Do All Persons Have Equal Moral Worth

The idea that all persons are in some way moral equals or owe each other equal respect and concern has become dogma, and thinkers who question it are often reviled as "Nazis" or "racists". The authors in this volume, however, take a more reflective and critical attitude and try to clarify concepts, showing that the argument is far from obvious.

An enduring theme of Western philosophy is that we are all one another’s equals. Yet the principle of basic equality is woefully under-explored in modern moral and political philosophy. What does it mean to say we are all one another’s equals? Jeremy Waldron confronts this question fully and unflinchingly in a major new multifaceted account.

That all human beings are one another's moral equals is taken by many to be the fundamental premise of contemporary moral, political and legal theory. It is also the demand of individuals and groups to be treated as equals that drives much of political practice and protest today. However, what does such a claim of 'basic equality' between human beings mean? How can it possibly be true, given that we are unequals in almost every other aspect of our lives? And, who, exactly, is meant to fall within its scope? This volume brings together leading thinkers on basic equality to address these questions. Collectively, they explore the concept of equality in history and criticism, analysing and presenting solutions to the most pressing challenges that have been raised against the principle.

This book defends an original and pluralist theory of when and why discrimination wrongs people. Starting from actual legal cases in which claimants have alleged wrongful discrimination by other people or by the state, Sophia Moreau argues that we can best understand these people's complaints by thinking of them as complaints about different ways in which they have not been treated as equals in their societies--in particular, through unfair subordination, through the violation of their right to a particular deliberative freedom, or through the denial to them of access to a basic good, that is, a good that this person must have access to if they are to be, and to be seen as, an equal in their society. The book devotes a chapter to each of these wrongs, exploring in detail what unfair subordination consists of; what deliberative freedoms are, and when each of us has a right to them; and what it means to deny someone access to a basic good. The author explains why these wrongs are each distinctive, but are each a different way of failing to treat some people as the equals of others. Finally the author argues that both the state and we as individuals have a duty to treat others as equals, in these three specific senses.

This is the first book devoted to the work of Peter Singer, one of the leaders of the practical ethics movement, and one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century.

This enlightening inquiry into the nature of human equality reveals the vital importance of this basic Western principle—“an important new book” (Robert B. Reich, New York Times Book Review). An enduring theme of Western philosophy is that we are all one another’s equals. Yet the principle of basic equality is woefully under-explored in modern moral and political philosophy. In a major new work, Jeremy Waldron attempts to remedy that shortfall with a subtle and multifaceted account of the basis for the West’s commitment to human equality. Waldron argues that there is no single characteristic that serves as the basis of equality. Instead, the case for moral equality rests on four capacities that all humans have the potential to possess in some degree: reason, autonomy, moral agency, and the ability to love. But how should we regard the differences that people display on these various dimensions? Waldron, who has specialized in the nature of equality for many years, confronts these questions and others fully and unflinchingly. Based on the Gifford Lectures that he delivered at the University of Edinburgh in 2015, One Another’s Equals takes Waldron’s thinking further and deeper than ever before.

That all human beings are one another's moral equals is taken by many to be the fundamental premise of contemporary moral, political and legal theory. It is also the demand of individuals and groups to be treated as equals that drives much of political practice and protest today. However, what does such a claim of 'basic equality' between human beings mean? How can it possibly be true, given that we are unequals in almost every other aspect of our lives? And, who, exactly, is meant to fall within its scope? This volume brings together leading thinkers on basic equality to address these questions. Collectively, they explore the concept of equality in history and criticism, analysing and presenting solutions to the most pressing challenges that have been raised against the principle.

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.