Devolution Accountability And Service Delivery

This paper studies the relationship between devolution, accountability, and service delivery in Pakistan. It examines the degree of accessibility of local policy-makers and the level of competition in local elections, the expenditure patterns of local governments to gauge their sector priorities, and the extent to which local governments are focused on patronage or the provision of targeted benefits to a few as opposed to providing public goods. The main findings of the paper are three-fold. First, the accessibility of policy-makers to citizens in Pakistan is unequivocally greater after devolution, and local government elections are, with some notable exceptions, as competitive as national and provincial elections. Second, local government sector priorities are heavily tilted toward the provision of physical infrastructure - specifically, roads, water and sanitation, and rural electrification - at the expense of education and health. Third, this sector prioritization is in part a dutiful response to the relatively greater citizen demands for physical infrastructure; in part a reflection of the local government electoral structure that gives primacy to village and neighborhood-specific issues, and in part a reaction to provincial initiatives in education and health that have taken the political space away from local governments in the social sectors, thereby encouraging them to focus more toward physical infrastructure.

Abstract: This paper studies the relationship between devolution, accountability, and service delivery in Pakistan. It examines the degree of accessibility of local policy-makers and the level of competition in local elections, the expenditure patterns of local governments to gauge their sector priorities, and the extent to which local governments are focused on patronage or the provision of targeted benefits to a few as opposed to providing public goods. The main findings of the paper are three-fold. First, the accessibility of policy-makers to citizens in Pakistan is unequivocally greater after devolution, and local government elections are, with some notable exceptions, as competitive as national and provincial elections. Second, local government sector priorities are heavily tilted toward the provision of physical infrastructure - specifically, roads, water and sanitation, and rural electrification - at the expense of education and health. Third, this sector prioritization is in part a dutiful response to the relatively greater citizen demands for physical infrastructure; in part a reflection of the local government electoral structure that gives primacy to village and neighborhood-specific issues, and in part a reaction to provincial initiatives in education and health that have taken the political space away from local governments in the social sectors, thereby encouraging them to focus more toward physical infrastructure.

Kenya adopted a new Constitution and began the process of devolution in 2010. The new Constitution was the institutional response to longstanding grievances over the centralization of state powers and public sector resources, and regional disparities in service delivery and development outcomes. This radical restructuring of the Kenyan state has three main objectives: decentralizing political power, public sector functions, and public finances; ensuring a more equitable spatial distribution of resources between regions; and promoting more accountable, participatory, and responsive government at all levels. The first elections under the new Constitution were held in 2013. Alongside the national government, 47 new county governments were established. Each county government is made up of a County Executive, headed by an elected Governor and works under the oversight of an elected County Assembly. Seven years after the "devolution train" left the station, this report takes stock of how devolution has affected the delivery of devolved basic services to Kenyan citizens. Whereas devolution was driven by political reform, the ensuing institutions and systems were expected to deliver greater socioeconomic equity through devolved service delivery. The Making Devolution Work for Service Delivery (MDWSD) study is the first major assessment of Kenya’s devolution reform. The study was a jointly coordinated effort by the Government of Kenya and the World Bank. The study provides key messages with respect to what is working, what is not working, and what could work better to enhance service delivery based on the currently available data. It provides an independent assessment of service delivery performance in five sectors, namely health, education, agriculture, urban, and water services and includes an in-depth review of the main pillars of devolved service delivery, namely public financial management, intergovernmental finance, human resource management, politics and accountability.

Dissatisfied with centralized approaches to delivering local public services, a large number of countries are decentralizing responsibility for these services to lower-level, locally elected governments. The results have been mixed. The paper provides a framework for evaluating the benefits and costs, in terms of service delivery, of different approaches to decentralization, based on relationships of accountability between different actors in the delivery chain. Moving from a model of central provision to that of decentralization to local governments introduces a new relationship of accountability-between national and local policymakers-while altering existing relationships, such as that between citizens and elected politicians. Only by examining how these relationships change can we understand why decentralization can, and sometimes cannot, lead to better service delivery. In particular, the various instruments of decentralization-fiscal, administrative, regulatory, market, and financial-can affect the incentives facing service providers, even though they relate only to local policymakers. Likewise, and perhaps more significantly, the incentives facing local and national politicians can have a profound effect on the provision of local services. Finally, the process of implementing decentralization can be as important as the design of the system in influencing service delivery outcomes.

Dissatisfied with centralized approaches to delivering local public services, a large number of countries are decentralizing responsibility for these services to lower-level, locally elected governments. The results have been mixed. The paper provides a framework for evaluating the benefits and costs, in terms of service delivery, of different approaches to decentralization, based on relationships of accountability between different actors in the delivery chain. Moving from a model of central provision to that of decentralization to local governments introduces a new relationship of accountability-between national and local policymakers-while altering existing relationships, such as that between citizens and elected politicians. Only by examining how these relationships change can we understand why decentralization can, and sometimes cannot, lead to better service delivery. In particular, the various instruments of decentralization-fiscal, administrative, regulatory, market, and financial-can affect the incentives facing service providers, even though they relate only to local policymakers. Likewise, and perhaps more significantly, the incentives facing local and national politicians can have a profound effect on the provision of local services. Finally, the process of implementing decentralization can be as important as the design of the system in influencing service delivery outcomes.

Offers new research on the vital importance of institutions, such as presidential term-limits in the African democratisation processes.

Historically, agriculture has been crucial to Pakistan's economic growth and development and remains so even today. The sector employs almost half of the country's labor force, supplies key inputs to the country's manufacturing sector, generates a significant share of export earnings, and nourishes a rapidly growing population. Further, beyond agriculture is the wider rural economy, including nonfarm economic activities such as small enterprises, transport services, village retail shops, local schools, and clinics, all of which account for an estimated 40 to 57 percent of total rural household income. Given the importance of these rural activities, the slow growth of agriculture in recent years—averaging just 2.8 percent during the period 2010-2014—should be a source of concern for Pakistan. Can the country's agricultural sector and rural economy once again play a significant role in growth and development? Can it contribute to poverty reduction? Agriculture and the Rural Economy in Pakistan: Issues, Outlooks, and Policy Priorities seeks to answer these questions by examining the performance of both agriculture and the rural economy. The authors identify several measures that can promote agricultural productivity growth as well as wider economic and social development. These include increasing the efficiency of water use in the Indus river basin irrigation system, especially in the face of climate change; reforming policies and regulations that govern markets for agricultural inputs and commodities; and improving the provision of rural public services for health, education, women's empowerment, and community development. The analyses and conclusions in Agriculture and the Rural Economy in Pakistan will be of use to policy makers, development specialists, and others concerned with Pakistan's development. Contributors: Madiha Afzal, Nuzhat Ahmad, Faryal Ahmed, Mubarik Ali, Shujat Ali, Elena Briones Alonso, Hira Channa, Stephen Davies, Paul Dorosh, Gisselle Gajate Garrido, Arthur Gueneau, Madeeha Hameed, Brian Holtemeyer, Huma Khan, Katrina Kosec, Mehrab Malek, Sohail J. Malik, Shuaib Malik, Amina Mehmood, Dawit Mekonnen, Hina Nazli, Sara Rafi, Muhammad Ahsan Rana, Abdul Wajid Rana, Danielle Resnick, Khalid Riaz, Abdul Salam, Emily Schmidt, Asma Shahzad, David J. Spielman, James Thurlow, Ahmad Waqas, Edward Whitney, Fatima Zaidi.