Does Regulatory Governance Matter For Financial System Stability An Empirical Analysis

This paper provides empirical evidence that the quality of regulatory governance-governance practices adopted by financial system regulators and supervisors-matters for financial system soundness. The paper constructs indices of financial system soundness and regulatory governance, based on country data collected from the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Regression results indicate that regulatory governance has a significant influence on financial system soundness, along with variables reflecting macroeconomic conditions, the structure of the banking system, and the quality of political institutions and public sector governance. The results also indicate that good public sector governance amplifies the impact of regulatory governance on financial system soundness.

This paper provides empirical evidence that the quality of regulatory governance governance practices adopted by financial system regulators and supervisors matters for financial system soundness. The paper constructs indices of financial system soundness and regulatory governance, based on country data collected from the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Regression results indicate that regulatory governance has a significant influence on financial system soundness, along with variables reflecting macroeconomic conditions, the structure of the banking system, and the quality of political institutions and public sector governance. The results also indicate that good public sector governance amplifies the impact of regulatory governance on financial system soundness.

This book provides novel insight into the governance of banks and looks at regulatory measures for strengthening bank stability. It includes empirical studies on the relationship between the board structures of banks and their financial risk-taking and analyses the determinants of bank reputation and the future prospects of small banks.

Using a multi-country panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk-adjusted ratio; the leverage ratio; the Tier I and Tier II ratios; and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk-adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.

The paper provides robust evidence that compliance with Basel Core Principles (BCPs) has a strong positive effect on the Z-score of conventional banks, albeit less pronounced on the Zscore of Islamic banks. Using a sample of banks operating in 19 developing countries, the results appear to be driven by capital ratios, a component of Z-score for the two types of banks. Even though smaller on Islamic banks, individual chapters of BCPs also suggest a positive effect on the stability of conventional banks. The findings support the effective role of BCP standards in improving bank stability, whose important implications led to the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) publication of new recommendations in 2015 to bring BCP standards in line with the Core Principles for Islamic Finance Regulation (CPIFRs) standards. Our findings suggest that because Islamic banks are benchmarked closely to BCPs, the implementation of CPFIRs should also positively affect their stability.

MCM conducted a survey in December 2010 to take stock of international experiences with financial stability and the evolving macroprudential policy framework. The survey was designed to seek information in three broad areas: the institutional setup for macroprudential policy, the analytical approach to systemic risk monitoring, and the macroprudential policy toolkit. The survey was sent to 63 countries and the European Central Bank (ECB), including all countries in the G-20 and those subject to mandatory Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs). The target list is designed to cover a broad range of jurisdictions in all regions, but more weight is given to economies that are systemically important (see Annex for details). The response rate is 80 percent. This note provides a summary of the survey’s main findings.

The October 2019 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) identifies the current key vulnerabilities in the global financial system as the rise in corporate debt burdens, increasing holdings of riskier and more illiquid assets by institutional investors, and growing reliance on external borrowing by emerging and frontier market economies. The report proposes that policymakers mitigate these risks through stricter supervisory and macroprudential oversight of firms, strengthened oversight and disclosure for institutional investors, and the implementation of prudent sovereign debt management practices and frameworks for emerging and frontier market economies.

Extraordinary policy measures have eased financial conditions and supported the economy, helping to contain financial stability risks. Chapter 1 warns that there is a pressing need to act to avoid a legacy of vulnerabilities while avoiding a broad tightening of financial conditions. Actions taken during the pandemic may have unintended consequences such as stretched valuations and rising financial vulnerabilities. The recovery is also expected to be asynchronous and divergent between advanced and emerging market economies. Given large external financing needs, several emerging markets face challenges, especially if a persistent rise in US rates brings about a repricing of risk and tighter financial conditions. The corporate sector in many countries is emerging from the pandemic overindebted, with notable differences depending on firm size and sector. Concerns about the credit quality of hard-hit borrowers and profitability are likely to weigh on the risk appetite of banks. Chapter 2 studies leverage in the nonfinancial private sector before and during the COVID-19 crisis, pointing out that policymakers face a trade-off between boosting growth in the short term by facilitating an easing of financial conditions and containing future downside risks. This trade-off may be amplified by the existing high and rapidly building leverage, increasing downside risks to future growth. The appropriate timing for deployment of macroprudential tools should be country-specific, depending on the pace of recovery, vulnerabilities, and policy tools available. Chapter 3 turns to the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on the commercial real estate sector. While there is little evidence of large price misalignments at the onset of the pandemic, signs of overvaluation have now emerged in some economies. Misalignments in commercial real estate prices, especially if they interact with other vulnerabilities, increase downside risks to future growth due to the possibility of sharp price corrections.