Economic Sanctions Reconsidered Third Edition

Accompanying CD-ROM contains ... "case histories and data."--CD-ROM label.

Economic sanctions continue to play an important role in the response to terrorism, nuclear proliferation, military conflicts, and other foreign policy crises. But poor design and implementation of sanctions policies often mean that they fall short of their desired effects. This landmark study, first published in 1985, delves into the rich experience of sanctions in the 20th century to harvest lessons on how to use sanctions more effectively. This volume is the updated third edition of this widely cited study. It chronicles and examines 170 cases of economic sanctions imposed since World War I. Fifty of these cases were launched in the 1990s and are new to this edition. Special attention is paid to new developments arising from the end of the Cold War and increasing globalization of the world economy. Analyzing a range of economic and political factors that can influence the success of a sanctions episode, the authors distill a set of commandments to guide policymakers in the effective use of sanctions.

Smart Sanctions explores the emerging concept of targeted sanctions and provides a comprehensive framework for new sanctions strategies for the 21st century. It includes essays by experts and analysts from the United Nations community, the European Union, the United States Government, and the academic community. Visit our website for sample chapters!

Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.--Publisher description.