Duncan Sandys And British Nuclear Policy Making

This book offers new perspectives on British nuclear policy-making at the height of the Cold War, arguing that the decisions taken by the British government during the 1950s and 1960s in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions cannot be properly understood without close reference to Duncan Sandys, and in particular the policy preferences that emerged from his experiences of the Second World War and his efforts leading Britain's campaign against the V-1 and V-2. Immersing himself in this campaign against unmanned weaponry, Sandys came to see ballistic missiles as the only guarantor of nuclear credibility in the post-war world, placing them at the centre of his strategic thinking and developing a sincerely-held and logically-consistent belief system which he carried with him through a succession of ministerial roles, allowing him to exert a previously undocumented level of influence on the nature of Britain's nuclear capabilities and its approach to the Cold War. This book shows the profound influence Sandys' personal belief system had on Britain's attempts to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent.

This book throws new light on the impact of informal ‘old boy’ networks on British decolonisation. Duncan Sandys was one of the leading Conservative politicians of the middle decades of twentieth-century Britain. He was also a key figure in the Harold Macmillan’s ‘Winds of Change’ policy of decolonisation, serving as Secretary for the Colonies and Commonwealth Relations from 1960 to 1964. When he lost office he fought strenuously to undermine the new Labour Government’s attempts to accelerate colonial withdrawal and improve race relations in Britain. Sandys developed important private business interests in Africa and intervened personally through both public and official channels on the question of Rhodesia, Commonwealth immigration and the ‘East of Suez’ withdrawal in the late 1960s. This book will appeal to students of decolonisation and twentieth-century British politics alike.

In the early 1950s the United States wished to concentrate its defence resources on the development of a 4,000 mile range intercontinental ballistic missile. As a stop-gap measure, US defence chiefs hoped to assist Britain with the development of its own intermediate range missile. Despite US concerns that British resources were limited the Air Ministry nonetheless proceeded with the missile, called Blue Streak, to fulfil the operational requirement which would give Britain an independent deterrent which should remain invulnerable until the early 1970s. Blue Streak: Britain's Medium Range Ballistic Missile traces the path from the political decision to issue the contracts through the early development and testing both in the UK and in Australia. The reasons for the project's cancellation are considered and Blue Streak's subsequent role as the first stage of the ELDO civilian satellite launcher is noted. A requirement of the project was the need to base the missiles in underground launchers to protect them from attack. This aspect of the project is fully covered using recently available information and specially drawn plans.

Bringing together leading researchers on Canadian air power, On the Wings of War and Peace captures the history of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) during the first decades of the Cold War – a period which marked the zenith of air force accomplishments in peacetime Canada. The volume covers topics that go beyond straightforward flying operations, examining policies that drove operational needs and capabilities and the personnel, technical, and logistical functions that made those operations possible. With contributions written by former RCAF members who have both expert and personal knowledge of their topics, On the Wings of War and Peace brings new perspectives to the RCAF’s role in shaping the modern Canadian nation.

Inhaltsangabe:Abstract: Is Great Britain really a desperate European? This was the question in mind whilst writing this essay. Would Britain go to war against Iraq with the United States of America, or would it search for a peaceful solution together with old Europe within the United Nations. The answer to this question is well known today. The UK decided to wage war on Iraq together with America. Once again Britain gave its continental European partners the feeling to be more the fifty-first state of America than a member of the European Union, trying to find a common European position in foreign and security policy. Why does the UK behave the way it does? Is it really taking a reluctant position against an ever increasing importance of the EU in foreign and security affairs? What is it about its relationship to the US, and which role does the Commonwealth play in this area traditionally the domain of sovereign national politics? The essay examining these questions will come to an astonishing conclusion. At the moment Britain is celebrating its 30th anniversary of EU membership. This should be an occasion to find out more about its foreign and defence policy. At the time of writing, Britain was the only European power coupled with the US in preparing for a war against Iraq. The question has to be asked as to why Britain has adopted such a pro-American stance? Since Blair's election to power in 1997, time and time again he has emphasized that Britain's future is in Europe. However, certainly with regard to foreign and defence policy, such a statement appears hollow. What happened with those honourable aims of European integration like a Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was established as a 'pillar' of the EU by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Finding an agreed European Common and Foreign Policy certainly has not been obtained and could even be said to be in its worst state ever. Nothing illustrated this better than the diversity of opinion within the EU concerning the possible war with Iraq. Italy and Spain tended towards the position of the US and Britain. France wanted to formulate a new UN resolution before deciding the course of action they wish to take. Germany stood against the use of any force. At present, it would seem that the CFSP remains an objective to be realised at a later date. Past and present, none of the other EU members act as closely with the US as Britain. Is Britain's policy influenced by American interests [...]

This book reveals the nature and level of British engagement with controversial and lethal nerve agent weapons from the end of the Second World War to Britain’s submission of a draft Chemical Weapons Convention. At the very heart of this highly secretive aspect of British defence policy were fundamental questions over whether Britain should acquire nerve agent weapons for potential first-use against the Soviet Union, retain them purely for their deterrence value, or drive for either unilateral or international chemical weapons disarmament. These considerations and concerns over nerve agent weapons were not limited to low-level defence committees, nor were they consigned to the periphery, but featured prominently at the highest levels of the British government and defence planning. Importantly, and despite stringent secrecy, the book further uncovers how public scrutiny and protest movements played a substantial and successful part in influencing policy and attitudes towards nerve agent weapons.

First published in 1990, this title examines British defence policy from 1688 onwards; the year in which Britain was successfully invaded for the final time, and which marked a generation of warfare that lasted until 1714, during which Britain came to be known as a major European power. David French considers the strategic alliances that formed and changed throughout the period, and tests his hypotheses in light of the varying paradigms of war, and British wartime and peacetime practices. The ways in which the needs of both the army and the navy have been balanced over time are analysed, with particular attention paid to how parliament allotted money and resources to each. Wars under discussion include the American War of Independence, and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. A detailed and critical title, this reissue will be of great value to history students studying Early Modern diplomacy, with a particular emphasis on the strategic development of British warfare and policy, and the place of Britain within the European power structure.