Democracy And Trade Policy In Developing Countries

Since the 1970s, two major trends have emerged among developing countries: the rise of new democracies and the rush to free trade. For some, the confluence of these events suggests that a free-market economy complements a fledgling democracy. Others argue that the two are inherently incompatible and that exposure to economic globalization actually jeopardizes new democracies. Which view is correct? Bumba Mukherjee argues that the reality of how democracy and trade policy unravel in developing countries is more nuanced than either account. Mukherjee offers the first comprehensive cross-national framework for identifying the specific economic conditions that influence trade policy in developing countries. Laying out the causes of variation in trade policy in four developing or recently developed countries—Brazil, India, Indonesia, and South Africa—he argues persuasively that changing political interactions among parties, party leaders, and the labor market are often key to trade policy outcome. For instance, if workers are in a position to benefit from opening up to trade, party leaders in turn support trade reforms by decreasing tariffs and other trade barriers. At a time when discussions about the stability of new democracies are at the forefront, Democracy and Trade Policy in Developing Countries provides invaluable insight into the conditions needed for a democracy to survive in the developing world in the context of globalization.

What explains the variation in trade policy among democracies in developing countries? Why have some liberalized trade more than others? We analyze the impact of political particularism - defined as the degree of party discipline and the incentives for politicians to cultivate a personal vote - on trade protection. We present theoretical results from a model of particularism and its effects on tariffs; we present quantitative evidence to test the model; and then we develop a case study of India to illuminate it. Our model analyzes how an increase in particularism (that is, a shift from a party-centered to a more candidate-centered system) interacts with the degree of inter-industry occupational mobility of labor and the asset-specificity of industries to influence trade policies in developing democracies. Our model suggests that an increase in particularism induces leaders from the ruling and opposition parties to shift trade policy in equilibrium to the median voter's optimal preference, who in a developing society is a worker; and this means a reduction in trade barriers when labor mobility is high. Our data strongly support this conclusion. Our case study of India shows how the dynamics of a party-centered system operate to maintain higher trade barriers.

This accessible, comprehensive and pertinent Handbook will be of interest to academics, researchers and students working in the fields of international politics, in particular political economy and foreign policy, and the economics of trade.¾ Practitio

Globalization is not new, nor is it a policy, it’s a process that has existed as long as man looked over the horizon, travelled and traded. It can’t be stopped but it can be slowed. It came to a grinding halt in August 1914 and the Marxist detour cost millions of lives and lost three generations their opportunity and hope in many countries. More wealth has been created in the past 60 years than in all of history. After the most successful decade of sustained economic growth in history, this progress is threatened. Extreme inequality, corruption and environmental degradation threaten the stability and legitimacy of many developing countries’ regimes. Anti-globalization and anti-capitalist campaigners’ confidence has been emboldened due to the present economic crisis. Protectionist rhetoric is growing as are the arguments to control and regulate markets. Leaders are meeting to discuss how to face these problems and create a new international architecture. How did we get to this position? What should we do? What is it that determines why some contemporary states are successful while others have failed? Saving Globalization departs from its analysis of the globalised economy in the twenty-first century to answer these question by tracing the development of what Moore considers to be ‘the big ideas of history’: democracy, independent courts, the separation of church and state, property rights, independent courts, a professional civil service, and civil society. Democratic capitalism has worked for most people. Why? It is a remarkable story, from the Greeks to the Geeks, encompassing technological progress and the corrections and contradictions between liberty and equality, technology, growth and the environment. In defence of the many virtues and opportunities that globalisation offers, Mike Moore makes the case for a fresh and new approach to our international Institutions and for domestic policies that promote equity and fairness. The book controversially attacks the new enemies of reason and evidence. The threats now come from all sides, especially workers in developed countries who fear for their jobs. Mike Moore is a political practitioner turned theoretician.

The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Theory, Evidence and Applications is a collection of sole-authored and co-authored papers by Devashish Mitra that have been published in various scholarly journals over the last two decades. It covers diverse topics in the political economy of trade policy, ranging from the role of modeling lobby formation in the context of trade policy determination to its applications to the question of unilateralism versus reciprocity and trade agreements. It also includes the theory and the empirics of the choice of policy instruments. Finally, the book presents the empirical investigation of the Grossman-Helpman “Protection for Sale” model as well as the Mayer “Median-Voter” model of trade policy determination.

A penetrating look at major challenges to the World Trade Organization and the future of trade liberalization. It also shows how the WTO is moving in a direction at odds with basic democratic principles. The author closes his analysis with some policy recommendations.

It was recognized by many developing countries in the 1980s that integration with the global economy is necessary for economic development and technological progress. Efforts to liberalize trade were controversial. A unique body of evidence on developing country trade liberalization will examine why outcomes have varied from one country to another. The political economy of trade liberalization and the interaction among trade and domestic reform, macro-economic stability, and export development is examined using: (a) cross-sectional data, (b) country studies, (c) and interviews. The sequencing of reforms and implications for multilateral trade negotiations, foreign direct investment, and regional integration schemes is an additional consideration. The emphasis is on practical problems-economic and political-and recommendations of how policies can be designed and implemented to yield stronger and more sustainable results.