Democratic Counterinsurgents

The rhetoric of armed social welfare has become prominent in military and counterinsurgency circuits with profound consequences for the meanings of democracy, citizenship, and humanitarianism in conflict zones. By focusing on the border district of Kargil, the site of India and Pakistan’s fourth war in 1999, this book analyses how humanitarian policies of healing and heart warfare infused the logic of democracy and militarism in the post-war period. Compassion became a strategy to contain political dissension, regulate citizenship, and normalize the extensive militarization of Kargil’s social and political order. The book uses the power of ethnography to foreground people’s complex subjectivities and the violence of compassion, healing, and sacrifice in India’s disputed frontier state. Based on extensive research in several sites across the region, from border villages in Kargil to military bases and state offices in Ladakh and Kashmir, this engaging book presents new material on military-civil relations, the securitization of democracy and development, and the extensive militarization of everyday life and politics. It is of interest to scholars working in diverse fields including political anthropology, development, and Asian Studies.

This book explores the ways in which democracies can win counterinsurgencies when they implement a proper strategy. At a time when the USA is retrenching from two bungled foreign wars that involved deadly insurgent uprisings, this is a particularly important argument. Succumbing to the trauma of those engagements and drawing the wrong conclusions about counterinsurgency can only lead to further defeat in the future. Rather than assuming that counterinsurgency is ineffective, it is crucial to understand that a conventional response to an insurgent challenge is likely to fail. Counterinsurgency must be applied from the beginning, and if done properly can be highly effective, even when used by democratic regimes. In fact, because such regimes are often wealthier; have more experience at institution-building and functional governance; are more pluralistic in nature and therefore enjoy higher levels of legitimacy than do autocracies, democracies may have considerable advantages in counterinsurgency warfare. Rather than give up in despair, democracies should learn to leverage these advantages and implement them against future insurgencies.

There is a common assumption that the promotion of democracy and economic development are the most effective means of quelling widespread political unrest within a country. Many believe that free and fair elections, health care, education, and employment will help secure the hearts and minds of citizens. By contrast, the violation of human rights and international law is presumed to be counterproductive, engendering political protest and violent rebellion. When Bad States Win challenges the belief that democratic institutions and economic growth are effectual tools in countering insurgencies. Jeffrey Treistman uses a mixed-methods approach to examine the conditions in which governments have violated human rights and attacked civilians to effectively suppress political dissent. His research suggests that moderate levels of violence against civilians tend to backfire and only provoke widespread resentments that lead to the overthrow of a central government; however, when pursued to extremes, brutal repression and indiscriminate violence against civilians can effectively defeat a rebellion. As a result, bad states may sometimes win. As the number of democratic states in the world continues to decline, violence and authoritarian rule are on the rise. A thought-provoking and timely analysis, When Bad States Win offers important insight into how democratic states can respond to human rights violations in regions in crisis.

South Africa's transition to democracy took place against a backdrop of shadow war between the apartheid regime's counterinsurgency forces and the African National Congress' armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). This book analyses in unprecedented detail the hidden history of MK's struggle and its contribution to South Africa's liberation, while exposing new dimensions of clandestine apartheid-era violence. Drawing on interviews with former MK guerrillas, Daniel Douek traces the evolution of MK's operations across southern Africa from the 1960s, culminating in the 1990-4 negotiations between the ANC and the white supremacist regime. As political violence escalated, the battle waged in the shadows became nothing less than a struggle to shape South Africa's future. Counterinsurgency forces recruited spies, deployed death squads, engaged in psychological warfare, and targeted ANC leaders, including MK chief Chris Hani. Even once ANC elites had come to power, apartheid counterinsurgency operations continued to undermine South Africa's new democracy by marginalizing MK guerrillas within the 'new' security forces, leaving legacies of violence and instability still felt today.

There is a common assumption that the promotion of democracy and economic development are the most effective means of quelling widespread political unrest within a country. Many believe that free and fair elections, health care, education, and employment will help secure the hearts and minds of citizens. By contrast, the violation of human rights and international law is presumed to be counterproductive, engendering political protest and violent rebellion. When Bad States Win challenges the belief that democratic institutions and economic growth are effectual tools in countering insurgencies. Jeffrey Treistman uses a mixed-methods approach to examine the conditions in which governments have violated human rights and attacked civilians to effectively suppress political dissent. His research suggests that moderate levels of violence against civilians tend to backfire and only provoke widespread resentments that lead to the overthrow of a central government; however, when pursued to extremes, brutal repression and indiscriminate violence against civilians can effectively defeat a rebellion. As a result, bad states may sometimes win. As the number of democratic states in the world continues to decline, violence and authoritarian rule are on the rise. A thought-provoking and timely analysis, When Bad States Win offers important insight into how democratic states can respond to human rights violations in regions in crisis.

Pathological Counterinsurgency critically examines the relationship between elections and counterinsurgency success in third party campaigns supported by the United States. From Vietnam to El Salvador to Iraq and Afghanistan, many policymakers and academics believed that democratization would drive increased legitimacy and improved performance in governments waging a counterinsurgency campaign. Elections were expected to help overcome existing deficiencies, thus allowing governments supported by the United States to win the “hearts and minds” of its populace, undermining the appeal of insurgency. However, in each of these cases, campaigning in and winning elections did not increase the legitimacy of the counterinsurgent government or alter conditions of entrenched rent seeking and weak institutions that made states allied to the United States vulnerable to insurgency. Ultimately, elections played a limited role in creating the conditions needed for counterinsurgency success. Instead, decisions of key actors in government and elites to prioritize either short term personal and political advantage or respect for political institutions held a central role in counterinsurgency success or failure. In each of the four cases in this study, elected governments pursued policies that benefited members of the government and elites at the expense of boarder legitimacy and improved performance. Expectations that democratization could serve as a key instrument of change led to unwarranted optimism about the likely of success and ultimately to flawed strategy. The United States continued to support regimes that continued to lack the legitimacy and government performance needed for victory in counterinsurgency.

Controversial new history of counterinsurgency which challenges its claims as an effective strategy of waging war.