Detection Of Radioactive Materials At Borders

Provides guidance for Member States for use by customs, police or other law enforcement bodies on the radiation monitoring of vehicles, people and commodities at border crossing facilities as a countermeasure to illicit trafficking and also to detect inadvertent movement of radioactive materials.

Provides guidance for Member States for use by customs, police or other law enforcement bodies on the radiation monitoring of vehicles, people and commodities at border crossing facilities as a countermeasure to illicit trafficking and also to detect inadvertent movement of radioactive materials.

Detection of nuclear security events involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control is an important challenge facing States. Timely detection of this material can reduce the risk of it being used in criminal or intentional unauthorized acts. This publication provides guidance for States on planning, implementing and evaluating nuclear security detection systems and measures at State borders. Special consideration is given to designated points of entry and exit and border areas. National competent authorities such as the border guard, customs authorities, national or local law enforcement agencies and regulatory bodies will find this guidance useful for developing, designing, implementing, and sustaining detection systems and measures at State borders.

Illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material has been an issue of concern since the first seizures in the early 1990s. By the end of 2004, IAEA member states had confirmed 540 cases with another 500 unconfirmed. This publication contains a set of technical specifications that can be used in the design testing, qualifying and purchasing of border radiation monitoring equipment, drawing on work undertaken through an IAEA co-ordinated research project as well as relevant national and international standards.

Concerns have grown that terrorists could use radioactive materials and sealed sources (materials sealed in a capsule) to build a ¿dirty bomb¿ -- a device using conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material. In 2003, it was found that there were weaknesses in the NRC radioactive materials licensing process and recommend. were made for improvement. This report assesses: (1) the progress NRC has made in implementing the recommend.; (2) other steps NRC has taken to improve its ability to track radioactive materials; (3) Customs and Border Protection¿s (CBP) ability to detect radioactive materials at land ports of entry; and (4) CBP¿s ability to verify that such materials are appropriately licensed prior to entering the U.S. Illustrations.

"This publication summarizes the research conducted during an IAEA coordinated research project (CRP) undertaken to address technical and operational difficulties in the detection of and response to illicit trafficking of nuclear material. Equipment to detect illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials at borders has specific technical and operational requirements that are very different from equipment used in other radiation monitoring cases. Automated and manual measurements need to be done in the field, often outdoors, at land or sea borders, crossing points or airports. The free flow of goods and passengers must not be impacted, thus requiring that the measurement time be short. The design needs to take into account that the users of the equipment are not experts in radiation detection; thus the results of the measurements should be easy to understand"--Provided by publisher.

This publication provides guidance for States on planning, implementing and evaluating nuclear security detection systems and measures at State borders.

Radiation protection, Radiation measurement, Detectors, Measuring instruments, Radioactive materials, Nuclear fuels, Security, Performance, Performance testing, Gamma-radiation, Neutrons, Nuclear particles, Mechanical properties of materials, Environmental testing