Exchange Rate Regimes In The Twentieth Century

Provides an account of the evolution of exchange rate regimes in the 20th century, in chronological, non-technical format. Links between the past and present shed light on the merits of different exchange rate systems. Discusses forces that have brought about change in order to determine how different regimes affected the economic environment, considers the merits or otherwise of the respective regimes, and assesses arguments for and against fixed and floating exchange ratesAnnotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

The themes of this study are the exchange rate regimes chosen by policy makers in the twentieth century, the means used to maintain these regimes, and the impact of these decisions on individual national economies and the world economy in general. The book draws heavily on new research showing the lessons and the legacy left for policy makers by the gold standard and the attempt at its resurrection in the 1920s. In examining issues such as the gold exchange standard, the gold bullion standard, the experience of floating exchange rates, the Bretton Woods arrangements, the EMS and the ERM, and the Currency Board approach, there is a conscious attempt to draw out the relevance of history for policy makers now.

"Most European countries are rather small, yet we know little about their monetary history. This book analyses for the first time the experience of seven small states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) during the last hundred years, starting with the restoration of the gold standard after World War I and ending with Sweden's rejection of the Euro in 2003. The comparative analysis shows that for the most part of the twentieth century the options of policy makers were seriously constrained by a distinct fear of floating exchange rates. Only with the crisis of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992-93 did the idea that a flexible exchange rate regime was suited for a small open economy gain currency. The book also analyses the differences among small states and concludes that economic structures or foreign policy orientations were far more important for the timing of regime changes than domestic institutions and policies"--

Exchange rate regime choice has evolved considerably in the past 100 years. At the beginning of the twentieth century the choice was obvious - - join the gold standard, all the advanced countries have done it. Floating exchange rates and fiat money are only for profligate countries. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the choice is also becoming more obvious - - go to floating exchange rates, all the advanced countries have done it. Moreover in both eras, the emerging markets of the day tried to emulate the advanced countries but in many cases had great difficulties in doing so. What happened in the past century to lead to this tour de force? In this paper I survey the issue of exchange rate regime choice from the perspective of both the advanced countries and the emergers taking an historical perspective. I first survey the theoretical issues beginning with a taxonomy of regimes. I then examine the empirical evidence on the delineation of regimes and their macro performance. The penultimate section provides a brief history of monetary regimes in advanced and emerging countries. The conclusion considers the case for managed float for today's emergers.

Most European countries are rather small, yet we know little about their monetary history. This book analyses for the first time the experience of seven small states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) during the last hundred years, starting with the restoration of the gold standard after World War I and ending with Sweden's rejection of the Euro in 2003. The comparative analysis shows that for the most part of the twentieth century the options of policy makers were seriously constrained by a distinct fear of floating exchange rates. Only with the crisis of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992-93 did the idea that a flexible exchange rate regime was suited for a small open economy gain currency. The book also analyses the differences among small states and concludes that economic structures or foreign policy orientations were far more important for the timing of regime changes than domestic institutions and policies.

During the twentieth century, foreign-exchange intervention was sometimes used in an attempt to solve the fundamental trilemma of international finance, which holds that countries cannot simultaneously pursue independent monetary policies, stabilize their exchange rates, and benefit from free cross-border financial flows. Drawing on a trove of previously confidential data, Strained Relations reveals the evolution of US policy regarding currency market intervention, and its interaction with monetary policy. The authors consider how foreign-exchange intervention was affected by changing economic and institutional circumstances—most notably the abandonment of the international gold standard—and how political and bureaucratic factors affected this aspect of public policy.

Many believe that Canada's deepening economic integration with the United States and the worldwide trend towards currency blocs will eventually lead to a North American monetary union. In the first detailed analysis of Canadian exchange rate politics, Eric Helleiner challenges this view.Helleiner finds little support in the US for the concessions that would be necessary to make a North American monetary union palatable in Canada. Comparing the US Federal Reserve and the European Monetary Union, he argues that Canada would exercise far less influence within a North American monetary union than individual countries do within the European community. He also analyses the seemingly paradoxical support of Quebec sovereignists for free trade and monetary union.Towards North American Monetary Union'explores Canada's unusually strong commitment throughout the twentieth century to a floating exchange rate for its national currency - a commitment that Heilleiner argues is likely to endure.

Some have argued that the only sustainable regimes are free floating and hard exchange rate commitments--essentially currency boards or monetary unions (Eichengreen, 1994, 1998; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). For instance, Eichengreen (1994, pp. 4-5) says that ..". contingent policy rules to hit explicit exchange rate targets will no longer be viable in the twenty-first century ... Countries ... will be forced to choose between floating exchange rates on the one hand and monetary unification on the other." Similarly, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, pp. 74) state ..". there is little, if any, comfortable middle ground between floating rates and the adoption of a common currency." Hence, in the view of these authors, in the future we will see a disappearance of the middle ground that corresponds to soft commitments to some sort of intermediate exchange rate regime--adjustable pegs, crawling pegs, or bands, and perhaps also managed floating. This view is sometimes called the "two poles" or "hollowing out" (e.g., Eichengreen, 1994, pp. 6) theory of exchange rate regimes, and is based on the observation that higher capital mobility makes exchange rate commitments increasingly fragile. However, like the optimal currency area literature, which is essentially static, an explicit or implicit assumption is made that regimes are chosen to last forever, and from this perspective, one would only choose a regime that could be sustained once and for all. Only the hardest peg and the absence of any exchange rate commitment whatsoever are likely to qualify on that basis. Thus Eichengreen (1994, pp. 5), states "This will rule out the maintenance for extended periods of pegged but adjustable exchange rates, crawling pegs, and other regimes in which governments pre-announce limits on exchange rate fluctuations ..." (italics added).