Decisionmaking For Arms Limitation

The first book anywhere to go inside the Soviet arms control decision-making process, this book reveals information previously known by no more than a handful of people, in the USSR and the U.S.--written by two of the players.

This book, first published in 1984, analyses the critically important Cold War issue of the Soviet national security decision-making process dealing with weapons acquisition, arms control and the application of military force. It conceptualises Soviet decision-making for national security from Stalinist antecedents to 1980s modes, and examines the problems of decision-making concerning weapons development, defence research and development and SALT negotiations. It also focuses on the decision-making processes which led to the use or threatened use of military force in Czechoslovakia (1968), the Middle East (1973) and Afghanistan (1979).

This facsimile reprint of the 1989 edition is, according to Library Journal, ..".a wonderfully concise and comprehensive resource on a very important topic. In 268 detailed entries, the authors provide a wealth of information on such topics as the arms race, conventional and nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and disarmament. The entries are cross-referenced, and there is an index. Of great value to general readers as well as specialists."

European arms control policy and domestic policy processes in the four major West European countries (the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and Italy) are assessed in this study, based on extensive interviews with governmental and opinion-making leaders in these four nations. The interview data are unique and make possible for the first time this kind of analysis of West European defense policy. The contributors assess the impact of the INF treaty and arms control developments since the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik.

Focusing on the most urgent issues of arms control, this collection of essays discusses the East-West military balance, the nature of U.S.-Soviet relations, the political dynamics of developments in weapons technology, the problems that conflicting national security policies pose for the management of the Western alliance, the influence of U.S. dom

The essential history of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) during the Nixon Administration How did Richard Nixon, a president so determined to compete for strategic nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, become one of the most successful arms controllers of the Cold War? Drawing on newly opened Cold War archives, John D. Maurer argues that a central purpose of arms control talks for American leaders was to channel nuclear competition toward areas of American advantage and not just international cooperation. While previous accounts of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have emphasized American cooperative motives, Maurer highlights how Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird shaped negotiations, balancing their own competitive interests with proponents of cooperation while still providing a coherent rationale to Congress. Within the arms control agreements, American leaders intended to continue deploying new weapons, and the arms control restrictions, as negotiated, allowed the United States to sustain its global power, contain communism, and ultimately prevail in the Cold War.