Epistemology Contexts Values Disagreement

This volume collects papers that were presented at the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium 2011 in Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria. They focus on five key debates in contemporary epistemology: Does the term “to know” vary its meaning according to features of the contexts in which it is uttered? What role may “epistemic virtues” play in our cognitive activities? What is the surplus value of having knowledge instead of mere true belief? What is the structure and significance of testimonial knowledge and belief? And when is disagreement rational, especially if it occurs among “epistemic peers”? In addition, a section is devoted to novel discussions of the work of Wittgenstein. Papers by A. Beckermann, E. Brendel, W. Davis, C. Elgin, S. Goldberg, J. Greco, A. Kemmerling, H. Kornblith, M. Solomon, M. Williams, and many others.

This volume is a collection of contributions that were presented at the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchbergam Wechsel, Austria. The essays focus upon five key debates in contemporary epistemology: Does the term "to know" vary its meaning according to features of the contexts in which it is uttered? What role may "epistemic virtues" play in our cognitive activities? What is the surplus value of having knowledge instead of mere true belief? What is the structure and significance of testimonial knowledge and belief? And when is disagreement rational, especially if it occurs among "epistemic peers"? In addition, a section is devoted to novel discussions of the work of Wittgenstein.

This book presents an original discussion and analysis of epistemic peer disagreement. It reviews a wide range of cases from the literature, and extends the definition of epistemic peerhood with respect to the current one, to account for the actual variability found in real-world examples. The book offers a number of arguments supporting the variability in the nature and in the range of disagreements, and outlines the main benefits of disagreement among peers i.e. what the author calls the benefits to inquiry argument.

This book brings together philosophers to investigate the nature and normativity of group disagreement. Debates in the epistemology of disagreement mainly have been concerned with idealized cases of peer disagreement between individuals. However, most real-life disagreements are complex and often take place within and between groups. Ascribing views, beliefs, and judgments to groups is a common phenomenon that is well researched in the literature on the ontology and epistemology of groups. The essays in this volume seek to connect these literatures and to explore both intra- and inter- group disagreements. They apply their discussions to a range of political, religious, social, and scientific issues. The Epistemology of Group Disagreement is an important resource for students and scholars working on social and applied epistemology, disagreement, and topics at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and politics.

Epistemic Value is a collection of new essays by leading epistemologists, focusing on questions regarding the value of knowledge, such as: Is knowledge more valuable than true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal, or do other values enter the picture?

The world's best introduction to philosophy, Knowledge, Reality, and Value explains basic philosophical problems in epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics, such as: How can we know about the world outside our minds? Is there a God? Do we have free will? Are there objective values? What distinguishes morally right from morally wrong actions? The text succinctly explains the most important theories and arguments about these things, and it does so a lot less boringly than most books written by professors."My work is all a series of footnotes to Mike Huemer." -Plato"This book is way better than my lecture notes." -Aristotle"When I have a little money, I buy Mike Huemer's books; and if I have any left, I buy food and clothes." -ErasmusContentsPreface Part I: Preliminaries 1. What Is Philosophy? 2. Logic 3. Critical Thinking, 1: Intellectual Virtue 4. Critical Thinking, 2: Fallacies 5. Absolute Truth Part II: Epistemology 6. Skepticism About the External World 7. Global Skepticism vs. Foundationalism 8. Defining "Knowledge" Part III: Metaphysics 9. Arguments for Theism 10. Arguments for Atheism 11. Free Will 12. Personal Identity Part IV: Ethics 13. Metaethics 14. Ethical Theory, 1: Utilitarianism 15. Ethical Theory, 2: Deontology 16. Applied Ethics, 1: The Duty of Charity 17. Applied Ethics, 2: Animal Ethics 18. Concluding Thoughts Appendix: A Guide to Writing GlossaryMichael Huemer is a professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado, where he has taught since the dawn of time. He is the author of a nearly infinite number of articles in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and political philosophy, in addition to seven other amazing and brilliant books that you should immediately buy.

Peter Baumann develops and defends a distinctive version of epistemic contextualism, the view that the truth conditions or the meaning of knowledge attributions of the form "S knows that p" can vary with the context of the attributor. The first part of the book examines arguments for contextualism and develops Baumann's version. The first chapter deals with the argument from cases and ordinary usage; the following two chapters address "theoretical" arguments, from reliability and from luck. The second part of the book discusses the problems contextualism faces, to which it must respond, and provides an extension of contextualism beyond epistemology. Chapter 4 discusses "lottery-scepticism" and argues for a contextualist response. Chapter 5 is dedicated to a homemade problem for contextualism: a threat of inconsistency. Baumann argues for a way out and for a version of contextualism that can underwrite this solution. Chapter 6 proposes a contextualist account of responsibility: The concept of knowledge is not the only one which allows for a contextualist analysis and it is important to explore structural analogies in other areas of philosophy. The third part of the book is focused on some major objections to contextualism and alternative views, namely subject-sensitive invariantism, contrastivism and relativism.

The thirteen essays in this volume explore for the first time the possible skeptical implications of disagreement in different areas and from different perspectives, with an emphasis in the current debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement. They represent a new contribution to the study of the connection between disagreement and skepticism in epistemology, metaethics, ancient philosophy, and metaphilosophy.