Financial Gatekeepers

Developed country capital markets have devised a set of institutions and actors to help provide investors with timely and accurate information they need to make informed investment decisions. These actors have become known as "financial gatekeepers" and include auditors, financial analysts, and credit rating agencies. Corporate financial reporting scandals in the United States and elsewhere in recent years, however, have called into question the sufficiency of the legal framework governing these gatekeepers. Policymakers have since responded by imposing a series of new obligations, restrictions, and punishments—all with the purpose of strengthening investor confidence in these important actors. F inancial Gatekeepers provides an in-depth look at these new frameworks, especially in the United States and Japan. How have they worked? Are further refinements appropriate? These are among the questions addressed in this timely and important volume. Contributors include Leslie Boni (University of New Mexico), Barry Bosworth (Brookings Institution), Tomoo Inoue (Seikei University), Zoe-Vonna Palmrose (University of Southern California), Frank Partnoy (University of San Diego School of Law), George Perry (Brookings Institution), Justin Pettit (UBS), Paul Stevens (Investment Company Institute), Peter Wallison (American Enterprise Institute)

Central banks can shape economic growth, affect income distribution, influence a country's foreign relations, and determine the extent of its democracy. While there is considerable literature on the political economy of central banking in OECD countries, this is the first book-length study focused on central banking in emerging market countries. Surveying the dramatic worldwide trend toward increased central bank independence in the 1990s, the book argues that global forces must be at work. These forces, the book contends, center on the character of international financial intermediation. Going beyond an explanation of central bank independence, Sylvia Maxfield posits a general framework for analyzing the impact of different types of international capital flows on the politics of economic policymaking in developing countries. The book suggests that central bank independence in emerging market countries does not spring from law but rather from politics. As long as politicians value them, central banks will enjoy independence. Central banks are most likely to be independent in developing countries when politicians desire international creditworthiness. Historical analyses of central banks in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand, and quantitative analyses of a larger sample of developing countries corroborate this investor signaling explanation of broad trends in central bank status.

Beyond the Gatekeeper State explores the dynamic changes occurring within and between African states, and the international system since the turn of the century. Frederick Cooper’s model of ‘gatekeeper states’ – shaped as much by their international links as by their domestic practices – provides the basis for the contributors’ thinking about international relations in Africa and the wider international system. The chapters explore the political implications of Africa’s new relations with the old super-powers, former colonial powers, and the emerging powers from the South. These new relationships reflect and affect changing technology, infrastructure, and resource flows within and between African states. Drawing on both rich empirical cases and theoretical approaches, the book interrogates the implications of these changes on how we think about states and state systems. Exploring the impact of changing technology, finance, and resources on African politics, Beyond the Gatekeeper State will be of great interest to scholars of African Politics and International Relations (IR), as well as African Studies, IR, and the politics of the Global South more broadly. This book was originally published as a special issue of Third World Thematics.

Central banks can shape economic growth, affect income distribution, influence a country's foreign relations, and determine the extent of its democracy. While there is considerable literature on the political economy of central banking in OECD countries, this is the first book-length study focused on central banking in emerging market countries. Surveying the dramatic worldwide trend toward increased central bank independence in the 1990s, the book argues that global forces must be at work. These forces, the book contends, center on the character of international financial intermediation. Going beyond an explanation of central bank independence, Sylvia Maxfield posits a general framework for analyzing the impact of different types of international capital flows on the politics of economic policymaking in developing countries. The book suggests that central bank independence in emerging market countries does not spring from law but rather from politics. As long as politicians value them, central banks will enjoy independence. Central banks are most likely to be independent in developing countries when politicians desire international creditworthiness. Historical analyses of central banks in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand, and quantitative analyses of a larger sample of developing countries corroborate this investor signaling explanation of broad trends in central bank status.

