Extended Consciousness And Predictive Processing

In this jointly authored book, Kirchhoff and Kiverstein defend the controversial thesis that phenomenal consciousness is realised by more than just the brain. They argue that the mechanisms and processes that realise phenomenal consciousness can at times extend across brain, body, and the social, material, and cultural world. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein offer a state-of-the-art tour of current arguments for and against extended consciousness. They aim to persuade you that it is possible to develop and defend the thesis of extended consciousness through the increasingly influential predictive processing theory developed in cognitive neuroscience. They show how predictive processing can be given a new reading as part of a third-wave account of the extended mind. The third-wave claims that the boundaries of mind are not fixed and stable but fragile and hard-won, and always open to negotiation. It calls into question any separation of the biological from the social and cultural when thinking about the boundaries of the mind. Kirchhoff and Kiverstein show how this account of the mind finds support in predictive processing, leading them to a view of phenomenal consciousness as partially realised by patterns of cultural practice.

This book argues that conscious experience is sometimes extended outside the brain and body into certain kinds of environmental interaction and tool use. It shows that if one accepts that cognitive states can extend, one must also accept that consciousness can extend. The proponents of Extended Mind defend the former claim, but usually oppose the latter claim. The most important undertaking of this book is to show that this partition is not possible on pain of inconsistency. Pii Telakivi presents three arguments for the hypothesis of Extended Conscious Mind, examines and answers the most common counterarguments, and introduces a novel means to interpret and apply the concept of constitution. She also addresses the tensions between analytic philosophy of mind and enactivism, and builds a bridge between two different traditions: on the one hand, extended mind, and on the other, enactivism and embodied mind—and maintains that a unifying approach is necessary for a theory about extended consciousness.

This title brings together work on embodiment, action, and the predictive mind. At the core is the vision of human minds as prediction machines - devices that constantly try to stay one step ahead of the breaking waves of sensory stimulation, by actively predicting the incoming flow. In every situation we encounter, that complex prediction machinery is already buzzing, proactively trying to anticipate the sensory barrage. The book shows in detail how this strange but potent strategy of self-anticipation ushers perception, understanding, and imagination simultaneously onto the cognitive stage.

The Predictive Processing Theory of Mind is a recent theory developed by philosophers, cognitive scientists, and neuroscientists about the nature and function of the brain and its role in creating the conscious mind that we humans, and perhaps some non-human animals, have. The authors that advanced those lines of research believe that there is a fundamental idea that has been overlooked in the research done about the brain until the present: that the brain is a prediction machine with the function of creating hypotheses about the causes of our sensory signals and predictions of possible future sensory signals. Moreover, the internal models of the world created this way are constantly challenged by incorporating the errors of the previous models into new models. From this point of view, the brain's work could be described as a process of making predictions about the upcoming sensory data based on its best current models of the causes of those data. This book intends to critically analyze this theory and its subsequent theoretical and empirical consequences. To achieve that, the volume brings together some of the best experts on Predictive Processing - such as Thomas Metzinger, Wanja Wiese, or Mark Miller - with the goal of presenting some of the advantages of this approach but also some of its caveats.

This book explores how predictive processing, which argues that our brains are constantly generating and updating hypotheses about our external conditions, sheds new light on the nature of the mind. It shows how it is similar to and expands other theoretical approaches that emphasize the active role of the mind and its dynamic function. Offering a complete guide to the philosophical and empirical implications of predictive processing, contributors bring perspectives from philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology. Together, they explore the many philosophical applications of predictive processing and its exciting potential across mental health, cognitive science, neuroscience, and robotics. Presenting an extensive and balanced overview of the subject, The Philosophy and Science of Predictive Processing is a landmark volume within philosophy of mind.

Andy Clark is a leading philosopher of cognitive science, whose work has had an extraordinary impact throughout philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and robotics. His monographs have led the way for new research programs in the philosophy of mind and cognition: Microcognition (1989) and Associative Engines (1993) introduced the philosophical community to connectionist research and the novel issues it raised; Being There (1997) showed the relevance of embodiment, dynamical systems theory, and minimal computation frameworks for the study of the mind; Natural Born Cyborgs (OUP 2003) presented an accessible development of embodied and embedded approaches to understanding human nature and cognition; Supersizing the Mind (OUP 2008) developed this yet further along with the famous "Extended Mind" hypothesis; and Surfing Uncertainty (OUP 2017) presents a framework for uniting perception, action, and the embodied mind. In Andy Clark and His Critics, a range of high-profile researchers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science, and empirical cognitive science, critically engage with Clark's work across the themes of: Extended, Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, and Affective Minds; Natural Born Cyborgs; and Perception, Action, and Prediction. Daniel Dennett provides a foreword on the significance of Clark's work, and Clark replies to each section of the book, thus advancing current literature with original contributions that will form the basis for new discussions, debates and directions in the discipline.

This innovative new volume analyses the role of emotions in knowledge acquisition. It focuses on the field of philosophy of emotions at the exciting intersection between epistemology and philosophy of mind and cognitive science to bring us an in-depth analysis of the epistemological value of emotions in reasoning. With twelve chapters by leading and up-and-coming academics, this edited collection shows that emotions do count for our epistemic enterprise. Against scepticism about the possible positive role emotions play in knowledge, the authors highlight the how and the why of this potential, lucidly exploring the key aspects of the functionality of emotions. This is explored in relation to: specific kinds of knowledge such as self-understanding, group-knowledge and wisdom; specific functions played by certain emotions in these cases, such as disorientation in enquiry and contempt in practical reason; the affective experience of the epistemic subjects and communities.

A new theory is taking hold in neuroscience. It is the theory that the brain is essentially a hypothesis-testing mechanism, one that attempts to minimise the error of its predictions about the sensory input it receives from the world. It is an attractive theory because powerful theoretical arguments support it, and yet it is at heart stunningly simple. Jakob Hohwy explains and explores this theory from the perspective of cognitive science and philosophy. The key argument throughout The Predictive Mind is that the mechanism explains the rich, deep, and multifaceted character of our conscious perception. It also gives a unified account of how perception is sculpted by attention, and how it depends on action. The mind is revealed as having a fragile and indirect relation to the world. Though we are deeply in tune with the world we are also strangely distanced from it. The first part of the book sets out how the theory enables rich, layered perception. The theory's probabilistic and statistical foundations are explained using examples from empirical research and analogies to different forms of inference. The second part uses the simple mechanism in an explanation of problematic cases of how we manage to represent, and sometimes misrepresent, the world in health as well as in mental illness. The third part looks into the mind, and shows how the theory accounts for attention, conscious unity, introspection, self and the privacy of our mental world.