Does Financial Tranquility Call For Stringent Regulation

Consistent with the Minsky hypothesis and the “volatility paradox” (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014), recent empirical evidence suggests that financial crises tend to follow prolonged periods of financial stability and investor optimism. But does financial tranquility always call for more stringent regulation over time? We examine this question using a simple portfolio choice model that features the interaction between learning and externality. We evaluate the potential of a macroprudential policy to restore efficiency, and characterize the necessary and sufficient condition for the countercyclicality of the optimal regulation/macroprudential policy. Our paper implies that policymakers should not only consider the cyclical indicators “on the surface” (for example, credit growth), but also closely examine the deep structural change of the resilience of the system. The paper also highlights the importance of assigning the macroprudential policy function to independent agencies with technical expertise.

In late 2008, the world's financial system was teetering on the brink of systemic collapse. While the impacts of the global financial crisis would be felt immediately, at every level of the economy, it would also send years-long aftershocks through investment, banking and regulatory circles worldwide. More than a decade after the worst year of the global financial crisis, what has been learned from its harsh lessons? Are governments and regulators more prepared for another financial system failure that would significantly affect the real economy? What may be the potential triggers for such a collapse to occur in the future? Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: Ten Years after the Great Crash draws on some of the world's leading experts on financial stability and regulation to examine and critique the progress made since 2008 in addressing systemic risk. The book covers topics such as central banks and macroprudential policies; fintech; regulators' perspectives from the United States and the European Union; the logistical and incentive challenges that impede standardization and collection; clearing houses and systemic risk; optimal resolution and bail-in tools; and bank leverage, welfare and regulation. Drawing on experts across disciplines — including Howell Jackson, John Geanakoplos, Charles Goodhart, Anat Admati, Roberta Romano and Martin Hellwig — Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector is the definitive guide to understanding the global financial crisis, the safeguards being put into place to try to avoid similar crises in the future, and the limitations of those safeguards.

This global handbook provides an up-to-date and comprehensive overview of shadow banking, or market-based finance as it has been recently coined. Engaging in financial intermediary services outside of normal regulatory parameters, the shadow banking sector was arguably a critical factor in causing the 2007-2009 financial crisis. This second volume explores three particular domains of shadow banking. The first domain deals with the macro-economic fundamentals of the respective shadow banking segments: Why do they exist, what problems do they solve and why are some of their embedded risks so persistent? The second domain captures the global dimensions of shadow banking markets, reviewing the particularities and specifics of various shadow banking systems around the world. Volume II concludes with an extensive overview of how the sector has changed since the financial crisis, focusing on regulatory arbitrage, contract imperfection and governance. Closing on unresolved issues and open-ended questions that will no doubt remain prominent in the shadow banking sector for years to come, this handbook is a must-read for professionals and policy-makers within the banking sector, as well as those researching economics and finance.

The countercyclical capital buffer (CCB) was proposed by the Basel committee to increase the resilience of the banking sector to negative shocks. The interactions between banking sector losses and the real economy highlight the importance of building a capital buffer in periods when systemic risks are rising. Basel III introduces a framework for a time-varying capital buffer on top of the minimum capital requirement and another time-invariant buffer (the conservation buffer). The CCB aims to make banks more resilient against imbalances in credit markets and thereby enhance medium-term prospects of the economy—in good times when system-wide risks are growing, the regulators could impose the CCB which would help the banks to withstand losses in bad times.

This work provides a guide to money and finance. The second edition highlights the changes that have taken place in the period since 1988, including the banking crises of the early 1990s.

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis, the federal government has pursued significant regulatory reforms, including proposals to measure and monitor systemic risk. However, there is much debate about how this might be accomplished quantitatively and objectively—or whether this is even possible. A key issue is determining the appropriate trade-offs between risk and reward from a policy and social welfare perspective given the potential negative impact of crises. One of the first books to address the challenges of measuring statistical risk from a system-wide persepective, Quantifying Systemic Risk looks at the means of measuring systemic risk and explores alternative approaches. Among the topics discussed are the challenges of tying regulations to specific quantitative measures, the effects of learning and adaptation on the evolution of the market, and the distinction between the shocks that start a crisis and the mechanisms that enable it to grow.

MCM conducted a survey in December 2010 to take stock of international experiences with financial stability and the evolving macroprudential policy framework. The survey was designed to seek information in three broad areas: the institutional setup for macroprudential policy, the analytical approach to systemic risk monitoring, and the macroprudential policy toolkit. The survey was sent to 63 countries and the European Central Bank (ECB), including all countries in the G-20 and those subject to mandatory Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs). The target list is designed to cover a broad range of jurisdictions in all regions, but more weight is given to economies that are systemically important (see Annex for details). The response rate is 80 percent. This note provides a summary of the survey’s main findings.

How philosophical differences between Eurozone nations led to the Euro crisis—and where to go from here Why is Europe’s great monetary endeavor, the Euro, in trouble? A string of economic difficulties in Eurozone nations has left observers wondering whether the currency union can survive. In this book, Markus Brunnermeier, Harold James, and Jean-Pierre Landau argue that the core problem with the Euro lies in the philosophical differences between the founding countries of the Eurozone, particularly Germany and France. But the authors also show how these seemingly incompatible differences can be reconciled to ensure Europe’s survival. Weaving together economic analysis and historical reflection, The Euro and the Battle of Ideas provides a forensic investigation and a road map for Europe’s future.