Executive Power

A defense of regulatory agencies’ efforts to combine public consultation with bureaucratic expertise to serve the interest of all citizens The statutory delegation of rule-making authority to the executive has recently become a source of controversy. There are guiding models, but none, Susan Rose-Ackerman claims, is a good fit with the needs of regulating in the public interest. Using a cross-national comparison of public policy-making in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, she argues that public participation inside executive rule-making processes is necessary to preserve the legitimacy of regulatory policy-making.

CIA operative Mitch Rapp investigates an attack on a team of Navy SEALs in the Philippines, searches for a possible State Department traitor, and fights to stop a Middle Eastern assassin out to ignite World War III.

Jacques Necker (17321804) was a Swiss statesman and financier who played a crucial role in French political life from 1776 to 1789. Born in Geneva, he was a devout Protestant who amassed considerable wealth as a successful banker. In October 1776, he was appointed as director of the Royal Treasury and, later, in June 1777, as director general of finances of France under Louis XVI. While in charge of the finances of the kingdom, his most famous decision, in 1781, was to make public the budget of France for the first time, a novel practice in an absolute monarchy. His work On Executive Power in Great States (1792) is arguably one of the most important texts ever written on the issue of executive power in modern society. It includes memorable formulations regarding liberty and public spirit among the English and the Americans, the relation between economic prosperity and political freedom, and the seminal influence of religion and morals on liberty. Necker provides a defense of representative government and offers an examination of the French political system, which he compares on several occasions with England and America. Before Tocqueville, Necker understood the importance of America for the Old World as the first successful example of popular self-government and free institutions. In his book, Necker called upon French legislators to study the principles of the U.S. Constitution. His bold innovation was to replace the theory of the functional separation of powers with the intertwining of powers that were dependent upon the existence of effective links between the executive and the legislative. In the absence of such links, Necker maintained, all would be contest and confusion. Neckers fundamental premise was that it would be impossible to establish effective cooperation between different powers solely through the exercise of constant watchfulness and mutual distrust. Although Necker was one of the most important politicians in France before and during the French Revolution, he has been largely ignored as a political thinker. This is the first modern edition of Neckers important work, shedding fresh light on the timely topics of executive power, constitutionalism and the rule of law, federalism, balance of power, and the dependence of liberty on morality and religion. Professor Aurelian Craiutu significantly revised and corrected the 1792 English translation and added explanatory notes, an introduction, and a select bibliography.

The George W. Bush administration’s ambitious—even breathtaking—claims of unilateral executive authority raised deep concerns among constitutional scholars, civil libertarians, and ordinary citizens alike. But Bush’s attempts to assert his power are only the culmination of a near-thirty-year assault on the basic checks and balances of the U.S. government—a battle waged by presidents of both parties, and one that, as Peter M. Shane warns in Madison’s Nightmare, threatens to utterly subvert the founders’ vision of representative government. Tracing this tendency back to the first Reagan administration, Shane shows how this era of "aggressive presidentialism" has seen presidents exerting ever more control over nearly every arena of policy, from military affairs and national security to domestic programs. Driven by political ambition and a growing culture of entitlement in the executive branch—and abetted by a complaisant Congress, riven by partisanship—this presidential aggrandizement has too often undermined wise policy making and led to shallow, ideological, and sometimes outright lawless decisions. The solution, Shane argues, will require a multipronged program of reform, including both specific changes in government practice and broader institutional changes aimed at supporting a renewed culture of government accountability. From the war on science to the mismanaged war on terror, Madison’s Nightmare outlines the disastrous consequences of the unchecked executive—and issues a stern wake-up call to all who care about the fate of our long democratic experiment.

In many companies, two or three executives jointly hold the responsibilities at the top-from the charismatic CEO who relies on the operational expertise of a COO, to co-CEOs who trust in inter-personal bonds to achieve professional results. Their collaboration is essential if they are to address the dilemmas of the top job and the demands of today's corporate governance. Sharing Executive Power examines the behaviour of such duos, trios and small teams, what roles their members play and how their professional and inter-personal relationships bind their work together. It answers some critical questions regarding when and how such power sharing units form and break up, how they perform and why they endure. Understanding their dynamics helps improve the design and composition of corporate power structures. The book is essential reading for academics, graduates, MBAs, and executives interested in enhancing teamwork and cooperation at the top.

A comprehensive regional study of women in the political executive power.

By revisiting Thomas Jefferson's understanding of executive power this book offers a new understanding of the origins of presidential power. Before Jefferson was elected president, he arrived at a way to resolve the tension between constitutionalism and executive power. Because his solution would preserve a strict interpretation of the Constitution as well as transform the precedents left by his Federalist predecessors, it provided an alternative to Alexander Hamilton's understanding of executive power. In fact, a more thorough account of Jefferson's political career suggests that Jefferson envisioned an executive that was powerful, or 'energetic', because it would be more explicitly attached to the majority will. Jefferson's Revolution of 1800, often portrayed as a reversal of the strong presidency, was itself premised on energy in the executive and was part of Jefferson's project to enable the Constitution to survive and even flourish in a world governed by necessity.