Emergence In Mind

There have long been controversies about how minds can fit into a physical universe. In Emergence in Mind a distinguished group of philosophers discuss whether mental properties can be said to 'emerge' from physical processes. The discussion is extended to cover the role emergence may play in free will and agency, and in the special sciences.

An anthology that traces the representation of consciousness and mind creation in English literature from 700 to the present.

A collection of essays on the relation between the conscious mind and the body. In this text, philosopher Robert Van Gulick gives a clear overview and comparison on "emergent" and "reductive" approaches, while others discuss more detailed aspects.

There have long been controversies about how minds can fit into a physical universe. In 'Emergence in Mind' a distinguished group of philosophers discuss whether mental properties can be said to 'emerge' from physical processes.

Strong claims have been made for emergence as a new paradigm for understanding science, consciousness, and religion. Tracing the past history and current definitions of the concept, Clayton assesses the case for emergent phenomena in the natural world and their significance for philosophy and theology. Complex emergent phenomena require irreducible levels of explanation in physics, chemistry and biology. This pattern of emergence suggests a new approach to the problem of consciousness, which is neither reducible to brain states nor proof of a mental substance or soul. Although emergence does not entail classical theism, it is compatible with a variety of religious positions. Clayton concludes with a defence of emergentist panentheism and a Christian constructive theology consistent with the new sciences of emergence.

There have long been controversies about how it is that minds can fit into a physical universe. Emergence in Mind presents new essays by a distinguished group of philosophers investigating whether mental properties can be said to 'emerge' from the physical processes in the universe. Such emergence requires mental properties to be different from physical properties, and much of the discussion relates to what the consequences of such a difference might be in areas such as freedom of the will, and the possibility of scientific explanations of non-physical (for example, social) phenomena. The volume also extends the debate about emergence by considering the independence of chemical properties from physical properties, and investigating what would need to be the case for there to be groups that could be said to exercise rationality.

Recent neuroscience research makes it clear that human biology is cultural biology - we develop and live our lives in socially constructed worlds that vary widely in their structure values, and institutions. This integrative volume brings together interdisciplinary perspectives from the human, social, and biological sciences to explore culture, mind, and brain interactions and their impact on personal and societal issues. Contributors provide a fresh look at emerging concepts, models, and applications of the co-constitution of culture, mind, and brain. Chapters survey the latest theoretical and methodological insights alongside the challenges in this area, and describe how these new ideas are being applied in the sciences, humanities, arts, mental health, and everyday life. Readers will gain new appreciation of the ways in which our unique biology and cultural diversity shape behavior and experience, and our ongoing adaptation to a constantly changing world.

This book presents an ontologically and methodologically well founded Physicalist proposal that does not lose sight of the special particularity and alleged irreducibility of some of the most obvious phenomena of our existence, such as the human mind. The author provides a compelling argument against the most widely accepted interpretation of Physicalism, Microphysicalism. Morales argues in favor of Emergentism as a non-reductive physicalist proposal that explains the causal reality of higher-level properties as metaphysically dependent but not supervenient on their microphysical bases.