Engagement With North Korea

Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang’s Nuclear North Korea was first published in 2003 amid the outbreak of a lasting crisis over the North Korean nuclear program. It promptly became a landmark of an ongoing debate in academic and policy circles about whether to engage or contain North Korea. Fifteen years later, as North Korea tests intercontinental ballistic missiles and the U.S. president angrily refers to Kim Jong-un as “Rocket Man,” Nuclear North Korea remains an essential guide to the difficult choices we face. Coming from different perspectives—Kang believes the threat posed by Pyongyang has been inflated and endorses a more open approach, while Cha is more skeptical and advocates harsher measures, though both believe that some form of engagement is necessary—the authors together present authoritative analysis of one of the world’s thorniest challenges. They refute a number of misconceptions and challenge the faulty thinking that surrounds the discussion of North Korea, particularly the idea that North Korea is an irrational actor. Cha and Kang look at the implications of a nuclear North Korea, assess recent and current approaches to sanctions and engagement, and provide a functional framework for constructive policy. With a new chapter on the way forward for the international community in light of continued nuclear tensions, this book is of lasting relevance to understanding the state of affairs on the Korean peninsula.

Examines how and why nations have persuaded North Korea to cooperate on topics such as nuclear policy.

This book addresses growing tensions in Northeast Asia, notably between North Korea and China. Focusing on China’s economic participation in North Korea’s minerals and fishery industries, the author explores the role of China’s sub-state and non-state actors in implementing China’s foreign economic policy towards North Korea. The book discusses these actors’ impact on the regional order in Northeast Asia, particularly in the Korean Peninsula. The project also provides a comprehensive and up-to-date account of China’s cultural and economic activities in North Korea as implemented by both the historically traditional actors in Jilin and Liaoning provinces in Northeast China, and new actors from coastal areas (Shandong and Zhejiang provinces) and inland provinces (Chongqing and Henan) to Zhejiang province. It argues that in the era of economic decentralisation, Chinese sub-state and non-state actors can independently deal with most of their economic affairs without the need for permission from the central government in Beijing. A key read for scholars and students interested in Asian history, politics and economics, and specifically the East Asian situation, this text offers an in-depth analysis of recent activity concerning the Sino-DPRK economic relationship.

A fresh historical and theoretical exploration of the much-debated, but still elusive, question of the Korean divide. In contrast to much of the literature on the divide, which deals with state-building on the two sides of the Demilitarized Zone, this book sheds light on the slow, but steady process of homogenization between the two estranged peoples, as accelerated after the end of the Cold War and especially after the inauguration of President Kim Dae-jung in 1998. Providing immense empirical detail as well as theoretical debate on the ideas in policy shaping in South Korea, the book presents a rich ‘history of enemies’ and covers issues including: an overview of the structural shift and the rise and fall of identity groups in South Korea history of 'enemy-making' and 'peace-building' North Korea's external relations with the US, Japan and Europe Hyundai's groundbreaking, cross-border tourism and other economic cooperation projects the lingering nuclear weapons crises. By focusing on the question of identities, the book presents a new approach on one of the most important legacies of the Cold War and threat to peace in the contemporary world: the divided Korean peninsula. As such it fills a major gap in the literature, utilizing new theoretical and empirical frameworks to deal with the Korean division and its future implications in East Asia.

Despite the volatility and unpredictability North Korea has come to symbolize in international diplomacy and security issues, it represents only half of the potential danger on the Korean peninsula. In a notable departure from its past role as guarantor of stability on the Korean peninsula, the United States has, under the stewardship of the Bush administration, come to be regarded as, at best, an obstacle to peace and security, and at worst a potential trigger for hostility. The most immediate result of this shift on the Korean peninsula has been the US failure to undertake an effective policy formulation process, which has manifested itself (on both sides of the 38th parallel) in more reactive and convulsive responses to challenges from the North Korean regime. Without such understanding there is little hope of advancing discussions or resolving North Korea's nuclear program. Fundamental to understanding North Korea's endgame is realizing that its nuclear weapons program, while menacing, is unlikely to be used offensively without major provocation; it functions as a tool of its diplomacy—missile diplomacy—to ensure survival of the regime. Working closely with South Korea, the United States must ensure that any potential resolution reached on North Korea's nuclear program does not undermine its longer-term objectives for securing broader peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Ideally, any resolution brokered over the North's nuclear weapons program will provide a synergistic effect in addressing the conventional war threat posed by North Korea on the Korean peninsula. In short, the United States must undertake constructive engagement. Steadfast unwillingness to engage with North Korea only provides more fodder for the regime to stall any action, and, as part of its endgame, makes U.S. behavior the issue. the issue, which is part of its endgame.

This ambitious book is constructed to provide the reader with unusually broad and deep insight into North Korea, illustrating how the Kim Jong-un regime calculates, balances, and addresses the various key policy challenges it faces. This will be accomplished through the extensive experience of the authors—Korean, European, and American—in North Korea and with North Koreans. There is no substitute for such direct experience in order to address the numerous myths and misconceptions that have grown up and persisted over the years about how the North functions, and how it perceives the world. Moreover, the usual focus on a single issue—for example, just nuclear or just economic matters—fails to provide a sense of how important the inter-relationship of these separate parts is in understanding the whole. The experience brought to bear in the book and the breadth of coverage provides badly needed, critical insights about North Korea at time when policy in Seoul and Washington toward the North is at a crucial hinge point.

Following the failure of recent efforts by the United States to engage North Korea in denuclearization negotiations, the author proposed and tested an approach to negotiations, called the portfolio method, that addresses the reasons for past failures in an effort to develop action plans that will successfully engage all sides. The author assembled a team of experts, who went through the steps for portfolio creation and provided a review.

The Korean peninsula remains one of the world's most dangerous places. While North Korea has an army of 1.2 million troops and holds Seoul hostage with its missiles and artillery, Pyongyang is in desperate straits after a decade of economic decline, food shortages, and diplomatic isolation. In 1998, former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry traveled to Pyongyang to propose increasing outside aid from the United States, South Korea, and Japan in exchange for North Korea's promise to reduce military provocations. The third in a series of influential Task Force reports on Korea policy, this study argues that, in spite of tensions, the United States should continue to support South Korea's engagement policy and keep Perry's proposal on the table. The Task Force recommends that, should North Korea increase tensions by testing long-range missiles, the United States and its allies should take a new approach to Pyongyang, including enhancing U.S.-Japan and South Korean deterrence against other North Korean threats, suspending new South Korean investment in North Korea, and placing new Japanese restrictions on financial transfers to the North. By suggesting the possibility of gradually reducing the danger on the Korean peninsula, this report represents a crucial addition to the discussion of U.S.-North Korean economic relations.