French Foreign L Gionnaire Vs Viet Minh Insurgent

The French Indochina War (1946–54) was the largest of the first generation of post-World War II wars of decolonization as Vietminh insurgents sought to topple their French colonial masters. It was also unique in that the insurgency evolved from low-level guerrilla activity to mobile operations by a large conventional army which finally defeated a large European-led expeditionary force, supported by artillery, armour and airpower. The war's progress was almost entirely dictated by the extreme terrain, and by the Chinese support enjoyed by the Vietnamese insurgents. The actions explored in this study cover three contrasting phases of the war in Tonkin during 1948–52, setting both sides on the path that would lead to the conflict's climactic encounter at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Featuring specially commissioned artwork and drawing upon a range of sources, this meticulously researched study casts new light on the troops who fought on both sides in this evolving and momentous conflict.

The French Indochina War (1946–54) was the largest of the first generation of post-World War II wars of decolonization as Vietminh insurgents sought to topple their French colonial masters. It was also unique in that the insurgency evolved from low-level guerrilla activity to mobile operations by a large conventional army which finally defeated a large European-led expeditionary force, supported by artillery, armour and airpower. The war's progress was almost entirely dictated by the extreme terrain, and by the Chinese support enjoyed by the Vietnamese insurgents. The actions explored in this study cover three contrasting phases of the war in Tonkin during 1948–52, setting both sides on the path that would lead to the conflict's climactic encounter at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Featuring specially commissioned artwork and drawing upon a range of sources, this meticulously researched study casts new light on the troops who fought on both sides in this evolving and momentous conflict.

A forensic study of Vietnam's war, imperial history and international relations in the years following the Second World War. A forensic study of war, imperial history and international relations, following the Second World War and leading into the Cold War and defeat of Western imperialism in Asia. And above all, the story of the pivotal battle and French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. It shows France's revanchist attempt to regain imperial 'glory' in her former Asian empire following humiliation in the Second World War - defeat and Vichy. The effort was spurred by de Galle's chauvinism and desire to recover France’s honour and reputation, after so many humiliations by friend and foe. The Communist led Vietminh, were guided to victory by ruthless revolutionary Ho Chi Min - far from the attractive 'Uncle Ho' who is revered as a communist saint in contrast to louche playboy emperor Bao Dai – and the very able General Giap. Communist strength in rural Vietnam society - the Vietminh represented a nation in arms – was backed by supplies from Communist China and the Soviet Union. It was an existential struggle on the French side - the end of cafe society, and the gravy train for planters, officials, the military, and politicians. Military matters including General Giap’s strategy and tactics are analyzed in detail, but it was a 'soldiers' war', told at ground-level, and readers will feel the heat and fear of battle, be shocked at war crimes, and intrigued by the tales of Graham Greene et al. The global importance was not lost on the powers following exhaustion from world war and in the shadow of the Cold War. All great leaders were involved, Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Churchill, Stalin, Khruschev, Chou En-Lai and Mao Zedong, Under the shadow of the A bomb, a negotiated peace and first detent of the Cold War would end in the sumptuous salons of Geneva.

A highly illustrated study of the battle at Dien Bien Phu, the 56-day siege that eventually led to the surrender of the remaining French-led forces, this iconic battle provided the climax of the First Indochina War. In late 1953, the seventh year of France's war against the Viet Minh insurgency in its colony of Vietnam, the C-in-C, General Navarre, was encouraged to plant an 'air-ground base' in the Thai Highlands at Dien Bien Phu, to distract General Giap's Vietnamese People's Army from both Annam and the French northern heartland in the Red River Delta, and to protect the Laotian border. Elite French paratroopers captured Dien Bien Phu, which was reinforced between December 1953 and February 1954 with infantry and artillery, a squadron of tanks and one of fighter-bombers, to a strength of 10,000 men. Giap and the VPA General Staff accepted the challenge of a major positional battle; through a total mobilization of national resources, and with Chinese logistical help, they assembled a siege army of 58,000 regular troops, equipped for the first time with 105mm artillery and 37mm AA guns. Here, author Martin Windrow describes how from their first assaults on 13 March 1954, the battle quickly developed into a dramatic 56-day 'Stalingrad in the jungle' that drew the attention of the world.

