Fiscal Federalism In Switzerland

Its highly fragmented structure of local governments and serious horizontal fiscal imbalances make Switzerland a surprisingly powerful model for Eastern European countries that are currently facing the challenge of fiscal decentralization. In spite of the substantial differences in the tradition and current practice of intergovernmental fiscal relations, transition economies may learn valuable lessons from the Swiss case in the fields of direct democracy, horizontal cooperation, expenditure and revenue assignment, and fiscal discipline. Among other conclusions, the authors suggest that subnational authorities can effectively fend off recentralization attempts of the central government if they engage in spontaneous cooperation to enhance the efficiency of public service provision. Together with an adequate fiscal equalization scheme, interjurisdictional cooperation also permits the reconciliation of the objective of an increasing devolution of powers with the existing regional disparities. The authors also show that the principle of subsidiarity can best be safeguarded by anchoring the expenditure and revenue powers of subnational governments in the constitution or in a similarly strong law. With regard to fiscal discipline, the combination of a "golden rule" with direct democratic instruments of budget control is proven to be successful in enhancing the accountability of local politicians toward their constituencies.

Its highly fragmented structure of local governments and serious horizontal fiscal imbalances make Switzerland a surprisingly powerful model for Eastern European countries that are currently facing the challenge of fiscal decentralization. In spite of the substantial differences in the tradition and current practice of intergovernmental fiscal relations, transition economies may learn valuable lessons from the Swiss case in the fields of direct democracy, horizontal cooperation, expenditure and revenue assignment, and fiscal discipline. Among other conclusions, the authors suggest that subnational authorities can effectively fend off recentralization attempts of the central government if they engage in spontaneous cooperation to enhance the efficiency of public service provision. Together with an adequate fiscal equalization scheme, interjurisdictional cooperation also permits the reconciliation of the objective of an increasing devolution of powers with the existing regional disparities. The authors also show that the principle of subsidiarity can best be safeguarded by anchoring the expenditure and revenue powers of subnational governments in the constitution or in a similarly strong law. With regard to fiscal discipline, the combination of a "golden rule" with direct democratic instruments of budget control is proven to be successful in enhancing the accountability of local politicians toward their constituencies.

This title offers readers an insight into one of the most sophisticated constitutional and political systems of the world. Very little has been written in English on the differenent levels of government.

Swiss citizens approve of their government and the way democracy is practiced; they trust the authorities and are satisfied with the range of services Swiss governments provide. This is quite unusual when compared to other countries. This open access book provides insight into the organization and the functioning of the Swiss state. It claims that, beyond politics, institutions and public administration, there are other factors which make a country successful. The authors argue that Switzerland is an interesting case, from a theoretical, scientific and a more practice-oriented perspective. While confronted with the same challenges as other countries, Switzerland offers different solutions, some of which work astonishingly well.

Contributors provide a fascinating account of how federal countries are confronting the traditional challenges of conflicts over division of fiscal powers while also coping with emerging challenges of globalization and citizen empowerment arising from the information revolution. They analyze how relationships and roles in different orders of government are being reshaped and show how local solutions inspired by global principles help strengthen government accountability and improve the quality of life for citizens.

This book describes and examines reforms of fiscal federalism and local government in 10 OECD countries implemented over the past decade.

The global financial crisis had a dramatic short-term effect on federal relations and, as the twelve case studies in this illuminating book show, set in place a new set of socio-political factors that are shaping the longer-run process of institutional change in federal systems. The Future of Federalism illustrates how an understanding of these complex dynamics is crucial to the development of policies needed for effective and sustainable federal governance in the 21st century. The book finds that growing fiscal pressures are interacting with domestic political variables to produce country specific federal dynamics. Arguably the first detailed study of the medium term impact of the financial crisis and its aftermath on federal governance, this volume highlights how growing budget pressures are contributing to increased centralisation in many federations, while in others national governments are devolving power to appease regional grievances and preserve the federal union. Contributions from leading federalism and public finance scholars test recent theoretical explanations of change in federal systems against the experiences of a diverse cross-section of federal jurisdictions. The case studies include both established federations and 'federalizing' jurisdictions, such as the UK and China, and highlights the complex dynamics which shape the evolution of federal governance Comprehensive and interdisciplinary, this timely book will appeal to students and scholars - from political science, economics and law - studying federalism, governance studies and comparative political economy. It is essential reading for public officials and policy makers interested in intergovernmental relations, public finance and budgeting and tax policy. Contributors include: J.R. Afonso, D.M. Brown, C. Colino, T.J. Conlan, L. de Mello, E. del Pino, R. Eccleston, R. Hortle, R. Jha, R. Krever, S. Lee, R. Mabugu, E. Massetti, P. Mellor, J. Schnellenbach, N. Soguel, C. Wong