Deception Tactics Of World War Ii

The first book to draw on the official British papers containing deception secrets taht were classified until 1978. Tells the fascinating story of brilliant and sometimes ingenious ploys, and also reveals the many pathetic and sometimes laughable failures of deception strategy.

Starting in 1939 with the Gleiwitz incident and ending in 1945 with Allied operations in the Pacific theater. Deception Tactics of World War II presents a vivid retelling of the most audacious deception efforts of the war. It provides eye-opening insight into the obscure world of counterintelligence and espionage, in which truth is often far stranger than fiction. Take for example the camouflaging of California's giant war plants, carried out by Hollywood's finest set designers, painters, landscape artistis, carpenters, lighting experts, and prop men, and executed so effectively that the factories were unrecognizable from the the air. Or consider one of the biggest conjuring tricks in military history, pulled off by an unlikely crew of artists, sculptors, filmmakers, and stage designers to make the Allied forces in the North African desert appear much larger than they actually were. Underpinning these efforts were the double agents: legendary operators such as Juan Garcia, codenamed Garbo, whose misinformation convinced the Germans that the main thrust of the D-Day invasion would be in Pas-de-Calais rather than Normandy and who was so good he was decorated by both Axis powers and the British.

Volume 5 of the Official History of Intelligence in the Second World War, Strategic Deception, brings the series to an end. Strategic deception depends for its success on the availability of good security and good intelligence. The first three volumes of the series described the intelligence channels that gave the Allies their incomparable insight into enemy capabilities and intentions.

This in-depth analysis of military deception examines tactics employed across centuries and continents, from ancient times to WWII. The art of military deception is as old as warfare itself. It has been a vital part of virtually every successful campaign ever recorded, and yet has been largely overlooked in the annals of military history. In The Art of Military Deception, Mark Lloyd corrects this oversight with a wide-ranging analysis of strategies and tactics through the ages. Lloyd treats this much-neglected aspect of warfare thematically rather than chronologically covering such topics as disinformation campaigns, lies on the home front, and psychological warfare. He draws on a wide range of examples to show the elaborate techniques which have been employed in the struggle to outwit the enemy. Particularly fascinating is his analysis of the fatal error of self-deception.

Discover the inner workings of many incredible, ingenious and decisive acts of military cunning in this fascinating insight into the tactics of World War II presents notable successes, as well as the most daring and outrageous plans. Critical advantage was gained through deception - the projection of power in areas of weakness, camouflage, manipulation, and the transmission of false intentions. Deceptions of World War II presents notable successes, as well as the most daring and outrageous plans. Be enthralled by accounts of: - Just how important the camouflage efforts were at home and in the Pacific - artists and photographers like William Dobell and Max Dupain were drafted into bold, creative and ingenious efforts.- Operation Hackney in the Pacific, where an Australian cargo fleet loaded with empty packing and used fuel drums supplied the illusion, from the air, of a full brigade's camps. - The British effort to project a fighting force in North Africa where none in fact existed and the flawless Japanese plan to conceal an entire fleet on its way to Pearl Harbour.- The enigmatic double agent Garbo, who established a fictitious network of spies in Britain and then fed Germany a stream of false information.These compelling stories are interspersed with equally captivating images, from full-page spreads of invasions in action, to the shipping container used to transport the body of a fictitious marine captain during Operation Mincemeat.

In World War II, the Allies employed unprecedented methods and practiced the most successful military deception ever seen, meticulously feeding misinformation to Axis intelligence to lead Axis commanders into erroneous action. Thaddeus Holt's elegantly written and comprehensive book is the first to tell the full story behind these operations. Exactly how the Allies engaged in strategic deception has remained secret for decades. Now, with the help of newly declassified material, Holt reveals this secret to the world in a riveting work of historical scholarship. Once the Americans joined the war in 1941, they had much to learn from their British counterparts, who had been honing their deception skills for years. As the war progressed, the British took charge of misinformation efforts in the European theater, while the Americans focused on the Pacific. The Deceivers takes readers from the early British achievements in the Middle East and Europe at the beginning of the war to the massive Allied success of D-Day, American victory in the Pacific theater, and the war's culmination on the brink of an invasion of Japan. Colonel John Bevan, who managed British deception operations from London, described the three essentials to strategic deception as good plans, double agents, and codebreaking, and The Deceivers covers each of these aspects in minute detail. Holt brings to life the little-known men, British and American, who ran Allied deception, such as Bevan, Dudley Clarke, Peter Fleming, Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., and Newman Smith. He tracks the development of deception techniques and tells the hitherto unknown story of double agent management and other deception through the American FBI and Joint Security Control. Full of fascinating sources and astounding revelations, The Deceivers is an indispensable volume and an unparalleled contribution to World War II literature.

First Published in 1987. New information obtained from the declassification of Ultra intercepts and other Second World War documents as well as from recent scholarly research has credited Allied deception operations with an even more important contribution to winning the war than was previously supposed. Yet deception is only one factor in the achievement of victory; it cannot guarantee success. It must be fully understood and exploited by the highest levels of command. Most histories of deception operations during the Second World War have focused on those that were successful. Instances in which deception operations failed to achieve their objectives are discussed by John Campbell, who describes an early attempt to convince the Germans that the Allies intended to invade at Pas de Calais in the summer of 1943, and by Katherine Herbig, who gives the first detailed description of US deception operations in the Pacific. Klaus-Jurgen Moiier questions the actual effectiveness of deception operations against the Germans. He argues that many successes attributed to the Allies' use of deception were in fact achieved by independent considerations on the German side. Professor Moiier builds a particularly strong case in challenging the success of Operation Fortitude North, in which the Allies tried to divert German troops to Norway before invading Normandy. Although very little is known of Soviet deception operations on the Eastern Front, it must be remembered that they were conducted on a much larger scale than those of either the British in Europe or the Americans in the Pacific. Colonel David Glantz's account of Soviet deception and covert activities offers a version of the historiography of the war between the USSR and Germany which may explain some of the monumental German failures. Tom Cubbage not only contributes a synthesis of the primary and secondary sources available on the deception operations preceding Overlord, but also reviews the so-called Hesketh Report - Fortitude: A History of Strategic Decep­tion in North Western Europe April 1943 to May 1945, Colonel Roger Hesketh's official report on Allied deception operations against the Germans in north-west Europe which was declassified in 1976, yet remains unpublished. It indicates that Professor Muller's suspicions that the Allies over-estimated the impact of Forti­tude are unfounded. Edited and with a comprehensive introduction by Michael Handel, these important and original studies put the entire deception effort during the Second World War into a more balanced and accurate perspective.