Democracy Without Parties In Peru

This book provides an in-depth look into key political dynamics that obtain in a democracy without parties, offering a window into political undercurrents increasingly in evidence throughout the Latin American region, where political parties are withering. For the past three decades, Peru has showcased a political universe populated by amateur politicians and the dominance of personalism as the main party-voter linkage form. The study peruses the post-2000 evolution of some of the key Peruvian electoral vehicles and classifies the partisan universe as a party non-system. There are several elements endogenous to personalist electoral vehicles that perpetuate partylessness, contributing to the absence of party building. The book also examines electoral dynamics in partyless settings, centrally shaped by effective electoral supply, personal brands, contingency, and iterated rounds of strategic voting calculi. Given the scarcity of information electoral vehicles provide, as well as the enormously complex political environment Peruvian citizens inhabit, personal brands provide readymade informational shortcuts that simplify the political world. The concept of "negative legitimacy environments" is furnished to capture political settings comprised of supermajorities of floating voters, pervasive negative political identities, and a generic citizen preference for newcomers and political outsiders. Such environments, increasingly present throughout Latin America, produce several deleterious effects, including high political uncertainty, incumbency disadvantage, and political time compression. Peru's "democracy without parties" fails to deliver essential democratic functions including governability, responsiveness, horizontal and vertical accountability, or democratic representation, among others. Omar Sanchez-Sibony is Associate Professor of Political Science at Texas State University.

This book generates a wealth of new empirical information about Latin American party systems and contributes richly to major theoretical debates about party systems and democracy.

Latin American opinion surveys consistently point to Peruvian citizens' deep distrust of their elected rulers and democratic institutions. The 2011 presidential and legislative elections in Peru, along with the regional and municipal polls of the previous year, showed once again the degree of political fragmentation in contemporary Peru and the weakness of its party system. Fractured Politics examines the history of political exclusion in Peru, the weakness of representative institutions, and the persistence of localized violent protest. It also evaluates the contribution of institutional reforms in bridging the gap between state and society, including Peru's Law on Political Parties, administrative decentralization, and the experience of the Defensoría, or ombudsman's office. The chapters, by leading scholars of Peruvian politics, emerge from a conference, held in 2009 in Saint Antony's College Oxford. Julio Cotler, from the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP), was the keynote speaker.

Under what conditions is democracy stable? What forces undermine or reinforce democratic institutions in Latin America? This book suggests answers to these questions in the context of Peru. It identifies the micro and macro causes that explain the gradual breakdown of democracy in the period between the 1980 transition from authoritarian rule and the 1992 suspension of the Constitution and closure of Congress by President Alberto Fujimori. Similar self-coups were subsequently threatened in Bolivia, unsuccessfully attempted in Guatemala and actively considered in Brazil.

This book provides an in-depth look into key political dynamics that obtain in a democracy without parties, offering a window into political undercurrents increasingly in evidence throughout the Latin American region, where political parties are withering. For the past three decades, Peru has showcased a political universe populated by amateur politicians and the dominance of personalism as the main party–voter linkage form. The study peruses the post-2000 evolution of some of the key Peruvian electoral vehicles and classifies the partisan universe as a party non-system. There are several elements endogenous to personalist electoral vehicles that perpetuate partylessness, contributing to the absence of party building. The book also examines electoral dynamics in partyless settings, centrally shaped by effective electoral supply, personal brands, contingency, and iterated rounds of strategic voting calculi. Given the scarcity of information electoral vehicles provide, as well as the enormously complex political environment Peruvian citizens inhabit, personal brands provide readymade informational shortcuts that simplify the political world. The concept of “negative legitimacy environments” is furnished to capture political settings comprised of supermajorities of floating voters, pervasive negative political identities, and a generic citizen preference for newcomers and political outsiders. Such environments, increasingly present throughout Latin America, produce several deleterious effects, including high political uncertainty, incumbency disadvantage, and political time compression. Peru’s “democracy without parties” fails to deliver essential democratic functions including governability, responsiveness, horizontal and vertical accountability, or democratic representation, among others.

In this paper Professor Conaghan reconstructs the last five years of Alberto Fujimori, drawing on Vladi-videos coming out on a weekly basis. It examines how the plan to re-elect President Alberto Fujimori deepened authoritarianism in Peru and how the opposition's struggle against re-election reshaped the political landscape and laid the groundwork for a surprising opening to to regime transition.

When Peru's APRA - one of the oldest and most controversial political parties in Latin America - came to power in 1985, expectations were high for the new government, and in part because a decade of economic decline and social crisis had discredited both the military and the right as alternatives. APRA did manage an unprecedented consensus for two years. But a sudden shift in strategy to confrontational rhetoric and authoritarian tactics led to policy stagnation, economic collapse, and a surge of reaction and political violence from extremes of the left and right. Rather than playing the role of the strong centre, APRA acted as a catalyst for the polarisation process. The party's sectarian and authoritarian strains, coupled with the increasingly erratic behaviour of its once-popular young leader, Alan Garcia, created damaging and perhaps irreparable divisions between the party and the rest of society, and between society and polity more generally.