European Military Crisis Management

International demand for military crisis-management missions continues to grow and demand for troops continues to outstrip supply. Like other Western democracies, European Union member states, because of their wealth, relative military competence and commitment to human rights, bear a particular responsibility to expand the international communitys capacity for action. But while the EU has succeeded in defining a complex military-technical and political-strategic framework to boost its role and that of its member states in crisis management, its performance so far has fallen well short of its ambitions. This paper analyses what the EU wants to be able to do militarily its level of ambition and contrasts this aspiration with the current reality. To explain the gap between the two, the paper examines national ambitions and performance across the EU and analyses their domestic determinants using the examples of Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. The paper concludes by suggesting that the EU might need to strike a new balance between the inclusiveness and the effectiveness of its activities in this area if it wants to increase its military crisis-management performance and live up to its declared ambitions.

This book analyzes both NATO’s and the EU’s military crisis management operations and provides an explanation for the fact that it is sometimes NATO, sometimes the EU, and sometimes both international organizations that intervene militarily in a conflict. In detailed case studies on Libya, Chad/Central African Republic, and the Horn of Africa, Claudia Fahron-Hussey shows that the capabilities and preferences of the organizations matter most and the organizations’ bureaucratic actors influence the decision-making process of the member states.

Assesses the EU and NATO's tools to prevent conflicts and manage international crises. It offers a unique insight into European security policy and questions the realism of the political goals. It argues for more coordination among European states, and an enhancement of the EU's strategic decision-making capabilities.

This book presents an up-to-date, scholarly analysis of European crisis management during the 1990s and is one of the first books to summarize European experiences in the field of peacekeeping and crisis management. With the help of eight case studies, the authors explore how European governments have responded to international crises. The book also contains in-depth studies on key concepts like humanitarian intervention, military doctrine and Petersberg tasks. The book describes Europe's increasing responsibility for the proper functioning of international society. It points to a pronounced move to collective action and highlights Europe's political and military adaptation to the post-Cold War strategic environment. The authors detect an ever stronger belief in the use of military power and thereby the contours of an emerging common European identity within the field of crisis management. The book establishes an agenda for future research on European crisis management and out-of-area operations. It will be of prime interest to students of international relations, European studies, foreign policy analysis, international organization, crisis management and conflict resolution, and will also be essential reading for all those who need a practical survey of the latest developments in the field of international crisis management.

Examines the examples of the Civilian Crisis Management Committee (Civcom) and EU Military Committee (EUMC), in order to shed light on the transgovernmental dynamic within the field of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the EU's cornerstone policy mechanism for crisis response in third countries. Provides insight into the transgovernmental processes of Member States' permanent representations, suggesting that committees can be dynamic, distinctive, and influential in their roles. The expertise, culture, meeting frequency, and norms of the two committees are compared, and the way in which how these factors influence their overall internal dynamic is analysed. Taking a sociological-institutionalist approach, the author suggests that the group dynamics, shared norms, and evolving worldviews within these committees contribute, at least in part, to whether consensus is possible.

This book offers a critical analysis of the EU's first police and military crisis management missions in the Balkans--in Bosnia and Macedonia. The authors have conducted extensive research both in the field and at EU headquarters in Brussels. Their findings yield some important lessons for ongoing and future missions, from establishing mission goals to operational planning and specialized training of troops to battlefield tactics and weaponry to adapting to shifting political situations and controlling the local populace. Contributors include Isabelle Ioannides (Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK), Anna Juncos (Department of Politics, Loughborough University, UK), and Ursula Schroeder (European University Institute, Florence, Italy).

"The EU made a strong commitment to developing an effective EU led crisis management capacity. By 2003 the EU must be in a position to deploy within 60 days up to 50,000-60,000 troops capable of a full range of so-called Petersberg tasks including: humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, combat force tasks in crisis management and peacemaking missions." "According to the EU however the initiative should not be seen as a duplication of NATO. Neither should the establishment of a European Force be confused with the concept of a European army. Whether a European army, or a common defence for Europe is more capable of handling the future needs and challenges of the EU is not the subject of this book. Essentially it is about whether a military crisis management system is practical and realistic and how the planned initiatives within the agreed limits are to be transformed into operative policy."--BOOK JACKET.