Forms Of Dictatorship

Forms of Dictatorship examines novels that depict the historical reality of dictatorship and exploit dictatorship as a literary trope.

Explains how dictatorships rise, survive, and fall, along with why some but not all dictators wield vast powers.

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Discusses what a dictatorship is, how it differs from a military dictatorship, and the history of this form of government and introduces current and past dictators.

Dictatorship is a form of government in which an individual or a small group wields power without legal or constitutional constraints. Dictators come in many varieties. Some are military officers who overthrow an elected government. Others are democratically elected politicians who, once in office, decide to discard democracy. Some dictators use power to transform society. Others expressly try to prevent social or political change. Still others don't appear to be motivated by any ideology, whether liberal or conservative. Instead, they use power simply to enrich themselves or bolster their egos. This book examines the diverse forms of dictatorship. It is filled with interesting and instructive case histories.

Dictatorship in South America explores the experiences of Brazilian, Argentine and Chilean experience under military rule. Presents a single-volume thematic study that explores experiences with dictatorship as well as their social and historical contexts in Latin America Examines at the ideological and economic crossroads that brought Argentina, Brazil and Chile under the thrall of military dictatorship Draws on recent historiographical currents from Latin America to read these regimes as radically ideological and inherently unstable Makes a close reading of the economic trajectory from dependency to development and democratization and neoliberal reform in language that is accessible to general readers Offers a lively and readable narrative that brings popular perspectives to bear on national histories Selected as a 2014 Outstanding Academic Title by CHOICE

This book addresses the question of why governments sometimes follow the law and other times choose to evade the law. The traditional answer of jurists has been that laws have an autonomous causal efficacy: law rules when actions follow anterior norms; the relation between laws and actions is one of obedience, obligation, or compliance. Contrary to this conception, the authors defend a positive interpretation where the rule of law results from the strategic choices of relevant actors. Rule of law is just one possible outcome in which political actors process their conflicts using whatever resources they can muster: only when these actors seek to resolve their conflicts by recourse to la, does law rule. What distinguishes 'rule-of-law' as an institutional equilibrium from 'rule-by-law' is the distribution of power. The former emerges when no one group is strong enough to dominate the others and when the many use institutions to promote their interest.