Eu Cartel Enforcement

There has a been a long-standing debate on the compatibility of EU competition law with fundamental rights protection, particularly as the latter is enshrined in the due process requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This book, a signal contribution to that debate, assesses two questions of paramount concern: first, whether the current level of fundamental rights protection in cartel enforcement falls within the accepted ECHR standards; and second, how the often conflicting objectives of effectiveness and adequate protection of fundamental rights could optimally be achieved. Following a detailed survey of relevant EU institutional, substantive, and procedural law rules, the author offers a set of persuasive normative responses to both questions. Proceeding from an in-depth analysis of the pertinent rights and legal nature of competition proceedings under EU and ECHR law, the author goes on to examine such elements of the perceived incompatibility as the following: investigatory powers vested in competition authorities; the privilege against self-incrimination; right to privacy; “fair trial” probatory requirements; degree of use of presumptions in EU practice; Article 6 ECHR guarantees pertaining to the presumption of innocence; proving coordination of competitive behaviour; proving restriction of competition; admissibility of evidence before EU Courts and the Commission; assessment of the attribution of liability rules; EU fining rules; judicial review of cartel decisions by EU Courts; and national sanctioning rules. The author’s extraordinarily thorough presentation is rounded off with a remarkably comprehensive bibliography that lists (in addition to books and articles) newspaper articles, EU regulations and directives, soft-law guidelines and “best practices”, EU and ECtHR case law, EU Advocate General opinions, European Commission decisions, and European Ombudsman decisions. General conclusions stress the necessity of introducing further reforms to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of fundamental rights in the context of competition proceedings. Few books have taken such a thorough and far-reaching approach to the reconciliation of “effective public enforcement” and “fundamental rights”, or of “effective deterrence” with the principles of legality, non-retroactivity, presumption of innocence, and ne bis in idem. In the depth of its appraisal of the entire spectrum of enforcement components from a fundamental rights perspective, the book is without peers. It will be warmly welcomed by any parties interested in the intersection of competition law and human rights.

In this book the author examines the compliance of the European anti-cartel enforcement procedure with the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The European Union (EU) leniency programme is a key weapon in the Commission’s fight against hard-core cartels. Much of the success of EU cartel enforcement depends on the continued effectiveness of the leniency policy and is especially critical in response to the growth of private enforcement. This book offers a comprehensive description of the development of the policy, along with a normative framework that promises to ensure the full legitimacy of the leniency programme: the Commission’s policy should pursue not only effectiveness but also fairness. It is the first work to extensively analyse the effectiveness and fairness in the EU leniency policy. Proceeding systematically from clarifying the concepts of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘fairness’ to addressing the tension between leniency and private actions for damages, the author discusses the nature of, and interrelations among, such aspects as the following: – the theoretical model of the EU fining policy; – the compatibility of the EU enforcement system with fundamental rights protection; – the gathering and evaluation of evidence at the preliminary investigation stage; – the severity and foreseeability of the EU cartel fines; – judicial review by the EU Courts in competition matters; – to what extent the current policy is effective and fair; and – reforms brought about by the 2002 and 2006 Leniency Notices and the leniency-related amendments by the 2014 Antitrust Damages Directive. A key feature is the author’s presentation of a normative framework to test the effectiveness (deterrence) and substantive fairness (retribution) of the EU leniency policy. As a clear demonstration of how to forestall the danger of focusing on effectiveness of leniency at the expense of fairness, both in a substantive and in a procedural sense, this book is a major contribution to the literature of competition law. It will prove to be of great value to competition authorities, antitrust practitioners and interested academics not only in Europe but also throughout the world.

The challenges facing the criminalisation of cartel activity in the European Union are threefold: theoretical, legal, and practical. This book analyses these crucial challenges so that the complexity of the process of European antitrust criminalisation can be accurately understood.

This is the eleventh in the series on EU Competition Law and Policy produced by the Robert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute in Florence. The volume reproduces the materials of the roundtable debate which examined the enforcement of the prohibition on cartels. The workshop participants - senior representatives of the Commission and the national competition authorities of some EC Member States, renowned international academics and legal practitioners - discussed the economic and legal issues that arise in this particular area, including: 1) unearthing cartels: the evidence; 2) the institutional framework and 3) tools of enforcement.

The challenges facing the criminalisation of cartel activity in the European Union are threefold: theoretical, legal, and practical. This book analyses these crucial challenges so that the complexity of the process of European antitrust criminalisation can be accurately understood.

Over the past fifteen years, the optimal enforcement of EU competition law has become a major concern. This book contains a unique collection of articles by lawyers and economists on current issues in the public and private enforcement of competition law. Public enforcement has been strengthened in numerous ways – for example, through the introduction of a leniency programme and a substantial increase in fines for competition law violations. At the same time the EU Commission has been promoting private enforcement – for example, by developing a legal framework that grants victims of EU antitrust law infringements access to compensation. The contributions in this book address a range of topics in the area of competition law enforcement, including the role of fines and leniency programmes in public enforcement; access to evidence and the quantification of damages in private enforcement; and the interaction between public and private enforcement of competition law in Europe.

This book examines the legislative patchwork surrounding access to the European Commission's cartel case files. Recent legislative changes have increased the value of the files and have also highlighted the inherent tension between a number of competing interests affecting their accessibility. The Commission is undoubtedly caught between a rock and a hard place, charged with the task to ensure due process, transparency and effectiveness while at the same time promoting both public and private enforcement of the EU competition rules. The author considers how best to ensure a proper balance between the legitimate, but often diverging interests of parties, third parties and national competition authorities in these cases. The book provides a unique and comprehensive presentation of the EU legislation and case law surrounding access to the Commission's cartel case files. The author examines the question of accessibility from three different perspectives: that of the parties under investigation, cartel victims, and national competition authorities. The author also considers the EU leniency system and whether any legislative changes could make the attractiveness of the system less dependent on the possibilities of cartel victims to access the evidence contained in the Commission's case files.