Economics And Management Of Franchising Networks

Franchising networks are experiencing great success in international business organization. Few books try to explain the characteristics of these networks. Contrary to the existing literature this book tackles more theoretical problems related to governance, organization, knowledge management, contract design, incentive and regulation issues both from the economic and management view point. It delivers new theoretical and empirical results regarding plural forms, contract design, and knowledge and strategic management issues. Its purpose is to offer researchers and practitioners new theoretical and empirical insights in one of the most important economic phenomenon at the beginning of the 21st century: Franchising networks as organizational arrangement for growth and internationalization of firms.

Previous research on the institutional structure of franchising networks (Bri- ley et al. 1991; Lutz 1995; Shane 1998; Lafontaine and Shaw 1999, 2005; - fuso 2002; Penard et al. 2003a,b) does not explain the governance structure of the franchising firm as an institutional entity that consists of two interrelated parts: Residual decision rights and ownership rights. The latter includes not only residual income rights of franchised outlets but also residual income rights of franchisor-owned outlets. Previous studies primarily examines the incentive, signalling and screening effects of fees, royalties and other contractual pro- sions from the point of view of organizational economics (see Dnes 1996 for a review) without taking into account the interactions between residual decision and residual income rights as interrelated parts of the governance structure. This paper fills this gap in the literature. According to the property rights view, de- sion rights should be allocated according to the distribution of intangible kno- edge assets between the franchisor and franchisee and ownership rights should be assigned according to the residual decision rights. Since ownership rights are diluted in franchising networks, the dilution of residual income rights of fr- chised outlets is compensated by residual income rights of company-owned o- lets. Under a dual ownership structure, company-owned outlets compensate the disincentive effect of low royalties for the franchisor, and low royalties strengthen the investment incentives for the franchisee.

The theory of networks aims at developing theoretical views on the design and management of alliances, franchise chains, licensing, joint ventures, cooperatives, and venture capital relations. The current trend in economics and management of networks is twofold: First there is a strong tendency toward application of theoretical approaches developed both in organizational economics, strategic management and organization theory. The second trend refers to the development of more integrative views on networks. Especially, combining organizational economics, strategic management and relational views on networks are very promising research directions. Starting from this status of research, the current book emphasizes network research as a theory-driven field by offering new perspectives on contract design, decision and ownership rights, value creation, knowledge management and the role of social capital in franchising networks, alliances and cooperatives.

This book highlights cutting-edge research in the economics and management of networks as an interdisciplinary field, offering new theoretical, empirical and practical perspectives on the management, governance, ownership and control of cooperatives, franchising networks and strategic alliances. Further, it presents a strategic group perspective on franchisers and discusses both social entrepreneurship issues in franchising and franchising strategies for Indigenous entrepreneurship in Australia. Lastly, it offers a dynamic capabilities approach to alliance portfolio management and analyses the antecedents of the transitions taking place in the lifecycles of alliances.

The book emphasizes research in economics and management of networks as an interdisciplinary field by offering new theoretical perspectives and presenting new empirical results on strategic and governance structure issues in cooperatives, franchising networks, alliances, joint ventures and venture capital relations. The authors apply different theoretical views on networks, such as transaction cost theory, property rights theory, resource- and knowledge-based theory, evolutionary theory, information richness theory and social exchange theory.

This contributed volume focuses on the management and governance of international business networks (IBN). Specifically, the chapters refer to theoretical, conceptual, empirical, and case study papers from all areas in economics and management of IBN. These include cooperatives, franchising, retail chains, strategic alliances, public-private partnerships and new network forms in the digital economy. This book is ideal for researchers and strategists who are keen to improve their understanding of the latest developments in the field.

Interfirm networks include franchising, retail and service chains, cooperatives, financial networks, joint ventures, strategic alliances, licensing, public-private partnerships and new network forms in the digital economy. This book gathers the latest research studies that approach these networks – and the creation of innovation under the conditions of a complex, dynamic, knowledge-intensive and digital economy – from an interdisciplinary perspective. The studies, all of which were written by respected experts, explore how firms can improve their competitiveness by securing access to innovation, knowledge, complementary resources and capabilities otherwise not available to them. In addition, they highlight how, driven by an unpredictable environment, firms embedded in inter-organizational networks are increasingly transforming from co-operators to collaborators and valuable co-creators of innovation.

The organization of interfirm networks, such as alliances, cooperatives, franchise and retail chains, has become an important research topic in the field of economics, marketing, strategic management, and organization theory. This book contributes to the literature on formal and informal inter-organizational governance by providing new insights on contract design, ownership, evolution of cooperation, role of social capital and performance in franchising networks; includes topics of loyalty, reputation and organizational form as well as performance of cooperatives, and discusses the relationship between formal and relational governance in alliances, governance structures of innovation activities, dynamics of interfirm conflicts, and network externalities and alliance formation.