Essays In The Metaphysics Of Mind

Jaegwon Kim presents a selection of his essays from the last two decades. The volume includes three new essays, on an agent-centered first-person account of action explanation, the concepts of realization and their bearings on the mind-body problem, and the nonexistence of laws in the special sciences. Among other topics covered are emergence and emergentism, the nature of explanation and of theories of explanation, reduction and reductive explanation, mental causation and explanatory exclusion. Kim tackles questions such as: How should we understand the concept of "emergence", and what are the prospects of emergentism as a doctrine about the status of minds? What does an agent-centered, first-person account of explanation of human actions look like? Why aren't there strict laws in the special sciences - sciences like biology, psychology, and sociology? The essays will be accessible to attentive readers without an extensive philosophical background.

The unifying theme of these thirteen essays is understanding. Haugeland addresses mind and intelligence; intelligibility; analog and digital systems and supervenience; presuppositions about the foundational notions of intentionality and representation; and the essential character of understanding in relation to what is understood.

"This book is an essay in the speculative treatment of certain problems, suggested but not usually discussed in the course of a thorough empirical study of mental phenomena. Inasmuch as these problems all relate to the real nature and actual performances and relations of the human mind, the essay may properly be called metaphysical. Let it be confessed, then, that the author comes forward with a treatise in metaphysics--in the more special meaning of that term. I think, however, that in spite of the marked disfavor into which all metaphysics has fallen in certain quarters, no detailed apology for asking readers for such a treatise need be offered in its Preface. Indeed, the first two chapters of the book are occupied in showing how inevitable is the demand which the science of psychology makes for a further philosophical discussion of all its principal problems. The nature of psychology, however, and the nature of philosophy, and especially the nature of the relations existing between the two, are such as to make it undesirable, if not impossible, to consider in one book all the metaphysical problems which this empirical science suggests. Indeed, the whole sphere of philosophical study scarcely does more than this. A somewhat but not wholly arbitrary selection of problems had, therefore, to be made; and their detailed discussion was then brought under the one title, "Philosophy of Mind." The reasons for the selection are made sufficiently clear in the course of the discussion itself"--Preface. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2008 APA, all rights reserved).

In May 2010, philosophers, family and friends gathered at the University of Notre Dame to celebrate the career and retirement of Alvin Plantinga, widely recognized as one of the world's leading figures in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of religion. Plantinga has earned particular respect within the community of Christian philosophers for the pivotal role that he played in the recent renewal and development of philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. Each of the essays in this volume engages with some particular aspect of Plantinga's views on metaphysics, epistemology, or philosophy of religion. Contributors include Michael Bergman, Ernest Sosa, Trenton Merricks, Richard Otte, Peter VanInwagen, Thomas P. Flint, Eleonore Stump, Dean Zimmerman and Nicholas Wolterstorff. The volume also includes responses to each essay by Bas van Fraassen, Stephen Wykstra, David VanderLaan, Robin Collins, Raymond VanArragon, E. J. Coffman, Thomas Crisp, and Donald Smith.

Mind, Meaning, and Reality presents fifteen philosophical papers in which D. H. Mellor explores some of the most intriguing questions in philosophy. These include: what determines what we think, and what we use language to mean; how that depends on what there is in the world and why there is only one universe; and the nature of time.

THIS book is an essay in the speculative treatment of certain problems, suggested but not usually discussed in the course of a thorough empirical study of mental phenomena. Inasmuch as these problems all relate to the real nature and actual performances and relations of the human mind, the essay nay properly be called metaphysical. Let it be confessed, then, that the author comes forward with a treatise in metaphysics, - in the more special meaning of that term. I think, however, that in spite of the marked disfavor into which all metaphysics has fallen in certain quarters, no detailed apology for asking readers for such a treatise need be offered in its Preface. Indeed, the first two chapters of the book are occupied in showing how inevitable is the demand which the science of psychology makes for a further philosophical discussion of all its principal problems. If, then, this demand is not made perfectly clear hy the more detailed discussion which follows, it would be quite use-less to put it forward unsupported, at the beginning of my task, in the hope of producing a favorable first impression upon reluctant intelligences. "No one whose peace of mind is sure to be disturbed by any attempt, however carried out, at this form of reflective thinking should venture beyond the titlepa-ge and table of contents of this volume. On the other hand, however, I wish to be held res-ponsible for two things which are required in order to entitle to respect every tre-atise of a similar character. These are, first, the statement of the facts and laws, scientifically established, to which the speculative discussion constantly refers for it own grounds in experience. And for metaphysics which has no foundations in incontestable experience, I have as little respect as has any one. But besides this constant appeal to facts and to laws empirically established, sound reasoning is indispensable for the derivation of acceptable conclusions in any metaphysical enterprise. Any reader, or critic, therefore, who will point out violations of either of these two requirements, will be entitled to grateful recognition for his service, no less by the author than by the readers of this volume. A few words concerning the relations which this book sustains to preceding works by the same author will be helpful for its better understanding. In some sort the entire volume may be regarded as in continuation of a series of works I on psychology, or the Science of mental phenomena. This science, which, as a science, is, and ever must remain, chiefly descriptive, starts many inquiries regar-ding the real nature and relations to the external World..""