Defence Planning As Strategic Fact

Defence Planning as Strategic Fact provides and elaborates on an "upstream" focus on the variegated organizational, political and conceptual practices of military, civilian administrative and political leaderships involved in defence planning, offering an important security and strategic studies supplement to the traditional "downstream" focus on the use of force. The book enables the reader to engage with the role of ideas in defence planning, of organizational processes and biases, path dependencies and administrative dynamics under the pressures of continuously changing domestic and international constraints. The chapters show how defence planning must be seen as a constitutive element of defence and strategic studies – that it is a strategic fact of its own which merits particular practical and scholarly attention. As defence planning creates the conditions behind every peace upheld or broken and every war won or lost, Defence Planning as Strategic Fact will be of great use to scholars of defence studies, strategic studies, and military studies. This book was originally published as a special issue of Defence Studies.

Strategy and Defence Planning: Meeting the Challenge of Uncertainty explores and examines why and how security communities prepare purposefully for their future defence. The author explains that defence planning is the product of interplay among political process, historical experience, and the logic of strategy. The theory of strategy best reveals both the nature and the working of defence planning. Political 'ends', strategic 'ways', and military 'means' all fed by reigning, if not always recognized, assumptions, organize the subject well with a template that can serve any time, place, and circumstance. The book is designed to help understanding of what can appear to be a forbiddingly complex as well as technical subject. A good part of the problem for officials charged with defence planning duties is expressed in the second part of the book's title. The real difficulty, which rarely is admitted by those tasked with defence planning duty, is that defence planning can only be guesswork. But, because defence preparation is always expensive, not untypically is politically unpopular, yet obviously can be supremely important, claims to knowledge about the truly unknowable persist. In truth, we cannot do defence planning competently, because our ignorance of the future precludes understanding of what our society will be shown by future events to need. The challenge faced by the author was to identify ways in which our problems with the inability to know the future in any detail in advance-the laws of nature, in other words-may best be met and mitigated. Professor Gray argues that our understanding of human nature, of politics, and of strategic history, does allow us to make prudent choices in defence planning that hopefully will prove 'good enough'.

How can countries decide what kind of military forces they need, if threats are uncertain and history is full of strategic surprises? This is a question that is more pertinent than ever, as countries across the Asia-Pacific are faced with the military and economic rise of China. Uncertainty is inherent in defence planning, but different types of uncertainty mean that countries need to approach decisions about military force structure in different ways. This book examines four different basic frameworks for defence planning, and demonstrates how states can make decisions coherently about the structure and posture of their defence forces despite strategic uncertainty. It draws on case studies from the United States, Australian and New Zealand, each of which developed key concepts for their particular circumstances and risk perception in Asia. Success as well as failure in developing coherent defence planning frameworks holds lessons for the United States and other countries as they consider how best to structure their military forces for the uncertain challenges of the future.

This book examines the processes, practices and principles of defence planning in small and middle powers. Small and middle powers are recalibrating their force postures in this age of disruption. They are adapting their defence planning and military innovation processes to protect the security of their nations. The purpose of this book is to explore defence planning and military innovation in 11 contemporary case studies of small and middle powers in North America, Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Oceania. Employing a structured focused comparison framework, it traces patterns in the choices of small and middle powers across the following themes: (1) alliances, dependencies and national ambitions; (2) approaches, processes, methods and techniques; and (3) military innovation strategies and outcomes. Breaking new theoretical ground, it offers a three-pronged typology distinguishing between the strategic defence planner, the transactional defence planners and the complacent defence planner. The book offers a rich array of insights into cases that fall across different geographies, strategic cultures and governance systems. These insights can help guide discussions on how to structure decision-making structures, arrive at ambition levels, formulate priorities, select partners and design defence planning and military innovation processes. This book will be of much interest to students of defence studies, security studies, public policy and international relations, as well as to professionals in defence planning.

This is the pilot in a series of reports on strategic planning conducted within the U.S. Department of Defense. It focuses on the strategic planning responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because planning at that level provides the critical nexus between the strategic direction provided by the National Command Authorities and its implementation by the unified combatant commands and military departments. The authors' thorough understanding of the statutory requirements for strategic planning and the interactions between the Chairman's complex strategic planning process and other key DOD planning systems enables them to explicate today's strategic planning challenges and offer insightful recommendations. Strategic planning in the post-Cold War era has proven to be exceptionally problematic. The plethora of national and international tensions that the east-west confrontation of the Cold War in large measure subdued combine now to create a world replete with diverse challenges to U.S. interests. Equally disturbing is the fact that these challenges are not as clearly defined and easily articulated as was the monolithic Soviet threat. The authors point out that the Cold War provided inherent stability in U.S. strategic planning and that the basic elements of a strategic military plan evolved over time. They go on to argue that the elimination of the National Military Strategy Document and the abandonment of the Base Case Global Family of Operation Plans amounted to recision of the Chairman's strategic plan, and that nothing has been developed to take its place.

Superior defense plans fuse political, economic, military, technological, and sociological power in ways that cover state interests, while conserving resources to the greatest prudent extent. Poor products can increase costs without reducing risks, because forces and funds that support slipshod schemes often fail to furnish security. This critical appraisal of the U.5. defense planning system seeks to serve a five-fold purpose: set assessment standards, appraise U.S. planning in principle, appraise U.5. planning in practice, identify U.S. planning problems and present optional courses of corrective action. The study shows how domestic and foreign policy inputs from the White House, National 5ecurity Council, and State Department affect defense planning.

It is generally accepted that there has been general neglect of matters defence in India. This book is very timely and it critically examines very comprehensively the issues involved in defence planning process. The book contains the chapters with commentaries by renowned defence professionals including two former Chiefs. An effective guidance on national security and defence policy objectives is fundamental to defence planning. The volume brings out in detail the inadequacies in our planning process. There is a lack of cohesive national security strategy and defence policy and inadequate coordination of defence planning and economic development. In the absence of CDS there is a lack of inter-Services prioritization. The volume also highlights the adhocism in the planning process. This volume is a must read for defence analysts, scholars, practitioners of statecraft and those dealing with defence planning, security and strategic issues.