Fiscal Rules To Tame The Political Budget Cycle

The paper provides evidence that fiscal rules can limit the political budget cycle. It focuses on the application of the Italian fiscal rule at the sub-national level over the period 2004-2006 and shows that: 1) municipalities are subject to political budget cycles in capital spending; 2) the Italian subnational fiscal rule introduced in 1999 has been enforced by the central government; 3) municipalities subject to the fiscal rule show more limited political budget cycles than municipalities not subject to the rule. In order to identify the effect, we rely on the fact that the domestic fiscal rule does not apply to municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. We find that the political budget cycle increases real capital spending by about 35 percent on average in the years prior to municipal elections and that the sub-national fiscal rule reduces these figures by about two thirds.

Two main themes of the book are that (1) politics can distort optimal fiscal policy through elections and through political fragmentation, and (2) rules and institutions can attenuate the negative effects of this dynamic. The book has three parts: part 1 (9 chapters) outlines the problems; part 2 (6 chapters) outlines how institutions and fiscal rules can offer solutions; and part 3 (4 chapters) discusses how multilevel governance frameworks can help.

This paper estimates the causal effect of fiscal rules on political budget cycles in a sample of 67 developing countries over the period 1985–2007. We exploit the geographical pattern in the adoption of fiscal rules to isolate an exogenous source of variation in the adoption of national fiscal rules. Based on a diffusion argument, we use the number of other countries in a given subregion that have fiscal rules in place to predict the probability of having them at the country level. We find that in election years with fiscal rules in place, public consumption is reduced by 1.6 percentage point of GDP as compared to election years without these rules. This impact is equivalent to a reduction by a third of the volatility of public consumption in our sample. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these rules depends on their type, their institutional design, whether they have been in place for a long time and finally on the degree of competitiveness of elections.

Recognising the regained importance of fiscal policy over the last two decades, this timely book provides much-needed insight into the changing practice of fiscal policy and how it is adapting to the unpredictable nature of the 21st century. Expert academic and practitioner contributors consider the resources which underpin current fiscal policy, assessing its overall effectiveness before outlining the changing priorities –ageing, inequality, climate change- and the financial tools available, and considering the future of fiscal policy in uncertain times.

This volume presents new methods and applications in longitudinal data estimation methodology in applied economic. Featuring selected papers from the 2020 the International Conference on Applied Economics (ICOAE 2020) held virtually due to the corona virus pandemic, this book examines interdisciplinary topics such as financial economics, international economics, agricultural economics, marketing and management. Country specific case studies are also featured.

This paper discusses how politics affects policies on the fiscal front. The literature on the political economy of fiscal policy dates back to the nineteenth century when the Italian and Swedish schools of public finance began to analyze how governments choose policies. During the twentieth century, the Public Choice school continued this work and focused on the political incentives and constraints in policy formulation. Elections mainly affect the stabilization and redistribution functions of the government. Proximity of elections can influence the government’s budget decisions in various ways. Ideology heavily influences fiscal policies that pertain to redistribution. Leftwing parties draw their support from workers and the middle- and low-income segments of the population. Thus, they pay particular attention to income inequality, redistribution, social benefits, and interventionist supply-side policies in the form of public provision of human and physical capital. Although the cabinet’s ideology is an important predictor of fiscal policy, it does not always play the same role, especially when the government’s credibility is at stake and they need to reassure financial markets.

Fiscal rule frameworks have evolved significantly in response to the global financial crisis. Many countries have reformed their fiscal rules or introduced new ones with a view to enhancing the credibility of fiscal policy and providing a medium-term anchor. Enforcement and monitoring mechanisms have also been upgraded. However, these innovations have made the systems of rules more complicated to operate, while compliance has not improved. The SDN takes stock of past experiences, reviews recent reforms, and presents new research on the effectiveness of rules. It also proposes guiding principles for future reforms to strike a better balance between simplicity, flexibility, and enforceability. Read the blog

Classical Economics, Keynes and Money casts new light on an approach to economic theory and policy that combines the modern classical theory of prices and income distribution with a Keynesian analysis of money and finance. Structured in four parts, the work considers issues within classical economics, monetary economics, Keynesian and post-Keynesian Economics, rationality and economic methodology. These themes are all central to the work of Carlo Panico, and the chapters both reflect on and build on his key contributions to the field. This collection is of interest to advanced students and researchers in the history of economic thought, monetary theory, financial economics and heterodox economics.