Esdp And Missile Defense

"Security cooperation with Europe has been the bedrock of American strategy for more than 50 years. Today, that relationship is undergoing both stress and refinement as Europe moves toward a more unified political and security identity, and as the United States responds to a changing global security environment. While many issues have the potential to complicate U.S.-European security cooperation, few are more pressing than the U.S. pursuit of missile defense and Europe's construction of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). The author explains the relationship between missile defense and ESDP. He shows that, rather than serving as wedges between the United States and Europe, both of these can help construct a better security relationship. In fact, transatlantic cooperation and understanding of these issues is necessary for either of them to succeed."--SSI site.

Before the horrible terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, one could easily have had the impression that transatlantic security relations were in a crisis. The immediate and overwhelming fight against international terrorism, in the aftermath of New York and Washington DC, has brought Americans and Europeans closer together again. Yet, two "hot topics" are still likely to dominate the political debates across the Atlantic and Europe in the foreseeable future, and both sides find it increasingly difficult to achieve a consensus on these important security and defense issues. It seems as if politics on both continents are dominated by a strong unilateralism when it comes to future security aspects, although--as this monograph will hopefully and convincingly show-these so seemingly different projects can only be realized in cooperation. What, however, are these topics that seem to have considerably cooled the political climate between the United States and Europe? On the one hand, America fears that the prospect of creating a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with robust and flexible military forces for the future could undermine the NATO alliance. On the other hand, Europe is tempted to believe that U.S. plans for a National Missile Defense (NMD), or more recently simply referred to as Missile Defense (MD), could seriously put global strategic balance at risk by creating a new arms race. In addition to that, Europe claims such a system would undermine the Atlantic alliance as well since it would create different spheres of security within NATO. Given that the claims of each side have some apparent merit, it is worthwhile to look deeper into these arguments. Despite the missile defense program still being in its technical and political infancy, it is currently the most hotly debated of the two programs. ESDP and MD-Getting Priorities Right. However, for the near future both sides of the Atlantic should focus with the same intensity, if not more, on the more eminent and realizable of the two projects: that is, creating capable European military forces to both strengthen NATO and enhance Europe's ability to operate with less heavy dependence on U.S. assets during multinational military operations. There looms the danger that the European goal of building military capacities could too easily be lost from sight through the overwhelming debate on MD. But just as important as missile defense is to protect against weapons of mass destruction by "states of concern," NATO, for instance, must be a strong and mission-ready alliance for future conflict resolution. The September 11 terrorist attacks and the following military fight against international terrorism in Afghanistan against the Taliban regime only give evidence to this. It is therefore necessary to stress that ESDP will not undermine NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. decisionmakers have repeatedly expressed their approval of a Europe with advanced military capabilities. Political pressure from the United States, as well as negative experiences during resolution of local conflicts of the 1990s, has shaped significantly European awareness that inherent advanced military capabilities are necessary in order to preserve and to stabilize NATO.

"As the United States continues to adjust to its role in the post-Cold War world, the transatlantic partnership remains fundamental to US security concerns. Commander Gunning[alpha]s paper is a wake-up call suggesting that Europe is concerned about US intransigence when it comes the security partnership with Europe. While the United States has often encouraged the Europeans to improve capabilities and take on a greater share of the defensive burden, their recent efforts to do so have often been viewed as paradoxical to US concerns. Policymakers on this side of the Atlantic worry that Europe in some ways is moving towards going it alone with the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Still, US desires for increased burdensharing need to be reconciled with ESDP. Commander Gunning highlights these differences and spells out how, in his opinion, it is possible for the United States to remain engaged in Europe and to allow the European Union to develop its own defense identity. The differences of opinion between the two sides are more "speed bumps" than "road blocks" and some disagreement and frustration is to be expected. The conclusion here is that security interests on both sides of the Atlantic will be served in the long run by encouraging the development of a more autonomous European defense capability and through American patience as that process unfolds."--Forward.

America's European allies, especially Britain, have frequently been concerned by the wider implications of U.S. repeated efforts to develop and deploy missile defense. The United Kingdom is host to one of three Ballistic Missile Early Warning Stations (BMEWS) and to the European ground station for the Space-Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS), both vital elements in U.S.missile defense architecture. Britain also has a long record of technological cooperation in missile defense. Britons do not share American concerns about North Korea, and are not prepared to view China as a long-term strategic competitor requiring a BMD response. The UK is progressively shedding many of its previous concerns about the wider consequences of missile defense deployment and gaining a better appreciation of the advantages of collaboration in both the policy and technical fields. For America's part, an understanding of the UK's stance and a willingness to engage in honest and forthright consultation are essential if the United States is to maximize the advantages of international cooperation in missile defense and avoid some of its penalties. Despite a recent focus on events in Iraq, missile defense remains a vital issue in U.S.-British relations and a subject of considerable intrinsic importance. Both countries need to better understand each other's policies and concerns, and cooperate in providing effective and appropriate defense capabilities.

Britain was the first country to come under sustained ballistic missile attack, during 1944-45. Defence against ballistic missiles has been a persistent, if highly variable, subject of political policy and technical investigation ever since. The British Second World War experience of trying to counter the V-2 attacks contained many elements of subsequent responses to ballistic missile threats. After the war, a reasonably accurate picture of Soviet missile capabilities was not achieved until the early 1960s, by which time the problem of early warning had largely been solved. From the mid-1960s on, British attention shifted away from the development of the country's own defences towards the wider consequences of US and Soviet deployments. After the end of the Cold War there was renewed interest in a limited active-defence capability against Third World missile threats. This well-researched book is primarily aimed at students of post-war British foreign and defence policies, but will also be of interest to informed general readers.