Prior to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the French Foreign Legion defended the Indochinese Union from 1883 through 1945 from frequent armed attacks launched from outside its borders as well as bloody inside uprisings. At that time, the Union consisted of Tonkin, Annam, Laos, Cambodia, and Cochin-China. Michael Kaponya shares his memoirs as a French Foreign Legionnaire who served in the infantry and participated in battles and countless skirmishes between 1949 and 1952 in Indochina. The French Foreign Legion and Indochina in Retrospect also outlines the politics that led America into the twentieth century wars in South-East Asia and provides readers with a greater understanding of the aftermath of the French presence and ensuing U.S. involvement. The French Foreign Legion and Indochina in Retrospect addresses an overview of the French Foreign Legion, since its foundation in 1831, that fought with Honneur et Fidelite countless battles, up to 1962, in Algeria, Spain, Morocco, Russia, Italy, Mexico, France, China, Dahomey (Benin), Soudan, Madagascar, Serbia, Syria, Tunisia, Norway, Egypt, Libya, Germany, and Indochina. It also unveils the spirit of the legionnaires, originating from many countries and inseparably unites under the French flag with the Latin motto Legio Patria Nostra (the Legion is our fatherland). This fascinating memoir details Michael's experiences during and post-World War II in Europe, which led him to join the French Foreign Legion. Gain a greater understanding of the Legion and its roles in crucial conflicts from this first-hand account.

In its revised and updated fourth edition, this exhaustive encyclopedia provides a record of casualties of war from the last five centuries through 2015, with new statistical and analytical information. Figures include casualties from global terrorism, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the fight against the Islamic State. New entries cover an additional 20 armed conflicts between 1492 and 2007 not included in previous editions. Arranged roughly by century and subdivided by world region, chronological entries include the name and dates of the conflict, precursor events, strategies and details, the outcome and its aftermath.

In his analysis of insurgency war, Donald Hamilton first attempts to provide insight into a strategic concept he believes is little understood today, and to explain its complicated relationship to American policy failures in Southeast Asia during the post-1945 era of containment. The study develops a working model of insurgency, explaining it as both a unique method and type of war-making. Significant findings include the inability of policymakers to perceive a potential insurgency in Vietnam as early as 1946, subsequent American involvement in not one, but three Asian insurgencies during the 1950s, and the ultimate failure of the U.S. military to meet the insurgency challenge in South Vietnam. This inability to eliminate the insurgency led not only to the complete breakdown of the South Vietnamese government, but was the primary reason why further U.S. military action after 1965 would prove ineffectual. This historical narrative also follows the involvement of several key players, including the personalities of Edward Lansdale, Sir Robert Thompson, Archimedes Patti, and Vo Nguyen Giap, who through their life experiences and writings, provide a keen profundity into why insurgencies occur, why they fail, and why they succeed.

Between 1954 and 1963, President Ngo Dinh Diem, against great odds but with U.S. assistance, built a functioning South Vietnamese state. But gravely misled by American journalists in Saigon, the U.S. embassy, in league with second-tier members of the State Department, urged certain South Vietnamese generals to stage a coup against Diem, resulting in his brutal murder. Despite the instability after Diem’s murder, the South Vietnamese Army performed well during the 1968 Tet Offensive and the 1972 Easter Offensive. In proportion to population, South Vietnamese Army losses were much greater than American losses. Nevertheless, the American media ignored South Vietnamese sacrifices, and completely misrepresented the consequences of the Tet Offensive. The disastrous “peace agreement” the U.S. forced on the South Vietnamese in 1973 made continuing American support vital. But Congress began to slash aid to South Vietnam, so that its soldiers had to fight on with dwindling supplies of fuel, ammunition, and medicine. Under these circumstances, the South Vietnamese attempted to regroup their army into the provinces around Saigon, an effort that ended in disaster. The final chapter reflects on the meaning of the conflict and the tragedy that abandonment by Washington and conquest by Hanoi brought upon the South Vietnamese people. An Appendix presents a strategy for preserving a South Vietnamese state with the commitment of a relatively small number of U.S. forces.