, beliefs, emotions, and standards of judgment in different areas of inquiry are shaped by experience, both in the personal history of the individual and in the life of a community. This book is valuable at many levels: for students, as an introduction to Hume's writings and issues in their interpretation; for Hume specialists, as a unified and intriguing interpretation of his thought; for philosophers generally, as a synthesis of recent developments in Hume scholarship; and for scholars in other disciplines, as a guide to Hume's contributions to their own fields.