Enforcing Contracts In Transition Economies

This important and incisive new book examines contractual enforcement mechanisms in Central and South-Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The volume is an outcome of the cooperation between the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. The book highlights that after more than 13 years of transition, contract enforcement has not reached a stage where it provides the required basis for economic development. It requires sustained attention from national governments, regional bodies, and the international community. The book concludes by examining the appropriate way forward. The enforcement of contractual rights and obligations is a condition for economic development, and this book should appeal to a wide readership ranging from academics and practitioners to policy makers and the judiciary in both developed and developing economies.

An institutional approach to explaining countertrade and barter in international trade and domestic trade in transition economies.

'Judicial Systems in Transition Economies' looks at the experience of countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as they reform their legal and judicial institutions to fit the needs of a market economy. The study shows, rather disturbingly, that less progress has been made in judicial reform than in most other areas of institutional reform in these countries. The transition from socialism to capitalism requires a fundamental reorientation of legal and judicial institutions. This study reviews the environment preceding reforms, forces that provoked and supported them, and the reform agendas undertaken in these countries since 1990. Against this background, it exposes the impact of reforms, implementation gaps, and the underlying determinants of success and failure. The report examines how courts have performed, and reveals their impact on public opinion and the business environment. It provides insight into linkages among reforms as well as linkages between reforms and public demand for a fair judiciary. The authors show that while each country presents different challenges and opportunities, certain lessons apply in most settings. Their insights and data would be useful to policy makers, judicial personnel, and those involved in reforming judiciaries. The study draws on numerous data sources. These include the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, the American Bar Association-Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (ABA-CEELI), the World Values Survey, the World Economic Forum, and the University of Strathclyde.

Why are some nations wealthy while others are desperately poor? Despite the rapid advancement of technology and the free flow of information provided by computers, many poor nations are falling further behind the wealthy nations of the world. Why is it that these poorer nations cannot catch up? Until recently, economic theory provided limited help in answering these questions. But the New Institutional Economics, a rapidly growing body of economic theory, may provide the answers. Timothy Yeager's Institutions, Transition Economies, and Economic Development clearly explains the New Institutional Economics, and applies its tenets to the transition economies of Poland and Russia. Readers will gain a perspective on transition and developing economies that has never been explored before in a single book.

An institutional approach to explaining countertrade and barter in international trade and domestic trade in transition economies. Difficulties in contract enforcement impede international transactions in the world economy and domestic transactions in transition economies. In Contracts in Trade and Transition, Dalia Marin and Monika Schnitzer explain how barter as an economic institution can facilitate contract enforcement across national borders in international trade and within borders in transition countries. The authors show that international countertrade—tying an export to an import—emerged in the 1980s in response to the international debt crisis when Western creditors refused to finance imports to developing countries and Eastern Europe. Barter—the exchange of goods without the use of money—reemerged in transition economies in the 1990s in response to a domestic debt crisis when banks in transition countries were reluctant to provide finance to firms. Countertrade and barter introduce a deal-specific form of collateral that addresses the lack of creditworthiness of countries and firms. Drawing on contract theory, the authors argue that parties might want to pay in goods rather than cash or link an export with an import as in countertrade to solve incentive problems that otherwise would prevent any trade from taking place. The incentive problems they discuss are the technology transfer problem to developing countries and the "lack of trust" problem in the former Soviet Union.

- What has been achieved in rural finance and institutional reform during more than a decade of transition and what challenges remain? - What are the special needs of South Eastern European countries to attract agricultural credit and finance to ...