In the wake of a series of corporate governance disasters in the US and Europe which have gained almost mythic status - Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, HealthSouth, Parmalat - one question has not yet been addressed. A number of 'gatekeeping' professions - auditors, attorneys, securities analysts, credit-rating agencies - exist to guard against these governance failures. Yet clearly these watchdogs did not bark while corporations were looted and destroyed. But why not? To answer these questions, a more detailed investigation is necessary that moves beyond journalism and easy scapegoating, and examines the evolution, responsibilities, and standards of these professions. John C. Coffee Jr, world-renowned Professor of Corporate Law, examines how these gatekeeping professions developed, to what degree they failed, and what reforms are feasible. Above all, this book examines the institutional changes and pressures that caused gatekeepers to underperform or neglect their responsibilities, and focuses on those feasible changes that can restore gatekeepers as the loyal agents of investors. This informed and readable view of the players on the contemporary business stage will be essential reading for investors, professionals, executives and business academics concerned with issues of good governance.

This case challenges students’ ability to justify difficult accounting choices and subsequently consider the ramifications of those choices. We provide two different scenarios that examine the responsibilities, incentives, and issues faced by accountants—the gatekeepers in many reporting environments. The first scenario is a familiar academic reporting task in which students assess group performance and allocate points to members. The second is a similar task within the segment reporting environment in which costs are allocated to the reporting units. A summary exercise then requires students to link these scenarios. The open-ended nature of the case allows its use in multiple courses and at various levels of accounting education. Ultimately, the case will encourage students to behave more like managers, make tough choices where guidelines are vague, and assess the consequences of their actions.

The financial system and its regulation have undergone exponential growth and dramatic reform over the last thirty years. This period has witnessed major developments in the nature and intensity of financial markets, as well as repeated cycles of regulatory reform and development, often linked to crisis conditions. The recent financial crisis has led to unparalleled interest in financial regulation from policymakers, economists, legal practitioners, and the academic community, and has prompted large-scale regulatory reform. The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation is the first comprehensive, authoritative, and state of the art account of the nature of financial regulation. Written by an international team of leading scholars in the field, it takes a contextual and comparative approach to examine scholarly, policy, and regulatory developments in the past three decades. The first three parts of the Handbook address the underpinning horizontal themes which arise in financial regulation: financial systems and regulation; the organization of financial system regulation, including regional examples from the EU and the US; and the delivery of outcomes and regulatory techniques. The final three Parts address the perennial objectives of financial regulation, widely regarded as the anchors of financial regulation internationally: financial stability, market efficiency, integrity, and transparency; and consumer protection. The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation is an invaluable resource for scholars and students of financial regulation, economists, policy-makers and regulators.

"The first in-depth, behind-the-scenes look at the White House Chiefs of Staff, whose actions--and inactions--have defined the course of our country. Since George Washington, presidents have depended on the advice of key confidants. But it wasn't until the twentieth century that the White House chief of staff became the second most powerful job in government. Unelected and unconfirmed, the chief serves at the whim of the president, hired and fired by him alone. He is the president's closest adviser and the person he depends on to execute his agenda. He decides who gets to see the president, negotiates with Congress, and--most crucially--enjoys unparalleled access to the leader of the free world. When the president makes a life-and-death decision, often the chief of staff is the only other person in the room. Each chief can make or break an administration, and each president reveals himself by the chief he picks. Through extensive, intimate interviews with all seventeen living chiefs and two former presidents, award-winning journalist and producer Chris Whipple pulls back the curtain on this unique fraternity, whose members have included Rahm Emanuel, Dick Cheney, Leon Panetta, and Donald Rumsfeld. In doing so, he revises our understanding of presidential history, showing us how James Baker and Panetta skillfully managed the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, ensuring their reelections--and, conversely, how Jimmy Carter never understood the importance of a chief, crippling his ability to govern. From Watergate to Iran-Contra to the Monica Lewinsky scandal to the Iraq War, Whipple shows us how the chief of staff can make the difference between success and disaster. As an outsider president tries to govern after a bitterly divisive election, The Gatekeepers could not be more timely. Filled with shrewd analysis and never-before-reported details, it is a compelling history that changes our perspective on the presidency."--Jacket flap.