Executive Compensation In Imperfect Financial Markets

This important book discusses the issue of executive compensation in Anglo-American financial markets following the financial crisis. The book begins by contextualizing the problem facing financial institutions in the US and the UK and argues that appr

Executive compensation has gained widespread public attention in recent years, with the pay of top U.S. executives reaching unprecedented levels compared either with past levels, with the remuneration of top executives in other countries, or with the wages and salaries of typical employees. The extraordinary levels of executive compensation have been achieved at a time when U.S. public companies have realized substantial gains in stock market value. Many have cited this as evidence that U.S. executive compensation works well, rewarding managers who make difficult decisions that lead to higher shareholder values, while others have argued that the overly generous salaries and benefits bear little relation to company performance. Recent conceptual and empirical research permits for the first time a truly rigorous debate on these and related issues, which is the subject of this volume.

This book investigates the pre-crisis practice of bankers' remuneration in the UK to provide evidence of the problems in practice. It critically analyses the regulatory initiatives implemented after the crisis and investigates the post-crisis practice to reflect the effects and problems of the regulation. The book also discusses the traditional administration of remuneration and political incentives in Chinese banks and the regulatory initiatives for reforming bankers' remuneration. It investigates the recent practices in major Chinese banks to reveal the problems of the regulatory initiatives and the impact of political incentives. It will help academics, researchers, students and practitioners develop a comprehensive understanding of the ongoing reform of bankers' remuneration in the UK and the uniqueness of banks' remuneration systems and incentive mechanisms in China. Furthermore, it provides theoretical insights into the differences between the two jurisdictions in their regulations and practices and the deep-seated reasons for the differences.

Well-functioning financial markets are crucial for the economic well-being and the justice of contemporary societies. The Great Financial Crisis has shown that a perspective that naively trusts in the self-regulating powers of free markets cannot capture what is at stake in understanding and regulating financial markets. The damage done by the Great Financial Crisis, including its distributive consequences, raises serious questions about the justice of financial markets as we know them. This volume brings together leading scholars from political theory, law, and economics in order to explore the relation between justice and financial markets. Broadening the perspective from a purely economic one to a liberal egalitarian one, the volume explores foundational normative questions about how to conceptualize justice in relation to financial markets, the biases in the legal frameworks of financial markets that produce unjust outcomes, and perspectives of justice on specific institutions and practices in contemporary financial markets. Written in a clear and accessible language, the volume presents analyses of how financial markets (should) function and how the Great Financial Crisis came about, proposals for how the structures of financial markets could be reformed, and analysis of why reform is not happening at the speed that would be desirable from a perspective of justice.

Executive compensation and its fairness to stakeholders are topics of heated debate on platforms ranging from news forums to financial markets. This book stimulates critical thinking on executive compensation and guides academics and practitioners on the key concepts by developing a multi-faceted and multi-cultural framework. It also presents the new ‘Fair CEO Compensation,’ which uses a scientifically developed and structured stakeholder-based approach to reach optimal and fair CEO compensation, without capping bonuses or variable pay by rules and regulations. Financial, non-financial, organizational, strategic, cultural, personal, and social aspects are all taken into account in the framework. In addition to implementation guidelines and real-world examples, the book presents a checklist for businesses to measure the fairness of their CEO compensation based on the suggested framework. Moreover, the author also provides a survey template to help businesses investigate their employees’ perception of the fairness of their CEO’s compensation.

Controlling Capital examines three pressing issues in financial market regulation: the contested status of public regulation, the emergence of ‘culture’ as a proposed modality of market governance, and the renewed ascendancy of private regulation. In the years immediately following the outbreak of crisis in financial markets, public regulation seemed almost to be attaining a position of command – the robustness and durability of which is explored here in respect of market conduct, European Union capital markets union, and US and EU competition policies. Subsequently there has been a softening of command and a return to public-private co-regulation, positioned within a narrative on culture. The potential and limits of culture as a regulatory resource are unpacked here in respect of occupational and organisational aspects, stakeholder connivance and wider political embeddedness. Lastly the book looks from both appreciative and critical perspectives at private regulation, through financial market associations, arbitration of disputes and, most controversially, market ‘policing’ by hedge funds. Bringing together a distinguished group of international experts, this book will be a key text for all those concerned with issues arising at the intersection of financial markets, law, culture and governance.

This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, or were influenced by, the risky business policy decisions made by these firms. The authors find strong evidence that bank CEOs responded to contractual risk-taking incentives by taking more risk; bank boards altered CEO compensation to encourage executives to exploit new growth opportunities; and bank boards set CEO incentives in a manner designed to moderate excessive risk-taking. These relationships are strongest during the second half of the author¿s sample, after deregulation and technological change had expanded banks' capacities for risk-taking. Charts and tables.

An exciting new textbook which presents critical perspectives on corporate and commercial law. Focussing on the key areas of trade and transactions, intellectual property, corporations and finance, it covers each of the areas of commercial and company law that would typically be offered to undergraduate and postgraduate law students. The chapters are written by acknowledged experts in the field and are aimed at undergraduates, post graduates and lecturers who wish to further their understanding of this area. Each of the authors focuses on an area within their subject and draws out the political, the controversial and the discursive, providing essential reading for undergraduate dissertation topics and postgraduate analysis.