Envisioning Future Warfare

The strategic environment at the end of the 20th century is characterized by two competing trends. First, the international system has entered a period of increased instability. Second, we are witnessing the maturation of information processing technology and its subsequent impact on economics, politics, and the conduct of war. This collection of three articles explores these trends and seeks to envision their implications on future war. Taken together, these articles illuminate contemporary debates in military affairs. "Land Warfare in the 21st Century" establishes a vision of the strategic landscape and identifies the two broad trends of instability and technological acceleration. "Ulysses S. Grant and America's Power-Projection Army" examines the issues of organizational change in the face of technological and social evolution. And "War in the Information Age" elaborates on what the power of information processing technology might mean for the conduct of future war.

This Revised Anthology is about the future of military operations in the opening decades of the 21st century. Its purpose is not to predict the future, but to speculate on the conduct of military operations as an instrument of national policy in a world absent massive thermonuclear and conventional superpower confrontation characteristic of the Cold War. Also absent are indirect constraints imposed by that confrontation on virtually all political-military relationships, not solely those between superpower principals. Most of these essays are attempts to define military operational concepts that might be employed to execute such an engagement strategy.

Rapid and momentous technological changes at the turn of the 20th century forced military professionals and educated civilians to envision the future of war and warfare, especially during an age where nations found themselves aggressively competing for dominance on the world stage. Antulio J. Echevarria II offers a comparative study of these predictions to assess who got it right and why. He concludes that professionals were particularly adept at predicting the warfare of the immediate future by framing their discussions in terms of solving tactical problems, but they were much less successful at thinking of the long-term. Unburdened by the necessity of strategic problem-solving, educated amateurs were allowed more flexibility to imagine the long-term future of warfare, and, at times, proved to be remarkably accurate. Echevarria organizes his study by comparing visions of future wars on land, at sea, undersea, and in air. In each instance professionals and amateurs had their own distinctive imaginings. Among the notable speculators included in this book are science fiction author H.G. Wells and military theorist Ivan Bloch. This approach to the study of warfare is one of those rare examples of a book that can appeal to and inform a wide cross-section of readers.

This book offers a speculative account of a hypothetical war that could have broken out in the late 19th century. It presents an insightful forecast of what could have happened in the Great War, written at a time of political unrest and mounting tensions in Europe. This book offers an intriguing account of fictional incidents that bear striking parallels to the actual events of World War I.

The Future of War makes a brilliant case that the twenty-first century, even more than the twentieth, will be the American century, and that America's global dominance will be associated with a revolution in weaponry and warfare as basic as the one that arose with the development of gunpowder five hundred years ago. From the era of flintlocks and cannons to the day of automatic weapons and heavy artillery, the waging of war-while undeniably changing in many aspects-has continued to rely on the technology that began with the use of black powder to expel a projectile through a tube. In The Future of War, the authors argue that this Age of Ballistics is ending and we are entering a fundamentally new period, the Age of Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs), the so-called smart weapons that will antiquate the traditional way of making war. Where guns and artillery are inherently inaccurate and need to be fired thousands of times to hit one target, these new projectiles are precise and lethally efficient; while ballistic weapons platforms must be brought within range of the battlefield, PGMs can devastate from any distance. The authors show how the innovations in weapons technology will affect America's defense strategies on land and sea, in air and in space, reshaping our military forces, while confronting us with new strategic challenges as America enters the twenty-first century as the dominant power on the globe.

In the seminal Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer famously considered the ethics of modern warfare, examining the moral issues that arise before, during, and after conflict. However, Walzer and subsequent scholars have often limited their analyses of the ethics of combat to soldiers on the ground and failed to recognize the moral responsibilities of senior political and military leaders. In Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory, James M. Dubik draws on years of research as well as his own experiences as a soldier and teacher to fill the gaps left by other theorists. He applies moral philosophy, political philosophy, and strategic studies to historical and contemporary case studies to reveal the inaccuracies and moral bankruptcy that inform some of the literature on military ethics. Conventional just war theory adopts a binary approach, wherein political leaders have moral accountability for the decision to go to war and soldiers have accountability for fighting the war ethically. Dubik argues, however, that political and military leadership should be held accountable for the planning and execution of war in addition to the decision to initiate conflict. Dubik bases his sober reassessment on the fundamental truth that war risks the lives of soldiers and innocents as well as the political and social health of communities. He offers new standards to evaluate the ethics of warfare in the hope of increasing the probability that the lives of soldiers will not be used in vain and the innocent not put at risk unnecessarily.